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This cumulative dissertation aims to complement existing literature with insights on two topics 
gaining strong importance in the Private Equity Industry: 1) cross-border investments and 2) co-
investments with portfolio firm management in times of uncertainty. Results in paper on cross-
border investments suggest that the physical presence of a local office of PE firms can actually 
make a difference for foreign investments. With a local office, operating performance of PE firms 
is higher after the buyouts. Local offices are especially beneficial for performance the higher the 
perceived foreignness between PE firm and portfolio firm is. In addition, PE firms increase deal 
flow after a local office opening, do less syndicates and have higher deal volumes. Respective 
results imply it is worth in future research to differentiate between pure cross-border deals and 
deals operated through a local office. The forth paper sheds light on the positive relationship 
between management buyouts (MBOs) and economic policy uncertainty. Analyses indicate that 
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1.1 TRENDS IN THE PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY 
“Private-Equity Firms Are Raising Bigger and Bigger Funds” (Gottfried, 2019) and “Private 
equity groups prepare to raise mega funds” (Espinoza, 2019) were two headlines published in 
the US and Europe by The Wall Street Journal and Financial Times on June 18, 2019. 
Consistently, industry data shows that the Private Equity (PE) industry reached an all-time peak 
of more than USD $3 trillion assets being managed by PE firms, so-called general partners 
(GPs) (Preqin, 2019). This capital gives PE firms the power to have a significant economic and 
political influence. Most of the capital is provided by institutional investors, so-called limited 
partners (LPs). They generally comprise pension and endowment funds, insurance companies, 
family offices, and high net worth individuals. The industry showed higher growth rates than 
any other asset class. Main reasons for described strong growth are continuously low interest 
rates, in parallel to a persistent strong performance of PE funds compared to other asset classes 
(Bain & Company, 2019). Business model of PE funds foresees that returns are generated 
through buying an equity stake of companies with the intention to sell the stake at a later point 
in time at a higher price. The holding period gives PE firms the chance to operationally and 
financially restructure so-called portfolio firms (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009).  
The high inflow of capital in relation to the limited number of investment opportunities for 
PE firms is causing several challenges. For example, prices for investments are increasing due 
to the competition (Bain & Company, 2019). Chances to generate value with low risk, e.g., 
through financial engineering, have been reduced as the industry matures (Gompers, Kaplan, 
& Mukharlyamov, 2016). Moreover, global political uncertainty resulting from Brexit and 
governmental changes is putting an external challenge on the PE industry 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2019). As a consequence, returns have declined in the last years and 
are approaching market returns, and fundraising of PE firms declined in 2018 compared to its 
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peak year 2017 with USD $855 million raised capital (Preqin, 2019). In this context of the 
growing competition and global uncertainty, PE firms look for new investment strategies. For 
example, PE firms have significantly increased their share of cross-border investment activity 
(Invest Europe, 2019). Furthermore, PE firms more actively look for opportunities to co-invest 
with other PE firms or management to distribute risk among partners (Bain & Company, 2019).  
1.2 OVERVIEW OF ESSAYS 
This cumulative dissertation at hand aims to complement existent literature with insights on 
those two topics gaining strong importance within described PE industry dynamics: (1) cross-
border investments and (2) co-investments with portfolio firm management in times of political 
uncertainty. The dissertation presents three essays. Two essays address the first research area 
in chapter 2 and 3. They investigate the role of local offices for PE firms’ cross-border buyouts. 
In addition, the third essay in chapter 4 focuses on the effect of policy uncertainty on the 
likelihood of PE firms to co-invest with portfolio firms’ management.  
For (1), Tykvová (2018) presents that research on cross-border investments in the PE 
industry is one of the “hot topics”. Academic literature has increased its interest in the 
international equity flows of PE firms. So far, most papers focus on a macro perspective and 
find that country characteristics such as market growth, market size, and governance rights are 
positively related to PE capital flows (Cao, Cumming, Qian, & Wang, 2015; Guler & Guillén, 
2010; Portes & Rey, 2005; Schertler & Tykvová, 2012). When analyzing the effect of 
international investors, arguments are mixed. On the one hand, literature argues that 
international investors can provide added value for growth and exit opportunities through their 
international network and experience (Cumming, Knill, & Syvrud, 2016; Devigne, Vanacker, 
Manigart, & Paeleman, 2013). On the other hand, academics highlight the disadvantages of 
distance resulting in higher transaction cost and higher information asymmetries. As a 
consequence, studies find a preference of investors for more proximate investments and 
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evidence for less successful investments with distance (e.g., Aizenman & Kendall, 2012; 
Buchner et al., 2018; Cumming & Dai, 2010; Dai, Jo, & Kassicieh, 2012; Mäkelä & Maula, 
2008). To date, multiple studies deal with syndications between domestic and foreign investors 
as well as PE firm experience as two measures to reduce the negative effects of foreignness 
(e.g., Dai & Nahata, 2016; Espenlaub, Khurshed, & Mohamed, 2014; Liu & Maula, 2016). 
Another strategy to overcome the hurdle of distance has found only limited focus in literature 
so far, which is to establish a local office in the target country (Devigne, Manigart, Vanacker, 
& Mulier, 2018). Essays which are presented in chapter 2 and 3 are an attempt to solve the 
current gap in literature. Unique feature of the analyses at hand is that they apply a novel 
definition of cross-border leveraged buyouts (LBOs). They differentiate between buyouts 
which are performed through a local office of a PE firm, and buyouts which are truly cross-
border. Therefore, I hand collect the global office locations and opening dates of more than 
1,350 PE firms. 
Chapter 2 presents results on the operating performance of cross-border PE buyouts. The 
study is based on an analysis covering 245 cross-border buyouts. It finds support that cross-
border deals operated through a local office show a superior change in profitability compared 
to cross-border buyouts without office. This finding is consistent with the argument that local 
offices provide benefits, i.e., reduce frictions of distance in cross-border buyouts. Exemplary 
benefits of a local office are a better access to local information, more frequent in-person 
interactions, and higher trust between owner and management (Devigne, Manigart, & Wright, 
2016; Meuleman, Jääskeläinen, Maula, & Wright, 2017; Pruthi, Wright, & Meyer, 2009). 
Furthermore, the study indicates that the positive effect of local offices increases when expected 
uncertainty is higher, e.g., when distance to the portfolio firm is higher.  
The essay is related to literature on the implications of PE firms on the operating 
performance of portfolio firms (e.g., Bonini, 2015; Boucly, Sraer, & Thesmar, 2011; Kaplan, 
1989). Moreover, it adds to the academic discussion on measures to overcome disadvantages 
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of distance in cross-border PE/Venture Capital (VC) buyouts (Buchner et al., 2018; 
Chemmanur, Hull, & Krishnan, 2018; Dai, Jo, & Kassicieh, 2012; Dai & Nahata, 2016; 
Espenlaub et al., 2014; Mäkelä & Maula, 2008; Meuleman et al., 2017; Meuleman & Wright, 
2011; Nahata, Hazarika, & Tandon, 2014; Tykvová & Schertler, 2014). In particular, it aims to 
fill the gap on the role local offices for PE firms’ cross-border buyouts (Devigne et al., 2016, 
2018). Respective results imply that it is worth to differentiate in future research on 
performance of cross-border buyouts between office and pure cross-border buyouts. 
The essay in chapter 3 analyzes the effect of a local office on PE firms’ international deal 
activity and characteristics of cross-border buyouts. The underlying line of argument is that 
with the proximity of a local office, chances and risk perception for PE firms in foreign markets 
changes (e.g., Devigne et al., 2013; Johanson & Vahlne, 2006; Pruthi et al., 2009). As a 
consequence, PE firms will likely increase commitment in markets with local office and are 
willing to take greater risks. Consistently, the study finds significantly higher deal activity of 
PE firms after the opening of a local office. Deal activity most strongly increases in the year 
the local office is opened. Furthermore, analyses reveal that the likelihood to syndicate with a 
partner is lower, and deal size is higher after the opening of a local office. This essay at hand 
stands out compared to other studies analyzing cross-border investment activity of PE firms in 
three ways: Firstly, the study uses a broad sample of 385 PE sponsors with 6,357 cross-border 
LBOs in the observation period from 1997 to 2016. Thereby, it exceeds current academic 
studies in sample size (Cao et al., 2015; Chemmanur, et al., 2018; Holloway et al., 2016). 
Secondly, the sample comprises 589 office openings, which is hand collected data from website 
research as well as direct contact with PE professionals. And thirdly, in contrast to most prior 
studies (e.g., Mingo, Morales, & Dau, 2018), this study investigates individual PE firm behavior 




This paper is most related to the literature on the international investment behavior of PE/VC 
firms (e.g., Cumming & Dai, 2010; Cao et al., 2015; Chemmanur et al., 2018; Groh, 2017; 
Hain, Johan, & Wang, 2016; Meuleman & Wright, 2011; Portes & Rey, 2005; Tykvová, & 
Schertler, 2011). Moreover, it complements the literature on measures to mitigate 
disadvantages of distance in cross-border LBOs beyond syndicates with local partners and 
experience (e.g., Holloway et al, 2016; Li, Vertinsky, Li; 2014; Mingo et al., 2018; Tykvová, 
& Schertler, 2014). Similar to the study presented in chapter 2, it adds to the literature on the 
role of local offices for PE firm’s internationalization behavior. Results highlight that the 
opening of a local office is a decisive event for PE firms’ international activity. 
For (2), the essay in chapter 4 sheds further light on the effect of policy uncertainty on the 
likelihood of PE-backed management buyouts (MBOs). The study classifies management 
buyouts as LBOs at which the management of the portfolio firm takes over the majority of 
firms’ equity and a PE firm co-invests as minority shareholder. Respective topic is of high 
current practical and academic for at least two reasons. Firstly, according to a CEO survey by 
PwC in 2019, uncertainty in policies is perceived as one of the highest threats for managers and 
also affects investment cycles of PE firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2019). Secondly, in the 
light of higher competition, PE firms look for new investment strategies such as co-investments 
and minority investments (Bain & Company, 2019). Starting point for the analysis at hand is 
an investment puzzle. While standard investment theory as well as literature on policy 
uncertainty argues that the investment level tends to fall in uncertain times (e.g., Baker, Bloom, 
& Davis, 2016), as investors prefer to wait, empirical research finds an increase in management 
buyouts in more volatile phases (Cao, Coy, & Nguyen, 2016; Harford, Stanfield, & Zhang, 
2019).  
The following analyses investigate respective puzzle using a sample of 18,225 LBOs across 
52 countries, of which 2,332 buyouts are MBOs. The study provides robust results that the 
likelihood of MBOs significantly increases with local policy uncertainty. The study contributes 
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to literature by deeper analyzing the channel for respective development. Analyses indicate that 
policy uncertainty is increasing the demand for access to private information. Consequently, 
higher MBO likelihood in more uncertain times can be at least partially explained by the better 
access to information of managers. In sum, these empirical findings are consistent with the 
assumption that access to information is a key driver for management buyouts.  
Those results contribute to the growing literature on effects of policy uncertainty. While a 
first wave of policy uncertainty literature focused on the effect on macro-economic 
developments (e.g., Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims; Bloom, 2009; Bloom, Bond, & van Reenen, 
2007; Baker et al., 2016), this research complements studies to better understand the individual 
firm exposure to policy uncertainty (e.g., Gulen & Ion, 2016; Kang et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
this analysis adds insights on determinants of MBOs in relation to other types of PE-backed 
buyouts. Most studies in respective field focus on the effect of portfolio firm characteristics on 
MBO propensity (e.g., Aslan & Kumar, 2011; Bharath & Dittmar, 2010; DeAngelo & 
DeAngelo, 1987; Fidrmuc, Palandri, Roosenboom, & van Dijk, 2013). This study, which is 
presented in chapter 4, is the first large-scale investigation of international LBOs that links the 
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Acquisitions, by nature, are risky and complex. Acquiring a firm in a different country adds 
layers of complexity even for sophisticated investors such as PE funds (Cao, Cumming, Qian, 
& Wang, 2015). Because of the informational disadvantages of being a foreign acquirer, there 
is a hidden information problem ex ante, possibly leading to adverse selection. There is also a 
hidden action problem ex post, because monitoring is more difficult when the acquirer is remote 
or when there are communication barriers due to different languages or cultural backgrounds 
(Dai, Jo, & Kassicieh, 2012). Zaheer (1995) terms these disadvantages the “liability of 
foreignness.”  
Prior literature suggests that the hazards of a cross-border transaction come with higher 
expected returns and additional opportunities for value creation. For example, firms that are 
acquired by an international investor have a higher probability of exiting via an initial public 
offering (IPO) (Cumming, Knill, & Syvrud, 2016), achieving higher IPO proceeds (Cumming 
et al., 2016), exiting via a trade sale (Bertoni & Groh, 2014), and listing on a foreign exchange 
using a top lawyer, banker, or accountant (Humphery-Jenner & Suchard, 2013a). Against the 
background of these benefits, it is not surprising that the PE industry has seen a growing share 
of cross-border buyouts in recent years (Invest Europe, 2019). 
Given the risks and rewards of cross-border buyouts, the literature has long investigated how 
PE investors can reduce their liability of foreignness. The evidence is consistent with two 
success determinants: syndication with local partners (e.g., Dai et al., 2012; Dai & Nahata, 
2016; Devigne, Vanacker, Manigart, & Paeleman, 2013; Humphery-Jenner & Suchard, 2013b; 
Nahata, 2016), and experiential learning (Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgard, & Sharma., 1997; 
Groh, 2017; Liu & Maula, 2016; Meuleman & Wright, 2011). Both options, however, are 
associated with significant transaction costs. When syndicating with local partners, PE firms 
face greater complexity due to coordination efforts, and are exposed to information brokerage 
and free rider risk (Dai & Nahata, 2016). To gain experiential knowledge, PE firms must be 
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willing to initially handle information asymmetries and high uncertainty, which often leads to 
inferior performance of early deals (Groh, 2017).  
Another way to reduce the inherent hazards of cross-border buyouts is to establish a local 
office in the portfolio firm’s country (Devigne, Manigart, & Wright, 2016). Having employees 
who are physically located within a target country can provide crucial benefits, such as access 
to local networks and better information flow about prospective targets and local politics. Local 
employees may also offer a deeper understanding of the culture (Cumming & Dai 2010; Dai et 
al., 2012). Surprisingly, there is no extant literature on the effects of such local offices on the 
performance of portfolio firms. 
We predict that the presence of a local office will have two key effects on the firm being 
acquired. First, ceteris paribus, it will improve the operating performance of the (acquired) 
company compared to a “pure” cross-border buyout without a local presence. Local offices can 
offer cheaper, faster, and more effective screening ex ante, as well as improved on-site support 
and monitoring ex post (Devigne et al., 2016; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Pruthi, Wright, & 
Meyer, 2009). This can be particularly helpful in the PE sector, where investors rely on context-
specific knowledge and governance improvements (Cumming, Schmidt, & Walz, 2010). 
Second, we expect that the degree to which local offices improve outcomes depends on the 
severity of the perceived liability of foreignness. Prior literature suggests that uncertainty in 
cross-border deals increases with 1) higher geographic and/or cultural distance, 2) weaker 
economic ties between the respective home countries, and 3) higher economic policy 
uncertainty (EPU) in the target’s home country. 
For (1), there is evidence that transaction costs increase with growing distance due to, e.g., 
greater difficulty with interactions and norms and values (e.g., Chemmanur, Hull, & Krishnan, 
2018; Nahata, Hazarika, & Tandon, 2014; Portes & Rey, 2005). Local offices can mitigate these 
costs, as well as any associated uncertainty, by internalizing market knowledge (Agarwal & 
Hauswald, 2010; Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997) or by staffing local experts (Pruthi et al., 2009) 
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For (2), prior research indicates that stronger economic ties between two countries facilitate 
access to existing business networks (Francis, Hasan, Sun, & Waisman, 2014; Tykvová & 
Schertler, 2011). Similarly, weaker country ties likely increase uncertainty.  
Finally, for (3), international investors facing high EPU likely have less access to private 
information about future policy decisions compared to locally embedded investors (Kang & 
Kim, 2010). Uncertainty about governmental policies can cause rational actors to reduce 
investments because it increases the real option value of waiting (Gulen & Ion, 2016; Kang, 
Lee, & Ratti, 2014). Thus, growth in assets and employment tend to fall significantly during 
periods of external uncertainty shocks (Baker, Bloom, & Davis, 2016; Bloom, Bond, & van 
Reenen, 2007). This problem is likely to be amplified in a PE context due to the opaque and 
illiquid nature of such investments (Johan, Knill, & Mauck, 2013).  
To test these hypotheses, we use a sample of 245 cross-border PE deals and 1,225 firm-year 
observations from 23 countries. We hand collect information about global office locations and 
opening dates for 82 PE firms in order to differentiate between deals where the PE acquirer has 
a local office in the PE country (so called “office deals”), and where it does not (“pure cross-
border deals”).  
Using fixed effects panel regressions, we find that the portfolio firm’s change in return on 
sales (RoS) over the three years after the buyout is significantly higher (+1.8 percentage points) 
if the deal is operated through a local office than if it is a pure cross-border deal. The effect of 
a local office is both economically and statistically stronger than the success determinants of 
cross-border buyouts discussed in the literature, i.e., local syndication, PE sponsor’s 
international experience, and PE sponsor’s country-specific experience. The effect is 
furthermore robust across different levels of the sponsor’s international experience, using 
Return on Assets (RoA) rather than RoS, and other alternate specifications. 
Next, we find that profitability improvements in local office deals tend to be stronger with 
greater distance, and weaker with economic ties between the respective home countries. For 
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example, a 1-standard deviation decrease in bilateral trade share results in a 0.9% (percentage 
point) reduction in RoS in a pure cross-border buyout; when the deal is operated through a local 
office, it results in a 1.2% increase. Furthermore, we find that office deals mitigate the negative 
effect of EPU on employment, total asset, sales, and EBITDA growth. For example, a 1-
standard deviation increase in EPU results in a 10% reduction in sales in a pure cross-border 
buyout, but only a 2% reduction with a local office. 
To confirm that our empirical findings reflect actual PE firm activity, we conduct eight semi-
structured interviews with experts at European PE firms. These discussions strengthen the view 
that local offices are perceived as particularly beneficial when PE firms and portfolio firms are 
culturally more distant. The experts also expect a local presence to provide better access to 
deals, increase managers’ trust in the PE owner, and enable better governance and monitoring 
structures. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate operating performance 
differences between pure cross-border buyouts and those operated through a local office.1 Our 
paper is related most strongly to literature on the investment scope of PE/VC firms and 
international investors (Cumming & Dai, 2010; Cumming et al., 2016) and risk and reward in 
cross-border PE/VC buyouts (Bertoni & Groh, 2014; Buchner, Espenlaub, Khurshed, & 
Mohamed, 2018; Cao et al., 2015; Groh, 2017; Dai & Nahata, 2016; Dai et al., 2012; Devigne 
et al., 2013; Espenlaub, Khurshed, & Mohamed, 2014, 2015; Humphery-Jenner & Suchard, 
2013a, 2013b; Mäkelä & Maula, 2005, 2008; Meuleman, Jääskeläinen, Maula, & Wright, 2017; 
Meuleman & Wright, 2011; Nahata et al., 2014; Tykvová & Schertler, 2011, 2014). In 
particular, it expands the scarce literature on the effects of local offices of PE firms (Devigne 
                                                 
1 The effect of office openings on cross-border deal PE/VC performance has received little academic attention thus 
far. This is surprising, as prior research suggests that the choice of entry mode significantly influences the 
performance of foreign direct investments for non-financial firms (Brouthers, 2002). The papers that do exist 
find that “office” deals generally lead to higher overall fund returns, higher numbers of deals, and a higher 
likelihood of successful exits (Holloway, Lee, & Shen, 2016; Li, Vertinsky, & Li, 2014).  
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et al., 2016). The results suggest it is necessary to differentiate between “office” and “pure” 
cross-border deals. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related literature 
and theoretical background, while section 2.3 describes our data. Section 2.4 presents the 
empirical results. We provide insights from the interviews with PE experts in section 2.5. 
Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.2.1 Liability of foreignness in cross-border buyouts 
Zaheer (1995: 343) defines the “liability of foreignness” as “all additional costs a firm 
operating in a market overseas incurs that a local firm would not incur.” This encompasses 
numerous underlying hazards (Eden & Miller, 2001). First, foreign firms are unfamiliar with 
the host environment, potentially leading to inadequate interpretation of norms and incorrect 
market assessments. Second, agency and monitoring costs are higher for units that are managed 
from a distance. Third, foreign firms may be subject to legitimacy risks. Zaheer (1995) finds 
that, ceteris paribus, foreign firms will likely have lower profitability than local firms in 
multinational enterprises. 
Consistent with Zaheer (1995), the PE/VC literature finds that non-local PE/VC firms are at 
a disadvantage in access to information, networks, and existing market knowledge, which can 
increase both screening and monitoring costs (Chemmanur, Hull, & Krishnan, 2016; Cumming 
& Dai, 2010; Dai et al., 2012; Mäkelä & Maula, 2008). Bernstein, Giroud, & Townsend (2016) 
find that a VC’s active on-site involvement in its portfolio firms improves outcomes. Moreover, 
differences in legal and governance systems constrain the behavior of organizations and limit 
the flexibility of investors (Li et al., 2014). This amplifies information asymmetries and 
increases monitoring costs (Ahsan & Musteen, 2011), and creates hurdles for contracting 
processes (La Porta, Lopez‐ de‐ Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002; Lerner & Schoar, 2005).  
  
14 
Recent studies have explored cross-border versus domestic PE buyouts from a binary 
perspective. They report largely inferior performance in cross-border transactions in a PE/VC 
context (Buchner et al., 2018; Li et al., 2014; Stotz, 2011). However, these studies define cross-
border buyouts based on headquarters location only, not through a local office. 
2.2.2 The role of local offices 
Devigne et al. (2016: 257) describe a local branch as “the most far-reaching form of local 
embeddedness a cross-border VC firm can display in the focal country.” A branch ensures 
proximity to portfolio firms, i.e., it allows for on-site support and monitoring. It also provides 
an international perspective and opportunities for growth (Bernstein & Sheen, 2016; Devigne 
et al., 2013; Mäkelä & Maula, 2005). The PE sponsor’s local embeddedness can help establish 
relationships, increase legitimacy in the local community, and instill trust (Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999; Oliver, 1997). It can also reduce information asymmetries (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999), 
which is particularly helpful in the PE sector because investors rely on context-specific 
knowledge, which is difficult to convey (Hennart, 1988). Proximate investors can also better 
exploit local networks and relationships to gain access to private information (Agarwal & 
Hauswald, 2010). This may allow them to internalize market knowledge (Aulakh & Kotabe, 
1997) more efficiently, or to staff local experts more quickly (Pruthi et al., 2009). All of these 
benefits can positively impact the profitability of portfolio companies (Bernstein et al., 2016; 
Bernstein & Sheen, 2016; Gompers, Kaplan, & Mukharlyamov, 2016; Nahata et al., 2014). 
Thus, our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1:  Office deals will result in higher profitability than other types of cross-
border buyouts. 
Prior VC/PE literature has investigated two main strategies to overcome distance and 
uncertainty in cross-border buyouts: 1) syndicating with a local partner, and 2) gaining 
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experience through repeated transactions. It may thus be informative to compare the 
effectiveness of local offices to these success determinants. 
Local partners in a syndicate can contribute valuable local knowledge about the market, 
institutions, and culture of a country and facilitate the monitoring of portfolio firms 
(Chemmanur et al., 2016; Dai & Nahata, 2016; Espenlaub et al., 2014; Tykvová & Schertler, 
2014). Chemmanur et al. (2016) show that portfolio investments by syndicates of mixed (i.e., 
local and foreign) investors are more successful than those composed solely of all foreign or all 
local sponsors. However, mixed syndicates present some downsides as well. Dai and Nahata 
(2016) argue that firms can face higher coordination efforts and are exposed to more 
information brokerage risk when cultural distance is high. 
PE firms may also benefit solely from engaging in the target country through repeated deals 
and associated learning gains (Liu & Maula, 2016; Meuleman & Wright, 2011). The literature 
distinguishes between general cross-border experience and country-specific experience. 
General cross-border experience can enhance firms’ abilities to deal with uncertainty such as 
cultural and institutional gaps (De Clercq & Dimov, 2008). In contrast, country-specific 
experience allows PE sponsors to obtain local information on culture and institutions, build 
expertise through deal outcomes, and establish links to local networks. Thus, international 
experience can reduce the negative effect of distance in cross-border transactions in a PE/VC 
context (Guler & Guillén, 2010; Li et al., 2014). A lack of such experience may impose 
additional costs (Eriksson et al., 1997), such as ex ante information disadvantages. We predict: 
Hypothesis 2:  The effect of local offices on profitability improvements is greater than for 
pure cross-border deals with local syndicate partners or internationally 
experienced PE owners. 
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2.2.3 Moderating effects 
Prior literature has discussed the magnitude of the “liability of foreignness” and its 
sensitivity to different contexts. Such disadvantages primarily depend on 1) the magnitude of 
the geographic and/or cultural distance between the country of the PE sponsor and the portfolio 
firm, 2) the strength of the economic relationship between the countries, and 3) the stability of 
the economic policy situation in the portfolio firm country. 
2.2.3.1 Distance 
As per, e.g., Anderson & Gatignon (1986) and Erramilli & Rao (1993), prior literature on 
entry mode choice in foreign investments has found that higher levels of control are favorable 
when transaction costs increase. In our context, this implies that local offices are particularly 
valuable when the costs for identifying and monitoring portfolio firms are high. The literature 
has focused primarily on geographic (e.g., physical) and cultural (e.g., beliefs, norms, language) 
distance as the sources of such costs.  
Consistent with the notion of higher transaction costs in foreign markets, cross-border 
transaction flows in the VC/PE industry are negatively related to the geographic distance 
between investor and portfolio firm (Portes & Rey 2005; Tykvová & Schertler, 2014). Portes 
& Rey (2005) suggest that geographic distance is a barrier for interaction among agents as 
information frictions increase. Bernstein et al. (2016) and Chemmanur et al. (2018) find that 
reduced travel time between VC/PE investors and portfolio firms increases the likelihood of a 
positive exit. Buchner et al. (2018) and Cumming & Dai (2010) find that geographic distance 
is negatively related to exit success and IRR. Proximity of working teams may help reduce 
associated costs (Buchner et al., 2018; Tykvová & Schertler, 2014; Coval & Moskowitz, 1999). 
Consistent with these arguments, Brouthers (2002) shows that the advantages of having a local 
subsidiary on post-deal performance are greater for more distant foreign investments. 
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There is evidence that cultural distance negatively impacts performance in a VC/PE context 
(Dai et al., 2012; Li et al., 2014; Buchner et al., 2018). Cultural distance increases disparities in 
norms and values and creates frictions for communication, which hinders effective knowledge 
diffusion and lowers the level of trust (Li et al., 2014; Nahata et al., 2014). Cultural distance 
may also reduce the ability to anticipate local partners’ behavior (Chang, Kao, Kuo, & Chiu, 
2012), and increase the costs of information gathering (Erramilli & Rao, 1993).  
Following this line of reasoning, Du, Yu, & Yu (2017) show that cultural proximity allows 
analysts to better absorb information. Similarly, Dai & Nahata (2016) show that local VC 
partners can provide the highest value-add in financing, monitoring, and performance in the 
case of syndicates with high cultural distance from the portfolio firm country. 
Hypothesis 3:  The effect of office deals on portfolio firm profitability will be more positive 
for firms headquartered in countries with high geographic and/or cultural 
distance from the headquarters of the PE firm.  
2.2.3.2 Cross-country economic ties 
Local economic ties can facilitate access to networks in the target country because of, e.g., 
embeddedness and a higher perceived level of trustworthiness (Tykvová & Schertler, 2011). 
For example, although distance between Germany and China is high across all dimensions, an 
enduring trade relationship over multiple decades has reduced uncertainty. Therefore, the 
explanatory power of bilateral trade in explaining cross-border M&A flow is higher than 
measures such as a common language or religion (Erel, Liao, & Weisbach, 2012). We thus 
expect that local offices may be less (more) important when cross-country ties are strong 
(weak). 
Hypothesis 4a:  The effect of office deals on portfolio firm profitability will be more positive 




Francis et al. (2014) report that firms can gain knowledge from previous cross-border 
acquisitions of other companies in the target country. Deal flow and post-merger performance, 
for example, are positively related to the number of prior deals. They suggest that even rivals’ 
experience helps reduce an acquirer’s own transaction costs and uncertainty. Almazan, de 
Motta, Titman, & Uysal (2010) show that firms learn most effectively from the experience of 
their peers in the same industry cluster. Similarly, Groh (2017) shows it is advantageous to not 
perform the first cross-border PE deal in an emerging market. Thus, local offices may be most 
effective when there is little prior deal flow between the respective countries. 
Hypothesis 4b:  The effect of office deals on portfolio firm profitability will be more positive 
for firms headquartered in countries with lower prior deal flow with the 
acquirer’s country. 
2.2.3.3 Economic policy uncertainty 
High uncertainty about government policy reduces individual firms’ investment incentives, 
especially investments that are costly to reverse (e.g., Baker et al., 2016; Bernanke, 1983). 
Growth in assets and employment drop significantly during periods of higher uncertainty, 
because it increases the real option value of waiting (Bloom et al., 2007). Bachmann, Elstner, 
& Sims (2013) describe this tendency as “wait-and-see” behavior, because it induces firms to 
postpone investment decisions.  
The impact is most significant for firms with higher firm-level uncertainty (Kang et al., 
2014), firms in policy-sensitive sectors, such as construction and defense (Baker et al., 2016; 
Gulen & Ion, 2016), firms with more irreversible investments (Gulen & Ion, 2016), and during 
general periods of distress (Kang et al., 2014). There is evidence of a less pronounced second-
order effect on firms’ output and productivity growth (Baker et al., 2016).  
The negative effect of EPU on investments in assets and employment may be amplified in 
cross-border buyouts because of the heightened uncertainty over prospective economic and 
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political situations (Kang & Kim, 2010; Mäkelä & Maula, 2008). Local offices may reduce this 
uncertainty by providing better access to private market knowledge (Agarwal & Hauswald, 
2010), or by employing local staff (Pruthi et al., 2009). Because the EPU literature suggests it 
affects firm growth (rather than profitability), we predict office deals will moderate this effect. 
Hypothesis 5:  The effect of office deals on portfolio firm growth will be more positive for 
firms headquartered in countries with higher economic policy uncertainty 
(EPU).  
2.3 DATA 
2.3.1 Sample construction and distribution 
To begin, we obtain all institutional buyouts between 1997 and 2013 from Bureau van 
Dijks’s “Zephyr” (BvD) database, where the deal financing is labelled as “private equity” or 
“leveraged buyout.” This initial sample is comprised of 13,884 global buyouts. We then 
mandate data availability of total assets, sales, number of employees, EBITDA, and EBIT for 
all years between one year prior to the buyout (T-1) and three years’ post-buyout (T+3) in BvD 
ORBIS (five-year period). This allows us to construct a balanced panel. We also require 
portfolio firm sales in the pre-transaction year (T-1) to be above USD $2 million in order to 
exclude misclassified VC deals. These requirements reduce our sample size to 892 LBOs. 
Following prior literature (e.g., Buchner et al., 2018; Cao et al., 2015; Li et al., 2014; Meuleman 
& Wright, 2011), we classify a deal as cross-border if the headquarters of the PE sponsor and 
the portfolio firm are in different countries. Our final sample is 245 cross-border buyouts. The 
share of cross-border LBOs (27%) is in line with the PE literature (e.g., Cao et al., 2015) and 
with industry reports (PitchBook, 2017). 
Next, we hand collect data on the global office locations of all 82 PE firms involved in our 
cross-border sample from websites and from telephone interviews with PE firm officials. We 
also requested office opening dates. This is a unique feature of our sample, because data on 
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opening dates allows us to confirm whether local offices were in place at each buyout entry 
date. We require the local office of the PE sponsor to be opened before or in the year of deal 
entry in order to classify a transaction as an “office deal.” We refer to the remainder as “pure 
cross-border deals.” In the case of a syndicate, the local presence of one partner is sufficient to 
classify this transaction as an office deal. We find that 95 of the 245 (39%) deals were 
performed through a local office. 
Note that the firms are located across 23 European countries. This is because of the strict 
disclosure requirements for accounting data of non-listed firms in Europe, which leads to 
improved data availability. The largest country is the U.K., with 23% of the sample, which is 
in line with the relative share of British deals in Zephyr’s total buyout sample (based on 13,884 
identified deals in the observational period).  
The acquiring PE firms in the dataset are from 24 countries. Most (69%) are European. Most 
of the non-European PE firms are in the U.S., but there are also firms in Bahrain, Canada, Hong 
Kong, Kuwait, Malaysia, and South Africa. There are both office and pure cross-border deals 
in every country with more than five targets or more than five PE firms.  
Table 2.1: Sample Distribution 
This table shows the distribution of the sample by home country of the portfolio firm and by PE firms’ headquarters 
location. 



















Austria 1  1  0   4  4  0  
Bahrain 0  0  0   4  1  3  
Belgium 23  16  7   2  1  1  
Bulgaria 3  3  0   0  0  0  
Canada 0  0  0   3  2  1  
Croatia 2  2  0   0  0  0  
Czech Republic 6  4  2   0  0  0  
Denmark 5  2  3   4  2  2  
Estonia 1  1  0   0  0  0  
Finland 9  8  1   8  6  2  
France 21  15  6   13  10  3  
Germany 26  10  16   8  7  1  
Greece 1  1  0   0  0  0  
Hong Kong 0  0  0   3  3  0  
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Hungary 1  1  0   0  0  0  
Italy 18  16  2   2  1  1  
Kuwait 0  0  0   1  1  0  
Luxembourg 0  0  0   3  2  1  
Malaysia 0  0  0   2  2  0  
Netherlands 2  2  0   24  14  10  
Norway 1  1  0   3  0  3  
Poland 1  1  0   4  2  2  
Portugal 2  1  1   0  0  0  
Romania 8  5  3   0  0  0  
Serbia 1  1  0   1  1  0  
Slovakia  0  0  0   1  0  1  
South Africa 0  0  0   1  1  0  
South Korea 3  3  0   0  0  0  
Spain 21  13  8   7  3  4  
Sweden 31  19  12   10  7  3  
Switzerland 0  0  0   2  2  0  
UK 58  24  34   72  42  30  
United States 0  0  0   63  36  27  
Total 245  150  95   245  150  95  
              
              
2.3.2 Variables 
2.3.2.1 Dependent variables 
We analyze the impact of local offices on post-LBO performance by investigating the change 
in profitability ratios around the LBO. These metrics because are the most suitable for 
comparing performance changes after corporate events (Barber & Lyon, 1996). Moreover, 
profitability ratios are by far the most common metrics used to measure M&A performance 
(Thanos & Papadakis, 2012), and are an important driver of PE value creation (Achleitner, 
Braun, Engel, Figge, & Tappeiner, 2010).  
Our study uses two different measures of profitability: return on sales (RoS), defined as 
EBITDA divided by sales, and return on assets (RoA), defined as EBIT divided by total assets. 
In our base results, we use RoS to measure profitability before asset revaluations and 
depreciations in order to address the possibility that PE sponsors have changed asset valuations 
(write-ups or write-downs) during the year of the LBO (Ayash & Schütt, 2016). To test for 
robustness of our RoS results, we use RoA as a measure of how profitably firms use their assets 
(the results are available from the authors upon request). RoA incorporates information on asset 
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productivity (Barber & Lyon, 1996). We apply EBIT in the numerator because it accounts for 
depreciation expenses, which are related to required operating investments (Ayash & Schütt, 
2016).  
We apply four dependent variables to investigate the effect of EPU on firm growth. We 
proxy for investments using number of employees and total assets, thereby following the EPU 
literature (e.g., Baker et al., 2016). We add indicators for operating output (sales) and operating 
profit (EBITDA) to analyze two measures that are more strongly related to firms’ output factors. 
All dependent variables are winsorized at the 2.5% level. 
Table 2.2 gives the descriptive statistics and correlations for the dependent variables. 
Portfolio firms on average have 758 employees and USD $183.6 million in sales in the first 
year after the buyout (T+1). They average 12.0% RoS (EBITDA/sales). The standard deviation 




Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
This table gives descriptive statistics and correlations of dependent and explanatory variables for the year after the LBO (T+1). 
Num Variable n Mean SD Q1 Q3   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
  
                   
1 Number of employees 245 758 1,341 79 775 
 
1.00 
            
2 Total assets (mUSD) 245 203.2 355.3 21.1 171.9 
 
0.65 1.00 
           
3 Sales (mUSD) 245 183.6 325.6 24.2 159.7 
 
0.77 0.66 1.00 
          
4 EBITDA (mUSD) 245 21.7 40.1 1.3 18.6 
 
0.58 0.72 0.66 1.00 
         
5 ROS 245 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.18 
 
0.07 0.31 0.04 0.52 1.00 
        
6 ROA 245 0.09 0.14 0.01 0.16 
 
-0.07 -0.07 0.01 0.26 0.57 1.00 
       
7 Office_deal 245 0.39 0.49 0 1 
 
0.13 -0.02 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.11 1.00 
      
8 PE_country_exp 245 0.44 0.50 0 1 
 
0.15 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.48 1.00 
     
9 PE_CB_exp 245 0.48 0.50 0 1 
 
0.16 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.22 0.48 1.00 
    
10 distance_index 245 0.48 0.20 0.35 0.60 
 
0.14 0.21 0.13 0.07 0.01 -0.16 -0.18 -0.15 0.08 1.00 
   
11 bilateral_trade_countries 245 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.12 
 
0.03 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.08 -0.07 -0.37 1.00 
  
12 log_prior_deals_countries 245 2.6 1.4 1.8 3.7 
 
0.17 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.05 0.10 0.27 0.36 0.18 -0.20 0.45 1.00 
 
13 EPU 242 146.4 57.9 98.4 181.6 
 
0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.09 1.00 








2.3.2.2 Explanatory variables 
As per our theoretical discussion, we construct a binary variable to differentiate between 
“pure” cross-border buyouts and those operated through a local office. The variable office_deal 
equals 1 if the PE sponsor has a local branch in the portfolio firm’s country as of the buyout 
entry date, and 0 otherwise. 
We benchmark the effect of local offices with three other success determinants of cross-
border buyouts. Similarly to Li et al. (2014), we measure both country-specific experience 
(PE_country_exp), a dummy variable for above-median experience in the portfolio firm’s 
country, and general international experience (PE_CB_exp), a dummy variable for above-
median cross-border experience. We also test for the effect of a local syndicate using 
local_syndicate, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the buyout is conducted by a syndicate where 
at least one of the PE sponsors is headquartered (HQ) in the target’s country, and 0 otherwise. 
We analyze the moderating effects of several variables to better understand when local 
offices provide benefits. We measure geographic distance (ln_distance) as the natural logarithm 
of the distance between the respective capital cities of the countries where the PE sponsor and 
the portfolio firm are headquartered. We measure cultural distance (Hof_average_diff) using 
the average score along all six Hofstede dimensions (power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence) (Hofstede, 2001). 
This is similar to other studies analyzing the effect of cultural distance on PE/VC performance 
(e.g., Dai & Nahata, 2016; Nahata et al., 2014). We combine these two dimensions of distance. 
The variable distance_index adds up the percentile ranks among our 245 cross-border buyouts 
of cultural and geographic distance.  
We also analyze the effect of economic ties between country pairs. We use the maximum of 
bilateral import or export share between the two countries, bilateral_trade_countries, similarly 
to Erel et al. (2012). Bilateral import (export) share is calculated as the portfolio firm country’s 
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value of imports (exports) from (to) the PE sponsor’s country as a percentage of total imports 
(exports).  
To account for the possibility that acquirers can learn from prior deals of peers in the 
respective target country, we compute the total number of PE deals between the countries of 
the portfolio firm and its PE sponsor in the three years prior to each buyout entry date. We then 
construct the variable log_prior_deals_countries as the natural logarithm of prior deal flow.  
We also use Baker et al.’s (2016) national indices of economic policy uncertainty (EPU), 
which are widely used to measure perceived uncertainty in a government’s economic policy. 
They are based on how frequently certain words occur in newspapers, in addition to measures 
such as stock volatility and consumer surveys (e.g., Meinen & Roehe, 2017). EPU scores are 
available on a monthly basis, so we use the average of the monthly scores of the respective 
years. For the few European countries where the EPU score is not available, we apply the 
average score of the European region. 
2.3.2.3 Control variables 
We compute two control variables to account for heterogeneity in economic conditions. 
First, we consider the development of the economy in the target country by including the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita in USD (LN_GDPcap_target_country). Second, we control for 
within-industry developments across markets by using Reg_ind_developments. This variable 
computes the annual median changes in our dependent variables for firms in the same country, 
and with Fama-French 10-industry as the portfolio firm. We source data about RoA, RoS, 
number of employees, total assets, sales, and EBITDA from publicly listed companies in the 
portfolio firm’s country by using national and regional stock market indices.2 Moreover, we 
control for inorganic growth of the portfolio firm by using the number of add-on acquisitions 
                                                 
2 We use the following indices as samples for the selection of companies in the same industry: FTSE350 (UK), 
CAC all companies (FR), Dax100 (Germany), Stoxx Nordic TM (Scandinavia), KOSPI200 (Korea), and all 
IBES-tracked companies in Eastern Europe (Eastern Europe). For the portfolio firms from other countries, we 
use the Euro Stoxx 600, excluding the U.K., Germany, France, and Scandinavia. 
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in the observation year (add-ons). Table 2.3 describes the construction details and variable 
sources in more depth.  
Table 2.3: Variable definitions 
This table describes the construction details and sources of the dependent (panel A) and independent (panel B) 
variables used in this paper. 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Variable Description 
RoS  EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) over sales; 
winsorized at the 2.5% level. Source: BvD Orbis. 
RoA EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) over total assets; winsorized at the 2.5% 
level. Source: BvD Orbis. 
LN_Employees Natural logarithm of the number of employees in the portfolio firm; winsorized at 
the 2.5% level. Source: BvD Orbis. 
LN_Total_Assets Natural logarithm of the total assets in USD of the portfolio firm; winsorized at the 
2.5% level. Source: BvD Orbis. 
LN_Sales Natural logarithm of the sales of the portfolio firm in USD; winsorized at the 2.5% 
level. Source: BvD Orbis. 
LN_EBITDA Natural logarithm of EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization) of the portfolio firm in USD; winsorized at the 2.5% level. Source: 
BvD Orbis. 
Panel B: Independent variables 
Variable Description 
Post Dummy variable that equals 1 in the three years after the buyout, and 0 otherwise. 
Source (for the buyout date): BvD Zephyr. 
office_deal Dummy variable that equals 1 if the portfolio firm operates in a country in which 
the PE sponsor has an office as of the buyout entry date, and 0 otherwise. Source: 
Hand collected data from PE firm websites and interviews. 
PE_country_exp Dummy variable that equals 1 if the PE sponsor completed an above-median 
number of deals in the country of the portfolio firm before the buyout entry date, 
and 0 otherwise. To construct this variable, we first source all institutional buyouts 
between 1997 and the buyout entry date from BvD Zephyr, where deal financing is 
labelled as “private equity” or “leveraged buyout.” We then compute the number of 
buyouts per PE sponsor before the respective entry date for each country. Source: 
BvD Zephyr. 
PE_CB_exp Dummy variable that is equals 1 if the PE sponsor performed an above-median 
number of cross-border deals before the buyout entry date, and 0 otherwise. To 
construct this variable, we first source all cross-border institutional buyouts between 
1997 and the buyout entry date from BvD Zephyr where deal financing is labelled 
as “private equity” or “leveraged buyout.” We then compute the number of cross-
border buyouts per PE sponsor before the respective entry date. Source: BvD 
Zephyr. 
local_syndicate Dummy of 1 if the buyout is performed as a syndicate, where at least one PE sponsor 
has a HQ in the target country and one PE investor is foreign (i.e., is without HQ or 
local office in the target country), and 0 otherwise. Source: BvD Zephyr; hand 
collected data from PE firm websites and interviews. 
Hof_average_diff Difference in Hofstede scores between the home countries of the portfolio firm and 
the PE sponsor. We apply the average difference of six Hofstede dimensions (power 
distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, 
and indulgence). Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/ 
compare-countries/. 
ln_distance Natural logarithm of the distance in miles between the capitals of the countries of the 




distance_index Index which combines the cultural and geographic distance between the country of 
the PE sponsor and portfolio firm. We rank the 245 cross-border buyouts into 
percentile ranks according to their Hof_average_diff and ln_distance. LBOs with the 
highest respective distance get the highest rank. distance_index represents the 
average of percentile ranks in terms of cultural as well as geographic distance. 
bilateral_trade_ 
countries 
Measures the economic relationship between the country of the PE sponsor and 
portfolio firm in the buyout year. Variable represents the maximum of bilateral 
import and export between a country pair. Bilateral import (export) is calculated as 
the value of imports (exports) by the target country from (to) the acquirer country as 
a percentage of total imports (exports) by the target country, based on the 
Harmonized System definition. Source: UN Comtrade. 
log_prior_deals_countries Natural logarithm of prior cross-border buyouts from the PE sponsor’s home country 
to the portfolio firm’s home country. To construct this variable, we first source all 
LBOs from the BvD Zephyr Database and combine respective data with information 
on locations of the PE sponsor. Source: BvD Zephyr; hand collected data from PE 
firm websites and interviews. 
EPU Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) score of the target country (average score of 
respective year) divided by 100. We obtain data from 
http://www.policyuncertainty.com/. If the score for a specific European country is 
not available, we use the broader European index. 
Add-ons Number of add-on acquisitions completed by portfolio firm with an equity stake of 
at least 50% in the observation year. Source: BvD Zephyr. 
LN_GDPcap_target_ 
country 
Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita of the portfolio firm's country (on the basis 
of 2010 USD values). We use data from World Bank development indicators. Source: 
World Bank. 
Reg_ind_developments Yearly median change of the dependent variable of interest (number of employees, 
total assets, sales, EBITDA, RoS, and RoA) for companies in the same industry and 
region/country as the portfolio firm. We use accounting data from companies from 
various indices (FTSE350; CAC all companies; Dax100; Stoxx Nordic TM; 
KOSPI200; and Euro Stoxx 600 excluding UK, Germany, France, and Scandinavia; 
all IBES-tracked companies in Eastern Europe) to calculate controls for country-
industry performance. We choose the applicable index for the transaction depending 
on the location of the portfolio firm and its Fama–French 10-industry classification 
scheme. Source: Datastream. 
2.4 OPERATING PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
2.4.1 Effect of local offices on post-LBO profitability 
Figure 2.1 visualizes the cumulative change in RoS from the year prior to the deal (T-1) to 
three years after the buyout (T+3). We split the sample into sub-samples for office deals and 
pure cross-border deals. On average, office deals exhibit a 1.8-percentage point higher RoS 
change over the five-year observation period. After the buyout year (T0), office deals exhibit a 
marginal increase in mean RoS, while the mean for pure cross-border deals decreases 
continuously. Similar effects are seen for RoA, with a 2.6-percentage point higher RoA change 
for office deals.  
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Figure 2.1: Changes in profitability (RoS) 
Mean change in profitability of the portfolio company for pure cross-border and office deals. T0 denotes the year 




Following Bonini (2015) and Boucly et al. (2011), we use a two-way fixed effects panel 
regression to investigate the differences in profitability development in a multivariate setting. 
Formally, we use the following regression model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝐶𝑛𝑖𝑡
⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑ + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, (1) 
where Yit is the dependent variable of interest (RoS) for portfolio firm i in year t; 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛿𝑡 
are firm and time fixed effects, respectively; Postit is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the 
three years after deal entry, and 0 otherwise (i.e., in T-1 and T0); Officei is a time-invariant 
variable that equals 1 for an office deal, and 0 otherwise3; and 𝐶𝑛𝑖𝑡
⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑ is a vector for the two time-
variant control variables LN_GDPcap_target_country and Reg_ind_developments in the 
portfolio firm’s home country n. Results are in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Effects of local offices on profitability of cross-border LBOs including 
benchmarking analysis with experience and partnership measures 
This table reports linear fixed effects panel estimates for the differential changes in RoS between T-1 and T+3 
(with T denoting the year of the buyout). Regressions include control variables for industry performance using the 
respective dependent variable in the target’s country (Reg_ind_developments_ROS), and for the country’s GDP 
per capita development (LN_GDPcap_target_country). The regression in column (4) adds 21 local syndicates to 
the sample, where one or more foreign PE sponsors syndicate with a domestic PE firm. These deals are not included 
                                                 
3 Note that, in a panel setup, this time-constant variable can only be included in regressions via its interaction term 






















Pure cross-border deal Office deal
  
29 
in our base sample (N=245 deals) due to our definition that one local partner is sufficient to classify respective 
deal as a domestic deal. See Table 2.3 for details on the construction of these variables. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at country x deal type level. P-values are in parentheses.  
 
 RoS 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
Post -0.005 0.002  0.006 -0.003  
 (0.532) (0.802)  (0.558) (0.664)  
         
    Post x office_deal 0.021       
 (0.025)       
        
    Post x PE_country_exp  0.002      
  (0.854)      
        
    Post x PE_CB_exp    -0.006   
    (0.589)   
       
    Post x local_syndicate     0.008  
     (0.445)  
        
           
Controls YES YES  YES YES  
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  
Firm FE YES YES  YES YES  
N 1,225 1,225  1,225 1,225  
Number of deals 245 245  245 266  
R2 0.81  0.81  0.81 0.80  
 
Regression (1) represents the base regression, which we use to investigate the effect of PE 
sponsors’ local offices on the change in profitability. The coefficient for the Post x Office 
interaction term implies a 2.1-percentage point impact of a local office on RoS in the post-LBO 
period. It shows a p-value of 0.025, supporting Hypothesis 1.  
In Columns (2)-(4), we replace Officei with PE_country_expi, PE_CB_expi, and 
local_syndicatei to test for the effectiveness of local offices in mitigating the liability of 
foreignness relative to alternative success determinants of cross-border buyouts.4  
 
                                                 
4 For the regression in Column (4), we add 21 local syndicates to our sample, where one or more foreign PE 
sponsors syndicate with a domestic PE firm. These deals are not included in our base sample (N=245 deals), 
because we mandate that one local partner is sufficient to classify a respective deal as domestic. Accordingly, 
our sample size in Column (4) increases to 266. 
  
30 
In support of Hypothesis 2, we find that all three measures have a statistically and 
economically inferior effect on post-LBO RoS.5 
2.4.2 Moderator analyses 
2.4.2.1 Distance and cross-country ties  
Similarly to the previous section, Figure 2.2 plots cumulative RoS development around a 
buyout. We split the 245 cross-border buyouts at the medians of our three metrics for distance 
and economic ties: distance_index, bilateral_trade_countries, and log_prior_deals_countries. 
This gives us six sub-samples in panels A to F. For each one, we show profitability development 
separately for pure cross-border and office deals. 
Figure 2.2: Changes in profitability stratified by distance and economic ties 
Mean change in profitability of the portfolio company for pure cross-border and office deals. We divide the main 
sample into sub-samples using the medians of distance_index (Panels A and B), bilateral_trade_countries (Panels 
C and D), and log_prior_deals_countries (Panels E and F). T0 denotes the year of the LBO. The figure plots the 
average cumulative change in RoS from T-1 (the pre-buyout year) to T+3 (three years post-buyout). 
 






                                                 
5 Note that prior literature suggests these measures serve as success determinants, but we cannot find any 
convincing evidence of this in our context. This may be because prior studies used samples of VC-backed 
portfolio companies, and did not apply accounting performance as the measure of success (e.g., Chemmanur et 
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Panel B: Return on Sales (RoS) for sub-sample of cross-border deals with high distance (N=121) 
 
Panel C: Return on Sales (RoS) for sub-sample of deals with high bilateral trade (N=123) 
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Panel E: RoS for sub-sample of deals with high number of prior deals between countries (N=122) 
 
Panel F: RoS for sub-sample of deals with low number of prior deals between countries (N=123) 
 
Panel A shows no substantial differences in RoS development between office and pure cross-
border deals when the PE sponsor and portfolio firm have comparatively low geographic and/or 
cultural distance. Similarly, panels C and E indicate that the gap in RoS development is below 
1.0 percentage point when the economic relationship is high in terms of bilateral trade and prior 
number of buyouts. In panels B, D, and F (high distance/low economic ties), the RoS of pure 
cross-border buyouts decreases on average with each post-LBO year, while office deals exhibit 
superior and positive RoS development. 
Next, we extend regression model (1) so that: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 +
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 𝑥 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝐶𝑛𝑖𝑡
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where 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 represents any of our three measures of distance and economic tie. We 
focus on the coefficient on Post x Moderator x Office. Table 2.5 shows the results. 
Table 2.5: Moderating effects of distance and economic ties on profitability 
This table reports linear fixed effects panel estimates for the differential changes in RoS between T-1 and T+3 
(with T denoting the year of the buyout). Regressions include control variables for industry performance of the 
respective dependent variable in the target’s country (Reg_ind_developments_ROS), and for the country’s GDP 
per capita development (LN_GDPcap_target_country). See Table 2.3 for details on the construction of these 
variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at country x deal type level. P-values are in parentheses. 
 
 RoS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  
Post 0.026 -0.020 -0.019 
 







Post x office_deal -0.016 0.062 0.051 
 





































































































           
Controls YES  YES  YES  
Year FE YES  YES  YES  
Firm FE YES  YES  YES  
N 1,225  1,225  1,225  
Number of deals 245  245  245  
R2 0.81  0.81  0.81  
The results in Column (1) indicate a negative effect of distance on post-LBO RoS for cross-
border deals, which is generally consistent with the VC/PE literature (e.g., Li et al., 2014; 
Buchner et al., 2018) and supports Hypothesis 3. The term Post x Distance_index x Office 
suggests that local offices can reduce, and even reverse, the adverse effects of distance. This 
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coefficient has a p-value of 0.034. In unreported regressions, we find similar results when using 
either cultural or geographic distance as a moderator variable.  
Columns (2) and (3) suggest that having a local office can mitigate the negative effect on 
RoS development of a lower bilateral trade relationship and a lower number of previous deals. 
A 1-standard deviation decrease in bilateral trade share results in a 0.9% (percentage point) 
reduction in RoS in a pure cross-border buyout, but a 1.2% increase in RoS when the deal is 
operated through a local office. Thus, Columns (2) and (3) provide support for Hypotheses 4a 
and 4b. 
Figure 2.3 depicts marginal effects to ease the interpretation of the triple interaction terms.6 
It reveals that the performance gap between both types of cross-border buyouts is greatest when 
distance is high and economic ties are low. Panel C shows that the post-LBO RoS of pure cross-
border deals actually increases with the number of prior deals. This is an interesting addendum 
to Groh (2017), who states that PE firms are at a disadvantage when they invest early in an 
emerging foreign market. 
Figure 2.3: Marginal effects of distance and economic ties on RoS 
The figures depict the marginal effects of distance (panel A), bilateral trade relationship (panel B), and number of 
prior deals between countries (panel C) on RoS in pure cross-border and office deals. Graphics show results for 
the 5th to 95th percentile  
Panel A: Distance (distance_index)  





                                                 
6 Note that we use the natural logarithm of the number of prior deals in regressions in Table 2.5 to account for the 
right skewness of the variable. The graphics in Figure 2.3, however, show the absolute number of prior deals for 
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2.4.2.2 Effect of economic policy uncertainty on growth 
Figure 2.4 presents mean total asset growth post-LBO for pure cross-border and office deals, 
stratified by low versus high EPU in the respective year of the buyout. There is no relevant 
difference between the two during times of low EPU. However, during times of high EPU, we 
detect substantially lower total asset growth for pure cross-border deals than for office deals. 
Figure 2.4: Total asset growth stratified by EPU levels 
Mean total asset growth of the portfolio company for pure cross-border and office deals. We divide the sample 
into observations with low and high EPU levels at the median of all firm-year observation EPU scores. T0 denotes 
the year of the LBO. The figure plots the average total asset growth from T-1 (the pre-buyout year) to T+3 (three 
years post-buyout). 
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Panel B: Sub-sample of deals with high EPU levels 
 
 
We use the following fixed effects panel regression to statistically validate the moderating 
effect of EPU on the relationship between local offices and growth:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝑥 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 +
 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑖𝑡  𝑥 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝐶𝑛𝑖𝑡
⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑ + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (3) 
where Y denotes LN_Employees, LN_ Total_Assets, LN_Sales, or LN_EBITDA for portfolio 
firm i in year t. We add EPU as an explanatory variable and 𝐶𝑛𝑖𝑡
⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑ to the vector of control 
variables. We are especially interested in the term Post x EPU x Office to investigate how PE 
sponsors’ local presence interacts with the effect of EPU during the post-buyout phase. The 
results are in Table 2.6.  
Table 2.6: Moderating effects of Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) on growth 
This table reports linear fixed effects panel estimates for the differential changes in LN_Employees, 
LN:Total_Assets, LN_Sales, and LN_EBITDA between T-1 and T+3 (with T denoting the year of the buyout). 
Regressions include control variables for industry performance of the respective dependent variable in the target’s 
country (Reg_ind_developments_Employ, Reg_ind_developments_Assets, Reg_ind_developments_Sales and 
Reg_ind_developments_EBITDA), for the country’s GDP per capita development (LN_GDPcap_target_country), 
and for number of add-on acquisitions by the target firm (add-ons). The number of observations in Column 4 is 
lower because observations with a negative EBITDA are dropped when using logarithms. See Table 2.3 for details 
on the construction of these variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at country x deal type level. P-values 
are in parentheses. 









Post -0.016  0.173  0.206  0.284  
 









EPU -0.065  -0.052  -0.087  -0.061  
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 (0.272)  (0.028)  (0.014)  (0.061)  
         
   Post x EPU -0.003  -0.032  -0.104  -0.154  
 









 Post x office_deal x EPU 0.098  0.113  0.175  0.236  
 




   
 
 
              
Controls YES  YES  YES  YES  
Year FE YES  YES  YES  YES  
Firm FE YES  YES  YES  YES  
N 1,214  1,214  1,214  1,076  
Number of deals 245  245  245  245  
R2 0.98  0.97  0.97  0.91  
We find that EPU has a negative effect on all tested growth indicators. This is consistent 
with the well-established notion that investments, in terms of, e.g., employment and assets, are 
negatively correlated with uncertainty (Bloom et al., 2007). The coefficient of the triple 
interaction term Post x EPU x Office is positive and statistically significant for all four growth 
indicators. Statistical significance is strongest for the effect of EPU on total asset development 
and sales (p-value of 0.009). These results suggest that local offices tend to reduce the negative 
effect of EPU on long-term-oriented investments during times of uncertainty. This supports 
Hypothesis 5. 
2.4.3 Robustness 
Panel regressions with firm fixed effects control for latent and time-constant firm 
characteristics that are potentially correlated with both a PE sponsor’s local presence and 
buyout performance. To address other sources of bias, we conduct two robustness checks.  
First, we re-run the regressions from Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 using RoA as an alternative 
dependent variable to check for possible measurement errors. In this way, we address the 
concern that RoS does not sufficiently account for asset productivity. The regression coefficient 
implies that office deals exhibit a 2.5-percentage point higher change in RoA (with a p-value of 
0.052). Similarly to the RoS regression, the other three measures have an economically weaker 
effect on RoA, with statistically insignificant coefficients. Further tests reveal that local offices 
can also mitigate the negative effects resulting from distance (p-value of 0.008), weak bilateral 
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trade relationships (p-value of 0.000), and a low number of prior deals (p-value of 0.077). Full 
results for these regressions are available from the authors upon request. 
Another concern for the generalization of our results is that the benefits of having a local 
office may be related to the PE sponsor’s international experience. For example, investors who 
establish a local office may draw upon past experiential knowledge through previous deals in 
the target country (e.g., De Clercq, Sapienza, Yavuz, & Zhou, 2012; Li et al., 2014). To address 
this concern, we split the sample into sub-samples for PE sponsors with low (high) international 
and country experience using the variables PE_country_exp and PE_CB_exp. We then re-
estimate our main regression for all four sub-samples.  
The results show that the effect of a local office is positive but statistically insignificant if 
the PE firm has substantial prior experience in the target’s country (p-value of 0.317). In 
contrast, the local office coefficient is economically and statistically stronger if the PE investor 
has low prior country experience, fewer than three deals, (p-value of 0.011) and low cross-
border experience, fewer than ten deals (p-value of 0.039). These results suggest that a PE 
sponsor’s local office is most effective when the PE sponsor has less knowledge about the 
specific foreign market or investment. Nevertheless, additional analyses indicate that even 
locally experienced investors in high distance/low connected markets perform significantly 
better with a local office. Specific results are available from the authors upon request. 
2.5 INSIGHTS FROM SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
In this section, we verify and illuminate the underlying reasons for our empirical results. To 
that end, we collect qualitative insights from eight semi-structured interviews conducted with 
experts in the PE sector headquartered in Europe. Each interview was 20 to 30 minutes in 
length, and we kept the company details and interview statements anonymous. In order to obtain 
the most comprehensive and representative picture, we varied the seniority level of interview 
partners, their investment focus, geography, and fund size. Positions range from investment 
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manager to managing director, and fund sizes range from less than EUR 1 billion to more than 
EUR 80 billion.7 Seven of the eight firms have local offices, with five having more than four 
local offices. The largest firm has fourteen local offices. Two firms are in Scandinavia, three in 
the U.K., and the remainder in Western Europe.  
We first focus on understanding the intentions of PE firms that open local offices. Next, we 
ask for the implications of having a local office on their investment behavior. Appendix 2.A.1 
provides information about our interviewed experts and companies, while Appendix 2.A.2 
gives an overview of most relevant answers. 
1) What were the main arguments (benefits) for you to open a local office? When do you 
think is the value of a local office highest for your organization? 
Closeness to potential deals and portfolio firms was cited as the primary reason for opting to 
open a foreign office. Seven of the eight experts stressed that a local presence is the basis for 
PE firms to join local networks of banks, advisors, and industry experts. Those networks are 
perceived as crucial to gaining access to local information flow (see topic 2). Moreover, seven 
experts emphasized that the presence of local staff helps build legitimacy and trust with 
(potential) portfolio firms. They noted that relationships strengthen significantly when PE 
experts speak the same language and are able to frequently meet in person. Three interview 
partners reported that they would not have had a chance to negotiate, especially for smaller 
targets, without the presence of a local office. 
The interview partners also proactively pointed out that local offices are most beneficial 
when the country of the local office is more distant from the PE firm’s home country. For 
example, six of the experts said that local staff is essential to bridging language and cultural 
barriers, which are especially prevalent in non-Anglo-Saxon countries. Geographic distance 
was perceived as a lower burden, at least for deals within Europe. In contrast, three interview 
                                                 




partners remarked that a local office is essential for PE companies planning to leave their 
continent. The underlying reason here is that access to local information is very limited across 
continents, and interactions tend to lessen in frequency and complexity with long travel times 
and time zone differences. 
2) What differences do local offices make in terms of your international investment 
behavior? When do you consider syndicates with local partners as an alternative? 
Seven interview partners reported that the screening and due diligence phases are positively 
impacted by a local presence. For example, one PE expert reported: “You get the most valuable 
information about upcoming deals informally around lunch or dinner at “Fressgasse” in 
Frankfurt.”8 Thus, PE local offices may better alleviate adverse selection problems.  
For the monitoring phase, four interview partners stated that a local office can make a 
difference by enhancing closeness, i.e., in terms of more frequent interactions. This helps create 
trust and establish a smoother functioning governance. One interview partner mentioned: “For 
success, it is key to establish a functioning governance. A functioning governance is likely 
easier to establish with a local office through the same language and more frequent 
interactions.” Similarly, other interview partners revealed that management selection is easier 
when you know the market. Market knowledge also helps for growth, i.e., for finding add-on 
acquisitions. Moreover, closeness can be a “downside protection,” as portfolio firms have less 
room for non-compliant activities. Local industry knowledge is sometimes critical even for 
assessing the potential for operational improvement. One interview partner mentioned that 
pharmaceutical regulation, for example, differs substantially between countries. This is why the 
PE firm has local experts.  
Finally, none of the interview partners said that they cooperated with a local partner. Five of 
the experts stated that they generally value local partners, but four stressed the risk and cost of 
                                                 
8 The “Fressgasse“ is an upscale shopping section in the banking district of Frankfurt, well-known for regular 
meeting and greeting between M&A bankers. 
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cross-country partnerships. Two even mentioned that local partners may apply information 
brokerage. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the liability of foreignness of PE funds in 
cross-border deals. Most studies on this topic have thus far neglected a common method that 
PE fund managers use to alleviate the disadvantages of cross-border deals: opening a local 
office in the country of the target. To analyze the influence of a local office on the performance 
of cross-border deals, we gathered an international dataset of PE funds’ global office locations 
and opening dates. 
We document that profitability development in cross-border LBOs is significantly higher for 
PE funds with local offices than for pure cross-border deals. We find that the existence of a 
local office has an economically and statistically stronger effect on portfolio firms’ profitability 
development than the PE sponsor’s international deal experience or partnering with a local PE 
firm in a syndicate. In a subsequent analysis, we document that local offices are more successful 
when the expected liability of foreignness is high. We find strong support for the notion that 
local offices help to bridge both distance and a lack of economic ties between the respective 
home countries. Moreover, high Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) in the target company’s 
country has a negative effect on all tested growth indicators. Local offices can mitigate these 
adverse effects. 
These findings have important implications for both academics and practitioners. Our 
results counter the common perception that cross-border buyouts underperform, instead 
suggesting that it is necessary to differentiate between office deals and pure cross-border 
buyouts to avoid an omitted variable bias. From a practical perspective, we specify some of 
the benefits that PE firms gain from opening a new branch. This can help PE managers’ cost-
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benefit analysis, thus allowing for better decision-making when evaluating market entry 
modes. 
We leave it to future research to examine non-performance-oriented aspects of opening a 
local office, such as higher expected deal flow, increased awareness for the PE fund, and more 




2.A  APPENDICES 
2.A.1  Anonymized overview of interview partners 







1 Director Scandinavia 4-10 local 
offices 
10-30 bn EUR Investments in large and 
medium sized companies 
in all sectors 
2 Managing 
Director 
United Kingdom 4-10 local 
offices 
30-60 bn EUR Global investments in 
small to large companies 
in all sectors 
3 Vice President Scandinavia >10 local 
offices 
>60 bn EUR Investments in small to 




United Kingdom <4 local offices 10-30 bn EUR Investments in middle 





Western Europe >10 local 
offices 
>60 bn EUR Global investments in 
small to large companies 
in all sectors 
6 Investment 
Manager 
Western Europe <4 local offices <10 bn EUR Investments in small and 
medium sized 
companies, mainly in 
Europe 
7 Principal United Kingdom 4-10 local 
offices 
30-60 bn EUR Global Investments in 
large and medium sized 
companies in all sectors 
8 Investment 
Manager 
Western Europe 0 offices <10 bn EUR Long-term orientated 
approach with 
transaction size between 






2.A.2  Answers to structured interviews 
This table reports the responses to selected questions from eight semi-structured interviews with employees of 
PE firms. 
Statements n in % 
Intention for office opening   
1) Access to networks, e.g., relationships with advisors and banks 7 0.88 
2) Higher proximity to portfolio firms 7 0.88 
Bridge cultural barriers, e.g., different language 6 0.75 
Allow for more frequent interactions with portfolio firms 3 0.38 
3) Higher legitimacy and trust towards portfolio firm owners and management 7 0.88 
4) Support of PE sponsor's regional growth (e.g., due to regional investment 
constraints) 
5 0.63 
Effect on investment behavior 
  
1) Earlier knowledge about prospective deals 7 0.88 
2) Better access to insights about target company and market in due diligence 
phase 
5 0.63 
Mitigate inexperience in the market, otherwise insights would have been 
gained through previous deals 
2 0.25 
3) Better chance and perception in negotiations (especially for smaller target 
companies) 
6 0.75 
4) Closer monitoring and better risk assessment of portfolio firms, e.g., owing 
to more frequent interactions 
4 0.50 
5) Set up of different (more sustainable) governance model due to market 
knowledge 
3 0.38 
6) Syndicates with local partner can be valid alternative if no office is present 5 0.63 
Syndicates represent a risk owing to uncertainty and information 
brokerage 
4 0.50 
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Opening a Local Office – PE Firms’ Engine  





This paper explores the international expansion of 385 private equity (PE) firms being 
involved in 6,357 cross-border buyouts in the period from 1997 to 2016. I use hand 
collected information about the global office locations and openings of PE firms. I find that 
PE firms more likely open an office in countries that exhibit higher market opportunities 
and are more proximate. Time series analysis shows that PE firms significantly upsurge 
deal activity in markets around the opening of a local office. Despite local offices, PE firms 
show higher deal activity in more proximate markets. This implies, that offices cannot 
entirely mitigate the local bias in investing. Moreover, I find that the presence of a local 
offices significantly reduces propensity to syndicate with a partner, and increases deal size 
after office an opening. These findings are consistent with the idea that local offices affect 
the chances and risk perception in foreign markets. 
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In the last decade, private equity (PE) firms have continuously increased their global 
coverage by opening local offices around the world (see Figure 3.1). For example, global PE 
firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) opened its 16th office outside its home market, the US, in 
Frankfurt in 2018. KKR writes in its press release that the office opening “sends out a strong 
signal of […] commitment to Germany” (KKR, 2018). Similarly, statements of other PE firms 
suggest that they are intended to increase commitment in a market and be closer to investment 
opportunities. When announcing the office opening in Milan in 2019, EQT writes that the 
“Milan office is a testimony to EQT’s commitment to investing in established Italian 
companies” (EQT, 2019). Ardian opened its fourth Asian office in Seoul in 2018 with the words 
“we can now be even closer to our growing local investor base while also capitalizing on the 
best investment opportunities” (Ardian, 2018). 
The trend of establishing local offices corresponds to the growing share of cross-border 
buyouts in the PE industry (Invest Europe, 2019). Reasons for higher international activity of 
PE firms are manifold. Motives can be a higher expected return (Chen, Gompers, Kovner, & 
Lerner, 2010; Wright, Lockett, & Pruthi, 2002), saturated home markets and a geographic 
diversification of the portfolio (Buchner, Espenlaub, Khurshed, & Mohamed, 2018). Moreover, 
international investors can provide added value for portfolio firms through their international 
network (Cumming, Knill, & Syvrud, 2016; Devigne, Vanacker, Manigart, & Paeleman, 2013).  
However, academic research presents that geographic and cultural distance in cross-border 
buyouts come with challenges for foreign PE firms. Local firms exhibit advantages due to their 
existing market knowledge, better access to networks and proximity to portfolio firms (e.g., 
Buchner et al., 2018; Cumming & Dai, 2010; Dai, Jo, & Kassicieh, 2012; Mäkelä & Maula, 
2008). As a result, research finds a local bias in the investment activity in the PE and Venture 
Capital (VC) industry, i.e., investors prefer investment opportunities which are closer to their 
home market (Cumming & Dai, 2010; Hain, Johan, & Wang, 2016; Portes & Rey, 2005).  
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The opening of a local office likely incrementally changes the investment context for PE 
firms in foreign markets. With a locally embedded team, PE firms can build local networks, 
which provide better access to private information (Meuleman, Jääskeläinen, Maula, & Wright, 
2017; Mingo, Morales, & Dau, 2018). Local staff can increase trust towards portfolio firm 
owners and management (Pruthi, Wright, & Meyer, 2009). Moreover, proximity facilitates 
monitoring, e.g., through more frequent in-person interactions (Oliver, 1997; Luo, Shenkar, & 
Nyaw, 2002). As a result, buyouts operated through a local office are more similar to domestic 
buyouts, ceteris paribus a buyout without any local presence (Devigne, Manigart, & Wright, 
2016). Accordingly, I assume that deal activity and deal characteristics of PE firms likely 
change with a local presence. Literature on the internationalization of PE and VC firms has put 
a low focus on the relevance of local offices (Devigne, Manigart, Vanacker, & Mulier, 2018). 
As a consequence, it is still not researched so far what determines for PE firms to open a local 
offices and what effect a local office has for the international deal activity of PE firms. For the 
VC industry, Chen et al. (2010) show that VC firms more likely open a local office in regions 
with higher prior success rate of other VC firms. 
Beyond this, research in the PE/VC industry has comprehensively analyzed syndicates with 
local partners as an option to reduce frictions of distance in cross-border deals (e.g., Dai & 
Nahata, 2016; Dai et al., 2012; Espenlaub, Khurshed, & Mohamed, 2014). Furthermore, studies 
present that measures, which reduce uncertainty of PE firms in foreign markets, positively 
affect international deal activity. Firstly, Liu and Maula (2016) argue that experiential 
knowledge generated through previous investments in the host country reduces uncertainty and 
the need for syndicates. Secondly, Holloway, Lee, and Shen (2016) show that PE firm 
heterogeneity across strategy and performance positively affects cross-border deal activity of 
PE firms. And thirdly, Mingo et al. (2018) argue that centrality of PE firms in foreign networks, 
which is established by previous syndicates, has a positive effect on deal activity. However, 
those options show a dependency on third partners or take time to evolve. In parallel, the 
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continuous high number of new office openings indicates the value-add for PE firms to quickly 
embed in a foreign market with a local presence. Moreover, I follow Devigne et al.’s (2016: 
257) view that a “local branch is the most far-reaching form of local embeddedness a cross-
border […] firm can display”.  
I predict that the opening of local office has a relevant effect on PE firms’ deal activity and 
deal characteristics. I assume that PE firms increase their deal activity in foreign markets after 
opening of a local office. Moreover, I assume that with a local office, the likelihood of 
syndicates is reduced and deal size increases, as PE firms can better manage risk in the foreign 
market. Those hypotheses are supported by well-known Uppsala model on internationalization 
patterns of enterprises (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990, 2006). Accordingly, firms increase 
commitment in foreign markets the more they are insider in a market. Respective embeddedness 
helps firms to better evaluate the trade-off between chances and risks. 
I test those hypotheses by analyzing the buyouts of 385 PE firms from 36 countries in the 
observation period from 1997 to 2016. The sample comprises in total 6,357 cross-border 
buyouts in 50 target countries. This sample exceeds samples of other studies on cross-border 
LBOs in literature (e.g., Cao, Cumming, Qian, & Wang, 2015; Chemmanur, Hull, & Krishnan, 
2018; Holloway et al., 2016). I hand collect data on office locations and opening dates for those 
PE firms. In sum, PE firms in the sample opened 589 offices before 2017. For 44 percent (2,792 
LBOs) of cross-border buyouts, the PE sponsor had a local presence in the target country at 
deal entry. Followingly, I refer to those buyouts as “office deals”. 
As a starting point, I analyze the determinants for PE firms to open a local office using a 
probit regression. Results show that PE firms more likely open a local office in countries the 
more experience they have already collected in respective market through prior deals. 
Moreover, higher opportunities in the target market in terms of market growth and market size 
as well as geographic and cultural proximity of the target market are positively related to an 
office opening.  
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Next, I find that deal activity of PE firms significantly increases around the office opening. 
For example, the average number of deals in a target market increases from 0.14 deals two years 
prior to the opening to 0.37 deals one year post office opening. Fixed effect panel regression 
and dynamic panel regression support that deal activity is higher with a local office and it most 
significantly increases in the year of the office opening. Further tests indicate, that PE firms 
have a higher deal activity in more proximate markets in spite of a local office. Those results 
suggest that local offices do not significantly reduce the local bias in investing. 
In line with hypotheses, analyses on deal characteristics show that buyouts in countries with 
a local office have a significantly lower likelihood to be syndicated and are significantly larger 
in size. Firstly, results show that buyouts have a 5 percentage points higher syndicate likelihood 
in the years before PE firms open an office (28 percent), compared to the years after an opening 
(23 percent). Looking specifically at the likelihood to syndicate with a local partner, this 
likelihood is also reduced after an office opening, however with lower economic and statistical 
significance. Interestingly, results show that propensity to partner with locals increases with 
country specific experience. This finding is consistent with Dai and Nahata (2016), who argue 
that local experience allows investors to build local networks, i.e., find local partners. Secondly, 
results on deal size support the argument that PE firms are willing to increase commitment in 
terms of deal size in markets with a local office. Deal size is on average USD $60 million larger 
for those deals performed after an office opening (USD $255 million).  
In sum, the findings show that the opening of a local office is a decisive event for PE firms’ 
internationalization behavior in terms of deal activity and deal characteristics. Accordingly, it 
is important to consider the role of local offices when investigating PE firm internationalization 
behavior. To the best my knowledge, this is the first study to specifically investigate the 
relevance local offices have for the internationalization patterns. Hereby, the study is based on 
a unique dataset, comprising a broad sample of cross-border LBOs as well as information of 
office locations and openings. Moreover, findings are of practical relevance for target countries 
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which have an interest to attract foreign capital. Analyses indicate that target countries, which 
can create an environment which is favorable for PE firms to open a local office, can likely 
increase capital flow from foreign investors. 
My paper contributes to the literature on the international investment behavior of PE/VC 
firms (Cumming & Dai, 2010; Buchner et al., 2018; Cao et al., 2015; Chemmanur et al., 2018; 
Dai & Nahata, 2016; Espenlaub, Khurshed, & Mohamed, 2014; Groh, 2017; Hain et al., 2016; 
Meuleman & Wright, 2011; Portes & Rey, 2005; Tykvová & Schertler, 2011, 2014). Thereby, 
it adds to the literature on measures to mitigate disadvantages of distance in cross-border LBOs 
(Holloway et al., 2016; Li, Vertinsky, Li; 2014; Mingo et al., 2018; Tykvová & Schertler, 2014). 
Particularly, it complements the limited literature on the effects of local offices of PE/VC firms 
(Chen et al., 2010; Devigne et al., 2016). 
The paper is organized as follows. I discuss related literature and derive hypotheses in 
section 3.2, and give an overview of the sample and data used in course of the study in section 
3.3. Section 3.4 provides the analyses on determinants of office opening. I present main results 
on the effect of a local office in section 3.5, and conclude findings in section 3.6. 
3.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
3.2.1 Related literature 
3.2.1.1 Cross-border activity in the private equity industry  
This study is related to literature on international investment activity of PE/VC investors and 
on deal characteristics of cross-border buyouts. Prior studies on cross-border investment 
activity have investigated determinants for international Private Equity flows along mainly 
three categories: country (market) characteristics, PE sponsor characteristics, and distance 
characteristics. Firstly, studies show that target country characteristics, for example market size, 
market growth, stock market development, creditor rights, and governance standards are 
positively related to PE/VC equity flows (Cao et al., 2015; Guler & Guillén, 2010; Portes & 
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Rey, 2005; Schertler & Tykvová, 2012). Secondly, research argues that PE/VC sponsor’s 
foreign networks, e.g., through previous syndicates, and firm diversity can help to better cope 
with uncertainty in foreign markets (Holloway et al., 2016; Liu & Maula, 2016). As a result, 
studies show that size of network ties (Jääskeläinen & Maula, 2014; Mingo et al., 2018; 
Tykvová & Schertler, 2011) as well as PE firm heterogeneity across strategy and performance 
(Holloway et al., 2016) is positively related to deal activity in foreign markets. Thirdly, studies 
find support for the argument of a local bias, i.e., a negative effect of geographic, cultural and 
institutional distance, on cross-border equity flows (Aizenman & Kendall, 2012; Cumming & 
Dai, 2010; Hain et al., 2016; Portes & Rey 2005; Tykvová & Schertler, 2014).  
Underlying reasoning for the local bias in PE investment activity is that transaction cost and 
information disadvantages increase with a growing distance between PE firm and portfolio 
firm. Studies in the PE context present that foreign buyouts exhibit disadvantages along the 
investment cycle, in screening, monitoring, and also exit search (Bernstein, Giroud, & 
Townsend, 2016; Chemmanur et al., 2016; Dai et al., 2012; Mäkelä & Maula, 2008). Investors 
prefer local investments owing to lower information asymmetries and less costly interactions 
with portfolio firms. Measures to reduce the frictions of distance can be firstly syndicates with 
local partners (Chemmanur et al.; 2016; Espenlaub et al., 2014; Tykvová & Schertler, 2014). 
Partners in syndicates can provide value-adding services, for example in collecting information 
and monitoring of portfolio firms (Dai & Nahata, 2016; Mäkelä & Maula, 2008). Secondly, 
investors show a lower local bias when they have built broader networks, which facilitate the 
local information flow, or built the market knowledge themselves through previous deals in the 
host country (Collins, Holcomb, Certo, Hitt, & Lester, 2009; Cumming & Dai, 2010; Meuleman 
& Wright, 2011; Mingo et al., 2018). 
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3.2.1.2 Local offices in cross-border buyouts 
A further option to stronger embed within a foreign market can be to serve a market through 
a local office (Devigne et al., 2018). A local office can provide benefits along the investment 
cycle. Firstly, PE sponsor’s local presence can help to establish relationship networks in the 
target country with banks and advisors. Respective networks increase access to private 
information, which are of high relevance especially in the screening and due diligence phase 
(Meuleman et al., 2017; Mingo et al., 2018). Accordingly, the networks reduce information 
asymmetries and disadvantages compared to local investors (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999).  
Secondly, PE sponsors typically employ local staff in their offices. This helps the PE firms 
to internalize market knowledge and reduce frictions resulting from varying culture, e.g., 
different languages (Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997; Pruthi et al., 2009). Moreover, the local address 
and local staff help to develop links to agencies and governments, and thereby create 
institutional capital. Respective connections can enhance perceived legitimacy towards the 
portfolio firms’ owner and management (Luo et al., 2002; Oliver, 1997). Pruthi et al. (2009: 
201) describe the value of local staff in the VC industry as a “useful marketing tool”. In parallel, 
the local staff can leverage the international perspective of the PE firms, and thereby provide 
additional growth and exit opportunities compared to purely local investors (Cumming et al., 
2016; Devigne et al., 2016; Humphery-Jenner & Suchard, 2013a; Mäkelä & Maula, 2005). 
Thirdly, the local presence of PE firms allows proximity and facilitates the bilateral exchange 
with the portfolio firms. For example, it increases the frequency of value-adding on-site support 
(Bernstein et al., 2016). Respective benefits stand against the additional organization cost of a 
local office, such as initial cost for staffing and cost of increased organizational complexity 
(Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Pruthi et al., 2009). 
The implications of local offices on the international activities of PE sponsor are only little 
investigated so far. Holloway et al. (2016) mention that, after opening a branch, PE sponsors 
are more likely to achieve better performance and to carry out more deals. However, they do 
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not focus on this finding and do not present their analyses on those observations. Chemmanur 
et al. (2018) find no effect of local offices on performance in cross-border LBOs. They argue 
that scarcity of talented investment managers limits the benefits of a local office. 
3.2.1.3 Local offices in the context of firm internationalization models  
The Uppsala internationalization model by Johanson and Vahlne provides a framework for 
firm’s internationalization patterns. According to the model, firms gradually increase their 
resource commitment in foreign markets the more market knowledge they have gained and the 
stronger their local networks are (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990, 2003; Vahlne & Johanson, 
2013). Market commitments are differentiated by size of the investments and strength of 
vertical integration. Within the context of PE firms, a local office can be understood as a 
relevant incremental investment and commitment to a foreign market. A local presence is 
regarded as especially valuable in the service sector, i.e., also the PE sector, as PE firms are 
dependent on context-specific knowledge (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Hennart, 1988).  
Following the model, firms first internationally expand in markets where 1) uncertainty is 
low and 2) opportunities are perceived as high (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990, 2006). Firstly, 
uncertainty is comparably lower after firms already gathered experiential knowledge in the host 
market, or/and the firm is part of a network with local partners (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 
Schweizer, Vahlne, & Johanson, 2010). Moreover, uncertainty tends to be lower in markets 
with lower psychic distance to the firm’s home market. Psychic distance is determined by 
geographic distance, but also distance in culture and other hurdles to become insider in local 
networks (Hutzschenreuther, Voll, & Verbeke, 2011; Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Following 
the argumentation, PE sponsors tend to have a higher propensity to establish a local office in 
markets, where they have made first experiences, and/or which have lower distance to the home 
market. Secondly, perception of opportunities is a main reason to go abroad (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2006). Consequently, PE firms likely stronger invest in markets, where opportunities, 
i.e., market growth and market size, are higher. According to supporters of the Uppsala model, 
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market knowledge and insidership in foreign networks are essential to understand those 
opportunities (Johanson & Vahlne. 2006).  
Transaction cost theory is a further model which provides arguments for firms to operate 
through a local office. According to the model, firms choose an operating model in a foreign 
market with the lowest transaction cost (e.g., Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Brouthers & 
Brouthers, 2003; Hennart, 1988). Academic research in the field of transaction cost theory has 
no consistent perspective on the role of distance on the entry mode choice. Research presents a 
trade-off between the benefits of reducing uncertainty in distant markets through a higher level 
of control versus the additional costs of market risk as well as challenges in coordination (e.g., 
Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Kogut & Singh, 1988; López-Duarte & Vidal-Suárez, 2010). 
Brouthers and Brouthers (2003) argue that offices in distant markets may increase internal 
organizational cost beyond transaction cost savings. Respective trade-off is intuitive for the PE 
industry. On the one hand, a local office in more foreign markets can reduce the growing 
liability of foreignness, however on the other hand internal coordination gets more difficult 
owing to geographic distance and gaps in norms as well as laws. Moreover, literature shows 
that country risk has a negative effect on higher levels of control (Zhou, Luo, & Suh, 2004). 
Empirical evidence in the PE/VC sector on internationalization patterns is limited. Chen et 
al.’s (2010) empirical study shows that local offices of VC investors are concentrated in markets 
with high level of prior successful deals, with higher economic size in terms of GDP per capita, 
and with higher rate of innovation. I will present results on determinants of local office openings 
of PE sponsors in section 3.4. 
3.2.2 Hypotheses development 
3.2.2.1 Local offices and the effect on deal activity 
The change in firms’ international deal activity, i.e., the pace of firm’s internationalization 
process and its determinants got low focus in research so far (Casillas & Acedo, 2013). 
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Following Chetty et al. (2014), it is interesting to understand what determines the development 
of deal activity in particular. For the PE/VC industry, prior studies have mainly investigated 
cross-border equity flows (e.g., Portes & Rey, 2005). 
Looking at the dimension of speed of internationalization, research shows that the pace of 
internationalization is positively related to firms’ market knowledge and previous learning 
activities (Casillas, Barbero, & Sapienza, 2015). De Prijcker, Manigart, Wright, and Maeseneire 
(2012) report that the likelihood and number of VC cross-border transactions increase with VC 
investors experiential and inherited knowledge on internationalization. Respective results are 
founded on the arguments provided by the Uppsala internationalization model. Firms have 
higher propensity to make greater resource commitments in markets they know, i.e., where 
perceived cost are lower (e.g., Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgard, & 
Sharma, 1997; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990). The more a firm has learnt about foreign 
markets, the more it has the intent to use that knowledge (De Clercq, Sapienza, & Crijns, 2005). 
This results into a step-wise increase in incremental investments with further expansion, as 
perceived knowledge gaps are reduced over time (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990; Petersen, 
Pedersen, & Lyles, 2008). In addition, studies discuss that firm’s own experiential knowledge 
can be replaced by market knowledge, e.g., through experience of other firms (Åckerman, 2015; 
Jiang, Holburn, & Beamish, 2014). Similarly, Mingo et al. (2018) show in a cross-sectional 
analysis that PE sponsor centrality in foreign networks increases deal activity in respective 
markets. 
Following this argumentation, PE sponsors likely accelerate the speed of the 
internationalization process with their own market knowledge. Beside collecting experiences 
through previous transactions, opening a local office represents an incremental increase in 
country-specific knowledge. The local presence will help investors to build relationship 
networks and collect own context-specific knowledge (Pruthi et al., 2009). Accordingly, the 
presence reduces transaction costs for the subsequent transactions (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999). 
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Moreover, the opening of a local office represents an investment into a market. To create 
benefits from respective upfront investment, the PE firm has to generate returns through a more 
frequent deal flow. This leads me to the following hypothesis: 
H1  The deal activity of PE firms in foreign countries will be higher with the presence 
of a local office. 
Applying the argument of increased transaction cost with uncertainty, distance between PE 
sponsor and target country should negatively affect speed in the internationalization process of 
PE investors. It is expected that PE sponsors prefer a slower international expansion owing to 
perceived higher cost (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Respective reasoning is supported by the 
analysis of gross equity flows (Portes & Rey, 2005). However, as local offices represent the 
highest possible embeddedness within a market (Devigne et al., 2016), local offices may reduce 
geographic and cultural gaps between home and target country. As a consequence, PE sponsors 
may mitigate market uncertainty resulting from distance with a local presence. Thus, it can be 
expected that PE investors apply an internationalization process independently from frictions 
of distance in markets in which they have opened a local office. Local investment bias would 
be mitigated. Therefore, I have two opposite predictions for the effect of distance on deal flow 
in target countries with a local office, as presented in hypothesis 2a and 2b. 
H2a  Deal activity of PE firms in foreign countries with local office will be lower with 
higher distance between PE firm and target country. (Argument of higher 
transaction cost) 
H2b  Deal activity of PE firms in foreign countries with local office will have no 
significant effect on distance between PE firm and target country. (Argument of 
muted transaction cost) 
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3.2.2.2 Local offices and the effect on syndicates in cross-border buyouts 
Syndicates are intensively discussed in the PE literature as a measure to reduce the “liability 
of foreignness” in cross-border transactions. Syndicates help to share risk among partners 
(Espenlaub et al., 2014; Meuleman & Wright, 2011). Especially local partners can provide local 
knowledge about the foreign market, institutions, and culture. Moreover, they facilitate 
monitoring and frequent interactions with portfolio firms (Chemmanur et al., 2016; Dai & 
Nahata, 2016; Tykvová & Schertler, 2014). In a VC context, Chemmanur et al. (2016) show 
that portfolio firms of mixed (i.e., local and foreign) investors are more successful than those 
composed purely of all foreign or all local sponsors. Consequently, it is expected that PE 
sponsors especially rely on partners when uncertainty is high, i.e., they have low market 
knowledge.  
Consistent with this argument, Tykvová and Schertler (2014) present that syndicates with 
local VC partners help to reduce negative frictions of distance. Meuleman et al. (2011) show 
that PE sponsor’s general international experience as well as country-specific experience both 
reduce the propensity to partner in cross-border buyouts. Moreover, PE sponsors partner less in 
more transparent financial markets. They found a negative effect of local offices on the 
syndicate propensity in cross-border buyouts, which is however not significant on the 
established significance levels. I follow Meuleman et al.’s (2011) argumentation, that a local 
office provides benefits a PE sponsor is looking to achieve through a local partner in a broader 
sample. PE firms likely look for an investment model, where they are less dependent on 
coordination and brokerage risk of a partner (Dai & Nahata, 2016). A local investment team 
can provide similar benefits than a third partner, but internally. Similarly, Imad’Eddine and 
Schwienbacher (2013) argue that US limited partners with branches in Europe more likely 
directly invest in European PE funds, instead of using a US vehicle which invests in Europe. 
Thus, a local team can reduce the need for a local partner. This leads me to the hypothesis: 
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 H3  The likelihood of syndicates in cross-border buyouts will be lower with the 
presence of a local office. 
3.2.2.3 Local offices and the effect on deal size of cross-border buyouts 
PE sponsor’s local presence can reduce the hidden information problem ex ante a 
transaction, e.g., through broader local networks (Mingo et al., 2018). Improved access to 
private information is likely of highest value for smaller targets with non-public information 
(Berger & Udell, 1998). Respective information advantage, ceteris paribus to a purely foreign 
investor, can result in an increasing investment into smaller portfolio companies in terms of 
deal size. Following this line reasoning, deal size of cross-border buyouts would be lower after 
opening of a local office. 
In contrast to this, the Uppsala model argues, that firms increase their commitments in 
foreign markets with enhanced market knowledge. Respective knowledge reduces market 
uncertainty and increases the awareness for opportunities (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2006). 
Among others, a market commitment is indicated by the size of the investment (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1990). Thus, the additional risk of a higher investment size can be balanced by a better 
assessment of chances and risks.  
Within the PE industry, acquiring an equity stake of a portfolio company can be understood 
as an investment/commitment into/to a foreign firm. Investigating global equity flows, Hain et 
al. (2016) show that relational and institutional trust have a positive effect on the volume of 
cross-border VC flows and mitigate the negative effect of uncertainty resulting from distance. 
A local office represents one further measure to better assess risk (Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997). 
Moreover, the knowledge about institutions and possibility of more frequent in-person 
interactions allow the PE firms to establish a tighter and more regionally adapted governance 
(Tykvová & Schertler, 2014). Thereby, a local office can reduce uncertainty and detect risks 
early. I follow respective argumentation and assume that PE sponsors likely apply lower 
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investment constraints in terms of deal size in markets with a local office due to a better risk 
assessment. I expect that respective effect outweighs the better access to smaller targets. PE 
firms likely stronger invest in larger portfolio firms to justify the presence of a local office and 
aim for higher absolute investment returns. Therefore, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
H4  Deal size in cross-border buyouts will be higher with the presence of a local 
office. 
3.3 SAMPLE AND DATA 
3.3.1 Sample construction and description 
As a starting point, this study collects all leveraged buyouts with deal entry between 1997 
and 2016 from two databases, Bureau van Dijks “Zephyr” (BvD) and Preqin Private Equity. 
The sample includes all buyouts from “Zephyr”, where the financing type is classified as 
“private equity” or “leveraged buyout”, and all buyouts from Preqin with classification as 
“buyout” or “public-to-private”. I checked for identical buyouts, which are included in both 
databases, and harmonized PE sponsor names in case of differences. The consolidation of LBOs 
from two databases allows to significantly extend the scope of buyouts. Moreover, it reduces 
potential “white spots” of a single databank, e.g., a regional focus, and thereby increases 
reliability of results. This process results into an initial sample of 34,428 LBOs.  
I research data on headquarters (HQ) country and country of local offices of 1,375 PE firms 
with more than five buyouts in the sample. I collect information mainly by research of PE firm 
websites. I validate data on the office locations for PE firms with local offices via telephone 
interviews and mail exchange with PE firm officials. During this exchange, I collect 
information on office opening years. In direct contact with PE officials, I am also informed 
about former local offices in few cases, which have been closed in the meantime. 
The following analysis concentrates on all PE sponsors that either performed in sum more 
than 25 LBOs in the 20-year observation period, or/and performed more than ten cross-border 
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buyouts, or/and opened a local office and performed a deal in the respective market. This 
approach follows the intention that only PE sponsors with international activities or/and 
relevant total deal activity remain in the sample to be analyzed. Thereby, the body of the 
following analysis is stronger harmonized, i.e., small PE sponsors with local orientation are 
excluded, to increase reliability. The application of the selection criteria results into a total 
sample of 385 PE firms from 36 countries.9 Table 3.1 reports distribution of PE sponsors by 
HQ country. It shows that the majority of PE firms are based in the United States (43 percent) 
and the UK (18 percent), followed by France (9 percent). The sample also includes PE firms 
from emerging markets such as Chile, Malaysia and South Africa. 
Table 3.1: Distribution of PE firms by HQ country 
This table presents the distribution of PE sponsors in the sample by HQ country. The sample consists of 385 PE 
sponsors with either more than 25 buyouts in sample, ten cross-border buyouts, or opening of a local office and 
one deal in respective country between 1997 and 2016. 
      n in %        n in % 
1 United States  165 0.43  19 Japan  2 0.01 
2 United Kingdom (UK)  69 0.18  20 South Africa  2 0.01 
3 France  35 0.09  21 China  2 0.01 
4 The Netherlands  13 0.03  22 Slovakia  2 0.01 
5 Germany  11 0.03  23 Czech Republic  2 0.01 
6 Canada  11 0.03  24 Luxembourg  2 0.01 
7 Sweden  10 0.03  25 United Arab Emirates  1 0.00 
8 Australia  8 0.02  26 Malaysia  1 0.00 
9 Spain  7 0.02  27 Estonia  1 0.00 
10 Norway  7 0.02  28 New Zealand  1 0.00 
11 Italy  4 0.01  29 Greece  1 0.00 
12 Finland  4 0.01  30 Latvia  1 0.00 
13 Denmark  4 0.01  31 South Korea  1 0.00 
14 Switzerland  3 0.01  32 Argentina  1 0.00 
15 Poland  3 0.01  33 Singapore  1 0.00 
16 Hong Kong  3 0.01  34 Brazil  1 0.00 
17 Bahrain  2 0.01  35 Ireland  1 0.00 
18 Belgium  2 0.01  36 Chile  1 0.00 
        Total   385 1.00 
The 385 PE sponsors account for 18,842 transactions in the LBO database. 6,357 (34 
percent) of those buyouts are cross-borders deals, following the established definition that HQ 
of the PE sponsor and portfolio firm are located in different countries (e.g., Meuleman and 
                                                 
9 I exclude private equity arms of investment banks, e.g., Royal Bank Private Equity Ltd, ABN Amro, and Nomura 
Holdings, as it is difficult to assess whether branches of corporate company work for the PE division, nor not. 
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Wright, 2011; Cao et al., 2015).10 The resulting sample of international buyouts by far exceeds 
recent studies on cross-border LBOs in size (Cao et al., 2015; Chemmanur et al., 2018; 
Holloway et al., 2016). In a subsequent step, I checked whether a local office of the PE firm 
was opened before or in the year of the transaction. I specify those LBOs as “office deals” and 
refer to the remainder as “pure cross-border deals”. Note that in 44 percent (2,792 LBOs) of 
cross-border buyouts, the PE sponsor has a local presence in the target country at deal entry. In 
sum, the sample comprises 589 office openings, 547 of those in the observation period between 
1997 and 2016.11 Table 3.2 summarizes statistics for the 385 PE sponsors and reports statistics 
on foundation year as well as number of local offices. 
Table 3.2: Characteristics of PE firm sample 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 385 PE firms which are analyzed in course of this study. 
It presents information on PE firm foundation year, number of local offices and number of buyouts between 1997 
and 2016. 
    n mean median SD Q1 Q3         
PE firm information        
Foundation year  385 1991 1994 19.0 1986 2000 
Local offices  385 1.5 0 2.7 0 2         
        
Buyouts (1997-2016)        
Total deals  385 48.9 35 47.2 26 55 
Domestic deals  385 32.2 27 28.1 16 41 
Office deals  385 7.3 0 18.0 0 6 
Pure cross-border deals  385 9.3 4 13.7 1 11 
        
 
Table 3.2 presents that the mean PE sponsor in the sample was founded in 1991 and has 
opened 1.5 local offices. The 385 PE sponsors have performed on average 48.9 LBOs and in 
median 35 LBOs. Respective results indicate a right-skewness of deals performed by the PE 
sponsors. PE sponsors with most deals in the sample are Carlyle Group (460 LBOs), 3i Group 
(381 LBOs), and The Riverside Company (337 LBOs). Figure 3.1 visualizes the development 
of cross-border buyouts and office openings by year. 
                                                 
10 Note that for the ease of interpretation of later analysis, I focus on deals in 50 target countries with most deals. 
Respective target countries account for 99 percent of all LBOs in the main sample. 




Figure 3.1: Office openings and cross-border buyouts from 1997-2016 
This figure presents the number of office openings and cross-border buyouts of 589 PE firms by year in the period 
between 1997 and 2016. It reports office openings and buyouts of the 50 most relevant target countries, which are 
analyzed in course of the study. In case a PE firm opens more than one office in a local country, the first opening 
is reflected. 
 
Figure 3.1 reports that the cyclical development of the number of cross-border buyouts is 
consistent with the general PE market development. It shows a first peak in the pre-financial 
crisis years of 2006 and 2007, and recovers after a downturn to the absolute peak in 2016 with 
527 cross-border LBOs. The number of office openings develops similarly, especially for the 
period before the financial crisis in 2008/2009. Office openings reached their peak in 2007 with 
45 openings per year. As a consequence of the increasing number of local offices, the share of 
office deals in relation to all cross-border deals is increasing in the observation period. While 
office deals account for 33 percent of cross-border deals on average in the years before 2008, 
the share increases to 59 percent in 2016. Appendix 3.A.1 reports a detailed development of 
office openings and cross-border deals per target country. For example, it shows that the highest 
number of offices have been opened in the UK (71), followed by Germany (53). Similarly, the 
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3.3.2 Level of analysis 
In the following course of this study, I investigate the described sample of 385 PE sponsors 
including 6,357 cross-border LBOs on two different levels of analysis: PE-country-year level 
and deal level. 
Firstly, I analyze the determinants of office openings and deal activity on PE-country pairs 
in a time series analysis. Thereby, I investigate the behavior of PE sponsors in a specific target 
country over time. The resulting unit of analysis is a PE-country-year observation. An example 
of a PE-country-year observation is the deal activity of Carlyle Group in France in 2010. The 
sample covers in maximum 385,000 PE-country-year observations (385 PE sponsors x 50 target 
countries x 20 years). From that basis, PE-country-year observations are excluded when they 
meet the following criteria: 1) years from 1997 to 1999, as I use a three-year period to determine 
pre-observation year characteristics; 2) observations with PE sponsor foundation after the 
observation year; and 3) observations where the target county is equal to PE sponsor HQ 
country. This process results into a sample of 303,409 PE-country-year observations.  
For the analysis of office openings, I restrict the sample to those PE-country pairs where the 
PE firm made at least one LBO in the target country between 1997 and 2016 or opened an office 
there later. This follows the intention to only assess PE-country pairs which are relevant, i.e., 
an office opening has certain propensity. Moreover, I exclude PE-country-year observations 
where the office is already present in the observation year. This gives a total sample of 26,237 
PE-country-year observations of 1,850 PE-country pairs. For the analysis of deal activity, I 
focus on PE-country pairs where a PE firm opened a local office in the target country before or 
in the observation period. This sample allows to specifically investigate the time pre office 
opening versus post opening in a time series for 589 PE-country pairs. Thereby, it controls for 
a wide range of endogeneity concerns. Respective sample comprises 9,593 PE-country-year 
observations, of which in 5,678 observations (59 percent) a local office is present.  
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Secondly, hypotheses on deal characteristics (3-4) are tested on deal level, using the 6,357 
cross-border LBOs. I use two sub-samples to assess deal characteristics, i.e., propensity to 
syndicate with a partner (H3) and deal size (H4): 1) all 6,357 cross-border deals, and 2) a more 
focused sample comprising cross-border deals of PE sponsors which opened a local office in 
the target county (3,457 LBOs). Note, that sample size for analyses on deal size are lower due 
to limited availability of information on deal size. 
3.3.3 Variables 
3.3.3.1 Dependent variables 
The analysis on local office openings refers to the binary variable Office opening. The 
variable takes on a value of 1 in a PE-country-year observation, in case a local office is opened 
by the PE firm in the target country and year, and 0 otherwise. If a PE sponsor opens multiple 
offices in a country, only the first opening is considered. Analysis on cross-border deal activity 
uses the variable Number deals CB as the indicator for PE firms’ deal activity. It measures the 
number of cross-border LBOs by a PE firm in a target country and year. Moreover, the variable 
Dev number deal CB measures the yearly change in the number of deals by a PE sponsor in a 
target country. Later robustness tests refer to the variable Share deals CB. It determines the 
share of cross-border LBOs in the target country in relation to all cross-border LBOs of the PE 
sponsor in that year. Share deals CB is less biased by size of the PE sponsor and fluctuations 
over time, i.e., it stronger indicates how focused the PE firm invests in that particular target 
country in the observation year. Changes in respective variable are measured by Dev share 
deals CB. 
Regressions on deal characteristics investigate three variables: 1) the binary variable 
Syndicate, which takes on a value of 1, if the deal is performed by more than one PE sponsor, 
and 0 otherwise; 2) Local syndicate, which has the value of 1, in case one of the syndication 
partners is a domestic investor, and 0 otherwise; and 3) LN deal size represents the natural 
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logarithm (log) of deal size at deal entry according to BvD ORBIS, and if not available 
according to Prequin Private Equity. 
3.3.3.2 Explanatory and control variables 
In course of the study, the effect of a local office is tested using the binary explanatory 
variable Local office present, which takes on the value of 1, if respective PE firm has opened 
an office in the target country before or in the observation year. The variable Log years office 
opened represents the natural log of number of years the local office is opened. Moreover, I 
introduce five dummy variables for the years around the office opening, from two years before 
(office_opening_t-2) to two years after office opening (office_opening_t2). 
Beyond the presence of a local office, I control for multiple PE sponsor characteristics. 
Country experience measures the number of LBOs the PE sponsor has performed in the target 
country before the observation year. Comparably, Log CB experience represents the natural log 
of the number of total cross-border LBOs the PE sponsor has performed before the observation 
year. Log number deals PE is the natural log of total LBOs of the PE sponsor in the observation 
year. To account for PE firm’s propensity for cross-border investments, I introduce CB share 
PE_L3 years. It measures the share of cross-border LBOs relative to all LBOs of the PE sponsor 
within the period of three years before the observation year. Log avg deal size PE_L3 years 
represents the natural log of deal sizes of all LBOs the PE sponsor performed within three years 
before the observation year. In addition, I include the natural log of deal value (LN deal 
size_imputed) to control for differences in portfolio firm’s size. I retrieve deal values for 3,025 
cross-border LBOs from BvD’s ORBIS and Preqin database. Deal values for the 3,332 LBOs 
with missing deal values are estimated using a Heckman two stage imputation model.12 
Additionally, regressions include control variables for time-variant characteristics of the PE 
                                                 
12 The model is named after the procedure outlined by Heckman (1979). I base the estimation on the original 




firm country and target country. Log number deals_target country is the natural log of total 
buyouts by all PE firms in the target country in the observation year. Log number deals_PE 
country is respective variable for all LBOs in the PE country. I apply both variables as indicators 
for the total deal flow in the local/foreign PE market. Moreover, regressions control for 
GDPgrowth_PE country and GDPgrowth_target country. Those variables present real GDP 
growth in the PE home country, and target country respectively, in the observation year. 
Variables are calculated using World Bank data. To account for target country’s general 
attraction of cross-border investments, CB share_target country determines the share of cross-
border LBOs in the target country relative to all LBOs in the target market in the observation 
year. Moreover, extant literature provides evidence that equity flows are related to the 
institutional/legal environment in the target country (e.g., Cao et al., 2015; Groh, Liechtenstein, 
& Lieser, 2010; Guler & Guillén, 2010). Therefore, I include the variable Insti quality_target 
country. I refer to year-specific scores from the World Governance Index (WGI) developed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011). The WGI values institutional governance along six 
dimensions: government effectiveness, quality of institutional policies, rule of law, political 
stability, voice and accountability, and control of corruption. Insti quality_target country is 
calculated as the average of the six governance dimensions, in line with Li et al. (2014). 
Lastly, regressions control for distance between PE firm and target county. They include 
binary variables Common border and Common language. Variables take on the value of 1, in 
case both countries share a common border, or/and a common language respectively, and 0 
otherwise. To stronger differentiate, I introduce two dimensions of geographic and cultural 
distance. Log geo distance represents the natural log of the distance between the capital cities 
of the PE sponsor and the target country. As an indicator of cultural distance, Cultural distance 
refers to most recent Hofstede scores (Hofstede, 2001). In line with Dai and Nahata (2016) and 
Nahata, Hazarika, and Tandon (2014), the variable is calculated as the average of the distance 
along all six dimensions: power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, 
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long-term orientation, and indulgence. In addition, studies such as Åckerman (2015) and 
Francis, Hasan, Sun, & Waisman (2014) indicate that PE sponsors can learn from previous 
deals of other local PE firms in the target country. Consistently, the variable Log country tie 
represents the natural log of the number of total deals from other PE firms with the same HQ 
country in the target country within the three years before the observation year.  
Moreover, in time series regressions I control for the dependent variable in the pre-
observation year by including a one-year lagged dependent variable, e.g., Number deals 
CB_lagged. Table 3.3 provides a more detailed description including sources of variables used 
in course of the study. 
Table 3.3: Variable definitions 
This table describes the construction details and sources of the dependent (panel A) and independent (panel B) 
variables used in this paper. 
Panel A: Dependent variables  
Variable Description 
Office opening Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 in a PE-country-year observation, in case a 
local office is opened by the relevant PE firm in the respective target country and year, 
and 0 otherwise. Source: Hand collected data from PE firm websites and interviews. 
Number deals CB Number of cross-border LBOs by a PE firm in a target country and year. Source: BvD 
Zephyr and Prequin Private Equity. 
Dev number deals CB Change in "Number deals CB" compared to previous observation year. Source: BvD 
Zephyr and Prequin Private Equity. 
Share deals CB Share of cross-border LBOs in the respective target country in relation to all cross-
border LBOs of the PE sponsor in that year. Source: BvD Zephyr and Prequin Private 
Equity. 
Dev share deals CB Change in "Share deals CB" compared to previous observation year. Source: BvD 
Zephyr and Prequin Private Equity. 
Syndicate Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1, if the deal is performed by more than one 
PE sponsor, and 0 otherwise. Source: BvD Zephyr and Prequin Private Equity. 
Local syndicate  Dummy of 1 if the buyout is performed as a syndicate, where at least one PE sponsor 
has its headquarters in the target country, and 0 otherwise. Source: Hand collected data 
from PE firm websites and interviews. 
LN deal size Natural logarithm of deal value in million USD at deal entry. Source: BvD Orbis (if 
value available), and Prequin Private Equity otherwise. 
Panel B: Independent variables  
Variable Description 
Local office present Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1, if respective PE firm has opened an office 
in the target country before or in the observation year. Source: Hand collected data 
from PE firm websites and interviews. 
Log years office 
opened 
Natural logarithm of number of years the local office is opened by the PE firm in the 
respective target country. Source: Hand collected data from PE firm websites and 
interviews. 
office_opening_0 Dummy variable that has a value of 1, if the PE firm opened an office in the target 
country in the observation year. 
office_opening_-2 Dummy variable that has a value of 1, if the PE firm opened an office in the target 
country two years after the observation year. 
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office_opening_-1 Dummy variable that has a value of 1, if the PE firm opened an office in the target 
country one year after the observation year. 
office_opening_1 Dummy variable that has a value of 1, if the PE firm has opened an office in the target 
country one year before the observation year. 
office_opening_2 Dummy variable that has a value of 1, if the PE firm has opened an office in the target 
country two years before the observation year. 
Country experience Number of buyouts the PE sponsor has performed in the target country before the 
observation year. Source: BvD Zephyr and Prequin Private Equity. 
Log CB experience Natural logarithm of the number of general cross-border buyouts the PE sponsor has 
performed before the observation year. Source: BvD Zephyr and Prequin Private 
Equity. 
Log number deals PE Natural logarithm of total buyouts of the PE sponsor in the observation year. Source: 
BvD Zephyr and Prequin Private Equity. 
CB share PE_L3 years  Share of cross-border buyouts relative to all buyouts of the PE sponsor within the 
period of three years before the observation year. Source: BvD Zephyr and Prequin 
Private Equity. 
Log avg deal size 
PE_L3 years 
Natural logarithm of deal sizes of all buyouts the PE sponsor performed within three 
years before the observation year incl. the buyout itself. Source: BvD Orbis (if value 
available), and Prequin Private Equity otherwise. 
Log number 
deals_target country 
Natural logarithm of total deals by all PE firms in the target country in the observation 
year. Source: BvD Zephyr and Prequin Private Equity. 
Log number deals_PE 
country 
Natural logarithm of total deals by all PE firms in PE firm's home country in the 
observation year. Source: BvD Zephyr and Prequin Private Equity. 
GDPgrowth_target 
country 
Real GDP growth in USD in the PE home country. Source: World Bank data. 
GDPgrowth_PE 
country 
Real GDP growth in USD in the target country. Source: World Bank data. 
CB share_target 
country 
Share of cross-border buyouts in the target country relative to all buyouts in the market 
in the observation year. Source: BvD Zephyr and Prequin Private Equity. 
LN deal size_imputed Natural logarithm of deal value in million USD. Deal value of buyouts is imputed using 
Heckman two stage imputation model based on 11,101 buyouts with deal value 
information. Values are winsorized on a 2.5% level. 
Common border Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1, if PE home country and target country 
share a common border. Source: Hand collected data from PE firm websites and 
interviews. Data is received from CEPII website: 
www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
Common language Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1, if PE home country and target country 
share a common language. Source: Hand collected data from PE firm websites and 
interviews. Data is received from CEPII website: 
www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
Log geo distance Natural logarithm of the distance in miles between the capitals of the countries of the 
portfolio firm and PE sponsor. Data is received from CEPII website: 
www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
Cultural distance Difference in Hofstede scores between the home countries of the portfolio firm and the 
PE sponsor. I apply the average difference of six Hofstede dimensions (power distance, 
individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and 
indulgence). Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/. 
Log country tie Natural logarithm of prior cross-border buyouts within the prior three years before the 
respective transaction between PE firms located in the country of the PE sponsor 
investing in target country. To construct this variable, I combine buyout data from BvD 
Zephyr and Prequin Private Equity with information on locations of the PE sponsor. 
Number deals 
CB_lagged 
One year lagged variable "Number deals CB" 
Dev number deals 
CB_lagged 
One year lagged variable "Dev number deals CB" 
Share deals 
CB_lagged 
One year lagged variable "Share deals CB" 
Dev share deals 
CB_lagged 
One year lagged variable "Dev share deals CB" 
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3.4 DETERMINANTS OF OFFICE OPENINGS 
The following analysis uses a probit model to test which characteristics affect the propensity 
of PE firms to open a local office in a relevant market in a certain year. Regressions refer to 
Office opening as the dependent variable. The sample comprises all 26,237 PE-country-year 
observations in countries in which the PE firm made at least one buyout in the observation 
period or/and opened a local office. Regressions test the influence of various PE firm, country 
and distance related factors. Table 3.4 reports results for each category first separately in 
columns 1 to 3, and combines all independent variables in columns 4 and 5. Regressions include 
PE sponsor, target country and year fixed effects to account for systematic differences beyond 
variables of interest. 
Table 3.4: Factors associated with PE firms’ local office opening 
The table presents results of probit regressions on the determinants PE firms’ opening of a local office in respective 
target country and observation year. The sample consists of 26,237 PE-country-year observations for 1,850 PE-
country pairs between 2000 and 2016. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 
one if the PE firm opened the first local office in the country-year, and zero otherwise. Only PE-country pairs in 
countries in which the PE firm has at least one buyout in that country between 1997 and 2016 are included. 
Observations, at which a local office is already present, are excluded. Probit regressions test the influence of PE 
firm, PE country and target country, as well as distance variables. I control for entry year, target country, PE firm 
fixed effects. I use robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 Probit - Office opening 
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Year FE YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
PE firm FE YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Target country FE YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
N 26,237  26,237  26,237  26,237  26,237  
PE-country pairs 1,850  1,850  1,850  1,850  1,850  
Pseudo R² 0.23  0.23  0.23  0.24  0.24  
Looking at the three tested PE sponsor characteristics, Table 3.4 reports that Country 
experience_PE, i.e., the number of prior buyouts in that market, and the total number of deals 
of the PE firm (Log number deals_PE) are significantly positively related to an opening of a 
local office. Respective results are consistent with Johanson and Vahlne (1990, 2003) who 
argue that firms likely choose an entry mode with lower commitment fist and increase 
commitment and investment after they gathered some local knowledge, i.e., reduced 
uncertainty. In parallel, PE firm’s general propensity for foreign investments, i.e., the share of 
cross-border deals in the last the years “CB share PE_L3 years”, has a positive effect, which is 
however not statistically significant. 
Column 2 presents that the decision to open a local office is more affected by target 
country characteristics than PE firm’s home market. Log number deals_target country and 
GDPgrowth_target country show a statistically positive effect on the office opening propensity. 
Respective results suggest that PE firms show a higher commitment in countries with 
potentially higher opportunities, i.e., greater market size in term of number of deals and market 
growth. This finding is consistent with Johansson and Vahlne’s (2006) argumentation that firms 
faster expand when they see higher opportunities in the market. Moreover, likelihood to 
establish a local presence is higher in markets with more profound institutional/legal standards. 
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This result is coherent with discussions in literature that higher legal standards facilitate cross-
border investments and equity flows (e.g., Cao et al., 2015). Results on market size and market 
growth are supported by combined regressions (column 4-5).  
Table 3.4 suggests that PE firms exhibit a local bias in the decision to open a local office. 
Results indicate that PE firms have a significantly higher propensity to open an office in a 
country with a common language. This notion of a local bias is supported by tests on the effect 
of geographic (Log geo distance) and cultural distance (Cultural distance). Both distance 
dimensions have a significant negative relationship to the likelihood to open a local office in 
the respective market. Interestingly, a common border has no statistical effect. One potential 
reason that a common border does not increase opening likelihood is that the benefits of a local 
office are less strong in a neighboring market, as PE firms have easier access to the market from 
their headquarters. This argument stands in contrast to the argument that PE firm’s show higher 
commitment in a more known environment. Moreover, PE firms more likely open a local office 
in markets with higher prior deal flow of other PE firms (Log_country_tie). 
To better understand how the relevance of determinants varies dependent on the 
experience of the PE sponsor, I re-run the regression analysis for four sub-samples. I split the 
sample among two indicators for experience, 1) the number of existing offices of the PE 
sponsor, and 2) the total number of deals in the previous three years. I define experienced PE 
sponsors as firms with more than one local office in the first sample split, and more than nine 
total deals in the last three years in the second sample split.13 Results are presented in the 
Appendices in 3.A.2. Tests for both sample splits indicate, that the number of previous deals of 
the PE firms in the target country as well as target country opportunities (in terms of number of 
deals and GDP growth) have lower statistical and economic relevance for experienced 
investors. The Uppsala model provides an explanation for this observation. Likely more 
                                                 
13 Values for sample split represent the median of PE-country-year observations with office opening. 
  
73 
experienced investors can leverage their experiential knowledge from existing offices and 
transactions to better assess chances and reduce uncertainties (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990). In 
parallel, less experienced investors likely first collect target country specific knowledge and 
rely on general market opportunities such as GDP growth.  
3.5 IMPACT OF LOCAL OFFICES 
3.5.1 Effect on deal activity  
3.5.1.1 Base results 
I investigate how the presence of a local office affects deal activity of a PE firm in the target 
country between 2000 and 2016 using time series analysis. The dependent variable Number 
deals CB measures the total number of buyouts in the target country and year by a PE firm. To 
begin, Figure 3.2 graphically presents the average number of buyouts in the target country per 
year around an office opening, from four years before to six years after the office opening. 
Sample comprises all 589 PE-country pairs where a PE firm opened a local office until 2016.  
Figure 3.2: Development of investment activity around office openings 
This figure presents the average number of yearly cross-border buyouts (Number deals CB) by one PE firm around 
the opening of a local office in a target country. The sample includes all PE-country pairs, for which a local office 
























Years from office opening
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Graphics visualize the increase in deal activity around the opening of a local office. While 
the average number of buyouts before the year the PE firm opened the office is around 0.12 
LBOs, it starts to increase in the year before office opening and reaches a level of 0.32 buyouts 
in the year of office opening. In the following years, the number of deals in the target country 
continually increases to above 0.4 buyouts on average in year 3, and then stays on this plateau. 
Respective graphics are a strong indicator in support of hypothesis 1, that foreign expansion is 
higher with the presence of a local office. In parallel, data shows that the PE sponsors have an 
average deal activity in their home countries of around 2.5 buyouts in the year of an office 
opening. This implies that in spite of an increase in foreign deal activity with a local office, PE 
sponsors still inhibit a strong local bias. 
Followingly, I use fixed effects panel regression analysis to control for other variables which 
affect PE firms’ investment activity.14 This regression technique has the advantage that all time-
constant PE-country characteristics, e.g., general ability of the PE sponsor, and constant 
characteristics of PE home country, are omitted. Hereby, I address potential endogeneity 
concerns. Sample comprises 589 PE-country pairs with a total of 9,593 PE-country-year 
observations. Regressions include the explanatory variables of interest, Local office present and 
Log years office opened. Moreover, multiple time-varying PE sponsor characteristics, home 
and target country variables, as well as year fixed effect are added. Table 3.5 presents the 
results. 
Table 3.5: Factors associated with PE firms’ investment activity in foreign countries 
This table reports panel estimates for the number of cross-border deals in a target county country by a PE firm 
(Number deals CB) in the observation period from 2000-2016 in column 1 and 2 using a Poisson regression model. 
Additionally, it reports OLS panel estimates for changes in the number of deals (Dev number deal CB) in column 
3 and 4. I run regressions on a sample of 589 PE-country pairs at which the PE firm opened a local office in or 
before the observation period. Regressions analyze the influence of a local office (local office present), the years 
the local office is opened (log_years office opened), and different years around office opening as dummies. 
Moreover, regressions include independent variables of PE firm, HQ country and PE sponsor country 
characteristics as well as the one-year lagged dependent variable. All regressions include PE-target country and 
                                                 
14 I apply a fixed effect Poisson model for regressions with the dependent variables, Number deals CB, as respective 
variable is count data.  
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year fixed effects. I apply robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Poisson - Number deals CB  OLS - Dev number deal CB 
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Log number deals PE 1.458 *** 1.458 ***  0.296 *** 0.296 *** 










Log number deals_PE country -0.090  -0.094   -0.107 *** -0.110 *** 










Log number deals_target country 0.926 *** 0.927 ***  0.132 *** 0.130 *** 










CB share_target country 1.255 *** 1.254 ***  0.121 *** 0.123 *** 










GDPgrowth_target country 0.000  -0.001   -0.002  -0.003  










Insti quality_target country -0.760 ** -0.738 **  -0.243 *** -0.246 *** 










Number deals CB_lagged -0.040 ** -0.038 **      
 (0.02)  (0.02)       
          









  (0.02)  (0.02)  
 
         
               
Year FE YES  YES   YES  YES  
PE-country FE YES  YES   YES  YES  
N 9,593  9,593   9,593  9,593  
PE-country pairs 589  589   589  589  
R² (Pseudo R²) 0.37  0.38   0.27  0.27  
In addition to results for dependent variable Number deals CB (column 1-2), columns 3 and 
4 present results for the dependent variables Dev Number deals CB. It is an indicator for the 
change (speed) in internationalization. As explanatory variables, I include five year dummy 
variables around the office opening, such as office_opening_0, to test in which years deal 
activity mostly changes. 
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 Consistent with hypothesis 1, results in columns 1 and 2 indicate that the number of deals 
performed by a PE firm in a target county is significantly (p<0.01) higher in years with a local 
office than without. The coefficient indicates that with a presence of a local office deal activity 
is more than 0.6 deals higher on average. In parallel, regression results in column 2 present that 
the number of deals in a target country does not increase with the years of existence of the local 
office. Respective finding suggests that cross-border deal activity in countries with local office 
significantly goes up around the year the office is opened and remains on that level afterwards. 
Respective notion is supported by results, analyzing the change in deal activity in columns 3 
and 4. They show that deal activity most economically and statistically increases in the year of 
the office opening (office_opening_0). The coefficient in column 4 indicates a positive change 
in deal activity of 0.1 buyouts on average in the year of the office opening. In parallel, the year 
before and after office opening also show a statistically positive development. Respective 
findings indicate that the event of an office opening is triggering the uplift in foreign deal 
activity. 
Beside that factor, the general deal activity of the PE firm in a year (Log number deals PE) 
is significantly positively related to its buyouts in a foreign market. Moreover, a higher number 
of deals (Log number deals_PE country) and a higher share of international investors in the 
target country (CB share_target country) are positively related to PE firm’s deal activity. In 
parallel, the total number of deals in PE firm’s home market, is negatively related to its foreign 
expansion. This implies that PE firms less likely look for foreign opportunities when their home 
market is larger and growing. Counterintuitively, a higher annual score in institutional quality 
in the target country (Insti quality_target country) tends to have a negative effect on buyout 
activity of foreign investors. 
I test robustness of results based on two further analyses. Firstly, I test whether the higher 
buyout activity in the target is not only driven by general growth of the PE firm, but corresponds 
to a higher propensity of the PE firm to invest in the respective foreign market. Therefore, I re-
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run regressions with the dependent variables Share deals CB and Dev Share deals CB, 
respectively. It measures the share of cross-border LBOs in the target country in relation to all 
cross-border LBOs of the PE sponsor in that year. Results, which support the base findings, are 
presented in Appendix 3.A.3. They show that sample firms significantly increase not only the 
total number, but also cross-border investment focus in the target country, where a local office 
is opened. 
Secondly, some academics propose to apply a dynamic panel regression model instead of a 
static panel regression as used in the previous analyses (Anderson & Hsiao, 1981; Flannery & 
Hankins, 2013). The argument is that the inclusion of a lagged dependent variables as 
explanatory variable violates the assumption of exogeneity, as the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term. As a consequence, estimators in the fixed effects model are 
inconsistent. An established method to cope with this bias is to apply Arellano-Bond method 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991). Hereby, fixed effects are eliminated by taking the first difference of 
the original model on both sides. Then, all available deeper lags of the dependent variable as 
well as standard instrument variables, if applicable, are used as instruments for the lagged 
dependent variable. Following Arellano-Bond, I re-run base regressions in a dynamic panel 
model. Results are not presented for brevity. In sum, those results are consistent with the 
findings of the fixed effects panel regression presented in Table 3.5. Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions indicates that applied subsets of instruments are appropriate in both 
regression models. 
3.5.1.2 Effect of local offices on deal activity dependent on distance 
In a second step, I follow the research question on the effect of distance between PE sponsor 
and portfolio firm on PE firm’s foreign expansion dependent on a local office. As distance 
variables are time-constant and would drop out of fixed effect panel analysis, I investigate the 
yearly deal activity in a target county (Number deals CB) in a cross-sectional tobit regression. 
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I include year, target country and PE firm fixed effects to control for respective differences 
within the sample. The sample comprises all 5,678 PE-country-year observations where a local 
office is present. This allows to investigate whether distance has an effect on deal activity, when 
the PE firm operates through a local presence in the target country. Beside explanatory 
variables, which are tested in the base regression in Table 3.5, I include variables on 
commonality of language and border (column 1) as well as distance in terms of geographic and 
cultural difference (column 2). Results are presented in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Influence of distance on investment activity in foreign countries with local office 
This table reports estimates for the number of cross-border deals in a target county (Number deals CB) in the 
observation period from 2000-2016 using a tobit model. Sample includes 5,678 PE-target country-year 
observations where a local office is present. Beside independent variables tested in Table 3.5, analyses include 
variables on distance between PE sponsor and target company (common border, common language, log_country 
tie, log_geographic distance, cultural distance). Moreover, regressions include PE firm, target country and year 
fixed effects. I apply robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 Tobit - Number deals CB 
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Log number deals PE 1.959 *** 1.958 *** 






Log number deals_PE country -0.214  -0.239  *   






Log number deals_target country 1.135 *** 1.147 *** 






CB share_target country 1.864 *** 1.918 *** 






GDPgrowth_target country -0.005  -0.005  






Insti quality_target country -1.611 *** -1.689 *** 






Number deals CB_lagged 0.159 *** 0.154 *** 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  
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Year FE YES  YES  
PE firm FE YES  YES  
Target country FE YES  YES  
N 5,678  5,678  
Pseudo R² 0.21  0.21  
Results indicate a higher deal activity in countries which are more proximate to PE firm’s 
home market. Number of buyouts are significantly higher in foreign countries with a Common 
Border and Common language. For example, the coefficient indicates on average 0.73 more 
buyouts per year in countries with the same language. Similarly, results in column 2 show a 
significantly higher investment activity in less geographically (Log geo distance) and culturally 
distant (Cultural distance) markets. This implies that PE firms tend to perform less buyouts in 
countries which are culturally more distant, even if they have a local investment team there. In 
addition, results show a positive relationship between prior deal flow of others between the 
countries (Log country tie) and the number of foreign investments by an individual PE firm. In 
sum, respective findings support hypothesis 2a that offices cannot entirely mitigate the bias 
towards closer investment targets. Result are consistent with Johansson and Vahlne’s (2003) 
argumentation, that firms show faster international expansion and higher investments in 
contexts which are more familiar. 
To test robustness of this argumentation, I analyze whether presented local bias is different 
compared to the local bias in cases, where no local office is present. Therefore, I extend the 
sample and also include PE-country-year observations prior to the opening of a local office. 
Thus, the sample comprises all 9,593 PE-country-year observations. To analyze how a local 
office moderates the effect of distance, I interact the variable Local office present with distance 
variables. Results, which are presented in Appendix 3.A.5, show that none of the described 
interaction terms has a statistically positive effect. Those results support the notion that a local 
office does not significantly reduce the local bias in foreign deal activity of PE firms. 
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3.5.2 Effect on deal characteristics 
The following analyses refer to the deal sample of 6,357 cross-border buyouts. Table 3.7 
presents descriptive statistics on the share of syndicates (panel A) and deal size (panel B) for 
two sub-samples. The first sub-sample comprises all cross-border buyouts. The second sub-
sample includes buyouts for those PE-country pairs where a PE firm opened a local office in or 
before the observation period.  
Table 3.7: Syndicates and deal size in cross-border buyouts 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the share of syndicates (Panel A) and deal size (Panel B). Table shows 
results for the sample of all cross-border buyouts (N=6,357) and the sample of buyouts in countries with local 
office opening before or after the buyout (N=3,457). Sample size for Panel B varies owing to availability of 
information on deal value. The table separately presents results for the subsample of office deals and pure cross-
border deals. Univariate differences between sub-samples are tested using t-test. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A - Share of syndicates     
  
Sample of all cross-border buyouts 
 Sample of buyouts in countries with 
local office (pre and post opening) 
  mean  median n  mean  median n 
Cross-border buyout (no 
differentiation) 
0.27  0 6,357  0.24  0 3,457 
Pure cross-border buyouts 0.31  0 3,565  0.28  0 665 
Office buyouts 0.23  0 2,792  0.23  0 2,792 
Pure cross-border vs. office   
buyouts 
0.08 *** 0    0.05 *** 0   
       
Panel B - Deal size (in million USD)   
  
Sample of all cross-border buyouts 
 Sample of buyouts in countries with 
local office (pre and post opening) 
  mean  median n  mean  median n 
Cross-border buyout (no 
differentiation) 
249.5  281.9 3,025  241.6  270.8 1,658 
Pure cross-border buyouts 245.6  276.1 1,689  194.5  210.1 322 
Office buyouts 254.6  287.7 1,336  254.6  287.7 1,336 
Pure cross-border vs. office 
buyouts 
8.9  11.6    60.1 *** 77.7   
Table 3.7 reports that on average 27 percent of all cross-border deals are syndicates. Hereby, 
the share of syndicates at office buyouts is significantly lower (23 percent) than at pure cross-
border buyouts (31 percent). For those 665 pure cross-border buyouts where the PE firm later 
opens a local office in the target country, 28 percent of buyouts are syndicates. Panel B shows 
that the average deal has a size of USD $242 million in the reduced sample. In markets where 
PE firms open a local office in the observation period, deal value is USD $60 million lower for 
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those deals which are performed before office opening compared to deals performed post 
opening. Following analyses in this chapter investigate the effect of a local office on both 
characteristics, propensity of syndicates and deal value, across cross-border buyouts using 
cross-sectional regression analyses.  
3.5.2.1 Propensity of syndicates in cross-border buyouts 
The following analysis applies a probit model to test which characteristics affect the 
propensity of PE firms to syndicate with a partner. I differentiate between the general propensity 
to partner, and the propensity to syndicate with local a partner. Consequently, regressions refer 
to two different binary dependent variables: Syndicate, which takes on the value of 1, in case 
the buyout is a syndicate deal, 0 otherwise, and Local Syndicate which takes on the value of 1 
if the foreign PE firm syndicates with at least one local partner, 0 otherwise. As explained in 
section 3.3.2, the hypothesis is tested at two different sub-samples: 1) all cross-border deals, 
and 2) buyouts in a PE-country pair where the PE firm opened a local office in or before the 
observation period. Regressions investigate the effect of a local office using the variable Local 
office present. Additionally, I include variables on investor experience to analyze what effect 
PE firm’s general international experience (Log CB experience) and experience in that specific 
country (Country experience) have. Regressions include control variables on deal size, target 
country characteristics and distance between PE sponsor and portfolio firm. Moreover, year, 
target country and PE firm fixed effect are included. Results are presented in Table 3.8. It 
reports regression results for the dependent variable Syndicate in columns 1 and 2, and results 
for Local Syndicate in columns 3 and 4. 
Table 3.8: Determinants of syndicates in cross-border buyouts 
The table presents results of a probit regression on the determinants of the choice to syndicate with a partner in a 
cross-border deal. The variable of interest is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1, if the deal is syndicated 
with a partner, and 0 otherwise. Regressions in columns 3 and 4 specifically test for a syndication with a local 
partner. I test the determinants in two samples. Sample 1 (columns 1 and 3) includes all cross-border deals 
(N=6,357). Sample 2 (columns 2 and 4) includes all deals in countries in which a PE opened a local office 
(N=3,457). In the regressions, I analyze the effect of local offices, general cross-border experience, country 
experience, as well as the influence of deal, target country and distance variables. I control for entry year, target 
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country, PE firm fixed effects. I use robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 























Local office present -0.226 *** -0.225 **  -0.136 * -0.189  










Country experience 0.006  0.007   0.014 *** 0.011 * 










Log CB experience -0.315 *** -0.215   -0.024  -0.004  










LN deal size_imputed 0.424 *** 0.500 ***  0.332 *** 0.347 *** 










log_no deals target country 0.053  -0.067   0.217 * 0.066  










inst quality_target country -0.373  -0.077   -0.151  0.783  










GDPgrowth_target country 0.003  0.030 ***  0.005  0.041 ** 










Common border 0.027  -0.421 **  0.042  -1.113 *** 










Common language -0.203 ** 0.104   -0.238 * 0.479 * 










Log_country_tie -0.038  0.061   0.069  0.059  










               
Year FE YES  YES   YES  YES  
PE firm FE YES  YES   YES  YES  
Target country FE YES  YES   YES  YES  
N 6,357  3,457   6,357  3,457  
Pseudo R² 0.25  0.26   0.32  0.35  
Columns 1 and 2 show that the presence of local office is significantly negatively related to 
the propensity to syndicate with a partner. The effect also holds for the reduced sample (column 
2) when I compare the pre-office opening to post-office opening behavior. Marginal effects 
analysis suggests that a local office reduces likelihood of partnering by 4.9 percentage points 
(sample in column 2), ceteris paribus. Those results support hypothesis 3. Moreover, regression 
results show that the general cross-border experience (Log CB experience) has a negative 
relationship to syndicate likelihood. Results are in line with learning theory, which argues that 
cross-border experience creates experiential knowledge, thereby reduces uncertainty (e.g., de 
Prijcker et al., 2012; Eriksson et al., 1997). Accordingly, necessity for syndicates is lower. In 
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opposite, country experience (Country experience) shows a positive relationship. At first, this 
seems to be counter-intuitive applying the argument of experiential learning. Nevertheless, this 
result is consistent with the evidence from Dai and Nahata (2016). They argue that local 
experience allows investors to get to know local partners who are willing to partner. When 
looking at the results in column 3 and 4, this argumentation can be supported. Foreign investors 
tend to partner more with local partners the more experience they have in the respective country. 
In parallel, a local office is negatively related to local syndicates, however, less strongly 
compared to general syndicates. A possible explanation can be that foreign PE firms stronger 
rely on non-local partners when they do not have an office there, as they do not have a relevant 
network in the host market. 
As results show that general cross-border experience significantly reduces syndicate 
propensity, I check for robustness whether the effect of a local office also holds for both sub-
samples of PE sponsors with below and above median cross-border experience (Log CB 
experience). Results, which are not presented for brevity, show that a local office is significantly 
negatively related to syndicate likelihood for both sub-samples, i.e., internationally experienced 
and less experienced PE firms.  
Beyond the office presence and experience variables, further independent variables indicate 
that the propensity to syndicate increases with deal size (LN deal size_imputed), what is 
intuitive. Moreover, GDP growth (GDPgrowth_target country) is positively related to the 
propensity to syndicates in general and to syndicates with local partners. One possible 
explanation can be that competition and prices are higher in growth times, and that multiple PE 
firms like to benefit from growth, and thus cooperate. Looking at the distance variables, results 
show that a common border (Common border) has negative relationship to syndicate likelihood 
in the smaller sample. Respective results are consistent with literature, as a common border 
implies that monitoring costs are reduced, i.e., uncertainty is relatively low compared to deals 
which are more distant.  
  
84 
3.5.2.2 Deal size in cross-border buyouts 
The following analysis on deal size of cross-border buyouts applies a cross-sectional OLS 
regression. Dependent variable is “LN deal size”, the natural log of deal size at deal entry. 
Independent variables are similar to those applied in regressions on propensity of syndicates. 
In addition, regressions include two control variables, Syndicate and Log avg deal size PE_L3 
years to consider systematic differences of syndicates and PE firms’ propensity for larger deals. 
Note, that sample size is reduced in the following analyses, owing to limited availability of 
information on deal size. Regression results are presented in Table 3.9. 
Table 3.9: Determinants of deal value in cross-border buyouts 
The table presents results of an OLS regression explaining the variability in deal size of cross-border buyouts. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of deal value in million USD. I test the influence of various variables 
in two samples. Sample 1 (column 1) includes all cross-border deals. Sample 2 (column 2) includes all deals in 
countries in which a PE opened a local office. In the regressions, I analyze the effect of local offices, general cross-
border experience, country experience, as well as the influence of deal, target country and distance variables. I 
control for entry year, target country and PE firm fixed effects. I use robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 OLS - LN deal size 
 
All cross-border deals 
Deals in countries 
with local office 






Local office present 0.120 ** 0.179 ** 






Country experience -0.005  -0.002  






Log CB experience 0.140 ** 0.300 *** 






Log avg deal size PE_L3 years 0.831 *** 0.756 *** 






Syndicate 0.617 *** 0.640 *** 






log_no deals target country -0.022  0.032  
 (0.07)  (0.10)  
     










GDPgrowth_target country -0.010  -0.017 ** 






Common border -0.310 *** -0.426 ** 






Common language 0.112  0.313 * 






Log_country_tie 0.039  0.041  








        
Year FE YES  YES  
PE firm FE YES  YES  
Target country FE YES  YES  
N 3,025  1,658  
R² 0.62  0.65  
Table 3.9 shows that the presence of local office is significantly positively related to deal 
size. The effect is significant on a 5 percent level when analyzing all cross-border deals (column 
1) and also when investigating only buyouts in PE-country pairs with a local office opening 
(column 2). Coefficients for country experience (Country experience) indicate no significant 
change in deal size with PE firm’s experience gathered in the county. In parallel, general cross-
border experience (Log CB experience) has a significant positive relationship with deal size, 
which implies that general experiential knowledge can be used. Those results support 
hypothesis 4 that the presence of a local office is positively related to deal size. 
To test robustness that deal size in general increases with a local office, and results are not 
driven by few comparably large deals, I compare deal values of office and pure cross-border 
deals by percentiles. Results, which are not shown for brevity, present that office deals are 
larger in all percentiles. Moreover, variance test shows no significant difference in variance 
between the two sub-samples. Respective tests show that the argumentation for more smaller 
buyouts in case of a local presence due to better screening does not hold. As a further robustness 
test, I analyze whether the effect of local offices differentiates between internationally 
experienced and unexperienced PE firms. Therefore, I split the sample among median cross-
border experience of PE firms (Log CB experience). Results indicate that a local presence is 
only significantly positively related to deal size for experienced investors. A possible 
explanation for this can be that especially more experienced, and likely larger PE firms, can use 
a step-wise approach. Thus, experienced sponsors can invest low at the beginning and increase 
commitment (reduce investment constraints) over time, while unexperienced investors may not 
have the fire power to size up, or/and do not want to face the risk. 
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Looking at the control variables, regression results indicate that deal size is higher for 
syndicates (Syndicates) and investors with high prior deal size (Log avg deal size PE_L3 years). 
PE firms tend to have larger deals in countries with higher institutional quality (Insti 
quality_target country ). This result is intuitive from an uncertainty avoidance tactic. Moreover, 
regressions results suggest that cross-border buyouts in neighboring countries are smaller 
(Common border). Applying the argument of uncertainty avoidance this result is counter-
intuitive, as uncertainty in a closer market is likely lower. However, screening and monitoring 
can be one main argument why PE sponsors invest in smaller targets which are closer. PE firms 
may have better access to information of small targets in countries which are closer and 
monitoring cost are lower. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this article, I study the role of local offices for PE firm’s internationalization. In spite of 
the high practical relevance, this topic is not intensively researched in literature yet. As a 
starting point, the paper documents the determinants to open a local office. Results show that 
PE sponsors more likely open a local office in countries the more experience they have collected 
through previous deals in the host market. Moreover, target country characteristics, such as 
GDP growth and market size, as well as proximity to the PE firm home country are positively 
related to open a local office. Interestingly, more experienced PE firms perform less buyouts in 
the target country before office an opening and are less influenced by target country 
characteristics. 
Further analyses reveal that the presence of a local office significantly affects 
internationalization activity of PE firms. Deal activity, i.e., the number of buyouts in a target 
country, significantly increases in the years around the office opening. Data shows that average 
number of buyouts in a target country increases especially in the window of one year prior to 
the office opening to three years post opening. It then stays relatively constant on that level of 
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above 0.4 buyouts per year. Deal activity most significantly increases in the year of the office 
opening itself. Further tests indicate, that PE firms more frequently invest in target countries 
with a local office, which are culturally and geographically more proximate. Accordingly, local 
offices tend to not significantly reduce the local bias in investing, in spite of the strong local 
embeddedness.  
Beyond deal flow, I find that after a local office opening PE firms less likely perform buyouts 
in syndicates and deal size increases. Respective results support the notion that local offices 
reduce frictions of uncertainty when investing in foreign markets. 
Those insights provide relevant implications for literature on internationalization in the PE 
industry as well as practice. My results indicate that PE firms act differently in a foreign 
environment, where they have established a local presence with an office. Accordingly, for 
future research local offices are a relevant influential variable when analyzing PE firms’ 
international activity. Practically, results can be of interest for policy setting in target countries, 
which follow the intention to attract foreign investors. Creating an environment which is 
favorable for PE sponsors to open a local office, can likely increase foreign capital flows.  
This article broadly points out the relevance local offices have for international activities of 
PE firms. Future research can extend my arguments. There is room to get a deeper 
understanding for the underlying determinants for observed patterns. For example, it would be 
interesting to analyze what causally influences PE firms to increase the number of deals after 
an office opening. Potential reasons can be a better screening, better position in negotiations, 
and lower investment constraints with a local office. Moreover, it can be of interest to 




3.A.1 Office openings and cross-border buyouts by target country 
This table presents PE firm activities of office openings (Panel A), office deals (Panel B), and pure cross-border deals (Panel C) by target country and by year in the time 
period between 1997 and 2016 of PE firms in sample. In case a PE firm opens more than one office in a local country, the first opening is reflected 
Panel A: Office openings (Top20 countries) 
    1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
                     
1 United Kingdom 2 4 4 4 1 2 3 6 4 2 4 3 3 6 6 3 1 2 71 
2 Germany 3 2 3 2 3 3 0 2 3 2 2 4 3 3 5 2 2 4 53 
3 China 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 6 2 1 3 4 2 1 2 0 35 
4 United States 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 0 1 1 0 6 0 3 3 32 
5 France 3 1 2 2 0 2 3 1 4 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 29 
6 Singapore 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 4 1 2 3 3 4 2 1 1 28 
7 Hong Kong 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 3 24 
8 Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 2 1 3 1 0 0 3 1 21 
9 Spain 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 5 2 20 
10 Italy 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 3 0 0 1 2 0 2 1 0 1 18 
11 India 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 18 
12 Brazil 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 3 2 2 2 0 1 2 17 
13 Japan 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 15 
14 Sweden 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 14 
15 The Netherlands 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 13 
16 Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 13 
17 Belgium 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 11 
18 Poland 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 11 
19 Denmark 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 10 
20 South Korea 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 8                      







3.A.1  Office openings and cross-border buyouts by target country (continued) 
                     
Panel B: Number of office deals (Top20 countries) 
    1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
                     
1 United Kingdom 2 5 15 9 6 8 18 33 41 22 7 37 38 34 44 46 59 36 487 
2 Germany 6 10 14 15 5 11 24 34 34 22 7 27 26 23 23 27 29 48 438 
3 France 6 6 12 16 22 18 29 41 34 14 6 18 35 10 21 29 29 30 411 
4 United States 1 2 4 5 3 6 22 22 22 10 6 7 23 25 18 21 29 38 281 
5 Spain 3 9 7 6 1 4 8 9 3 3 1 7 9 2 4 18 17 12 131 
6 Sweden 2 3 0 2 9 0 4 5 8 8 7 8 2 5 4 6 5 21 104 
7 Italy 1 1 2 0 1 1 2 10 5 6 2 2 3 4 7 7 10 15 87 
8 Denmark 0 1 2 1 1 0 7 2 5 1 3 2 3 4 4 8 9 12 71 
9 India 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 9 6 6 2 2 2 2 7 4 9 12 68 
10 China 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 11 6 1 5 3 5 9 11 3 5 68 
11 The Netherlands 2 2 3 1 2 4 6 7 6 2 2 1 3 2 1 2 5 7 63 
12 Japan 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 7 4 6 2 5 4 3 1 3 4 11 60 
13 Brazil 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 3 3 2 7 6 7 10 8 56 
14 Australia 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 2 0 1 7 8 2 4 5 6 7 48 
15 Belgium 0 0 1 0 0 1 6 2 2 2 3 1 5 2 3 4 4 5 43 
16 Poland 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 5 2 3 4 5 4 2 2 1 8 43 
17 Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 2 3 3 6 5 2 3 29 
18 Czech Rebublic 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 3 4 0 1 0 2 1 0 3 3 27 
19 Switzerland 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 5 4 1 0 1 1 0 3 2 3 25 
20 Romania 0 1 2 0 2 0 3 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 0 1 0 2 24                      








3.A.1  Office openings and cross-border buyouts by target country (continued) 
Panel C: Number of pure cross-border deals (Top20 countries) 
    1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
                     
1 Germany 11 12 16 21 17 11 32 35 17 19 9 8 20 14 6 8 14 15 335 
2 United States 5 11 14 17 3 6 26 24 26 18 15 16 21 18 10 36 16 16 322 
3 France 16 10 18 20 20 12 19 21 20 14 6 9 13 9 6 6 17 18 284 
4 United Kingdom 8 14 12 24 10 10 27 20 26 22 7 12 8 11 13 4 6 12 272 
5 The Netherlands 4 3 15 8 1 11 19 19 19 21 3 10 14 4 10 14 19 23 242 
6 Italy 5 3 6 6 2 8 19 26 19 7 3 13 17 10 15 16 17 16 233 
7 Sweden 2 0 1 7 3 5 12 7 32 21 9 15 12 12 16 16 20 15 224 
8 Switzerland 4 9 6 5 7 7 7 9 9 7 2 6 12 4 6 7 2 13 133 
9 Canada 0 2 5 4 6 5 16 16 10 4 1 4 8 6 6 3 8 10 130 
10 Finland 2 1 6 6 2 4 12 7 7 10 1 3 2 3 5 8 14 11 114 
11 Belgium 2 7 8 3 3 2 6 14 7 5 3 7 5 7 3 6 8 8 113 
12 Spain 3 1 0 0 3 1 13 7 8 3 6 6 8 10 13 7 7 8 112 
13 Norway 2 0 9 2 6 0 5 8 5 6 3 7 6 6 9 14 4 7 110 
14 Denmark 2 2 5 5 3 8 6 6 9 6 1 2 8 2 5 8 7 5 102 
15 Australia 0 2 2 4 4 3 2 12 9 6 7 6 2 3 8 4 1 4 85 
16 Austria 1 2 4 3 1 3 1 7 4 2 2 1 2 3 4 4 7 5 61 
17 Russia 0 5 2 2 1 1 5 10 6 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 4 1 52 
18 Ireland 1 3 3 0 6 4 4 3 3 1 2 4 1 1 1 2 4 2 48 
19 South Korea 0 1 3 1 1 2 0 1 3 2 2 0 2 2 1 4 2 4 38 
20 India 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 5 7 2 2 3 0 3 2 1 1 37                      












3.A.2 Factors associated with the opening of a local office subject to PE firm experience 
The table presents results of probit regressions on the determinants of PE firms opening a local office in respective 
target and observation year. Sample consists of 26,237 PE-country-years observations for 1,850 PE-country pairs 
between 2000 and 2016. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the PE 
firm opened the first local office in the target country-year, and zero otherwise. Only PE-country pairs in countries 
in which the PE firm has at least one buyout in that country between 1997 and 2016 are included. Observations, 
at which a local office is already present, are excluded. I run regressions with varying samples. Regressions in 
columns 1 and 2 differentiate between observations where the PE firm has opened more than 1 local office 
(Number_offices), or not. Regressions in columns 3 and 4 differentiate between observations where the PE firm 
has made more than nine deals in the last three years (no_deals_L3_PE), or not. Probit regressions test the influence 
of PE firm, PE country and target country, as well as distance variables. I control for entry year, target country, 
PE firm fixed effects. I use robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Probit - Office opening 
 
Number_offices 







  (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  









Country experience_PE 0.041 ** -0.008   0.058 ** 0.005  










CB share PE_L3 years -0.058  0.175   0.031  0.392  










Log number deals_PE 0.166 ** 0.156 **  0.213 *** 0.190  ** 










Log number deals_PE country -0.090  0.093   0.058  0.135  










GDPgrowth_PE country -0.020  0.005   -0.010  -0.016  










Log number deals_target country 0.276 *** 0.066   0.206 ** 0.063  










CB share_target country 0.296  -0.220   -0.284  0.115  










GDPgrowth_target country 0.023 *** 0.007   0.023 ** 0.004  










Insti quality_target country 0.205  0.974**   0.199  0.692   * 










log_geographic distance -0.025  -0.184 ***  -0.077  -0.174 *** 
 (0.06)  (0.06)   (0.06)  (0.06)  
          
Cultural distance -0.024 *** -0.018 **  -0.022 *** -0.016  ** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01)  
          
Log_country tie 0.080  0.073   0.061  0.148 *** 










               
Year FE YES  YES   YES  YES  
PE firm FE YES  YES   YES  YES  
Target country FE YES  YES   YES  YES  
N 17,420  8,817   14,043  12,194  




3.A.3 Factors associated with the share of investments in foreign countries 
This table reports panel estimates for the share of cross-border LBOs in the respective target country in relation to 
all cross-border LBOs of the PE firm (Share deals CB) in the observation period from 2000-2016 in column 1 and 
2 using a Poisson regression model. Additionally, it reports OLS panel estimates for changes in the share (Dev 
share deals CB) in column 3 and 4. I run regressions on a sample of 589 PE-country pairs at which the PE firm 
opened a local office in or before the observation period. Regressions analyze the influence of a local office (local 
office present), the years the local office is opened (log_years office opened), and different years around office 
opening as dummies. Moreover, regressions include independent variables of PE firm, HQ country and PE sponsor 
country characteristics as well as the one-year lagged dependent variable. All regressions include PE-country and 
year fixed effects. I apply robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Poisson - Share deals CB  OLS - Dev share deals CB 





























Log_years office opened 
 


































































































































Log number deals PE 0.801 *** 0.803 ***  0.062 *** 0.066 *** 










log_total deals_HQ country 0.040  0.033   -0.020 * -0.017  










log_total deals_target country 0.776 *** 0.782 ***  0.034 *** 0.033 *** 
 (0.10)  (0.10)   (0.01)  (0.01)  
          
share_CB_deals_target country 0.907 *** 0.911 ***  0.035 ** 0.034 ** 
 (0.25)  (0.24)   (0.02)  (0.02)  
          
GDPgrowth_target country -0.009  -0.010   -0.001 *** -0.001 ** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.00)  (0.00)  
          
Share deals CB_lagged -0.077  -0.067       
 (0.07)  (0.07)       
          
Dev share deals CB_lagged      -0.508 *** -0.503 *** 
      (0.01)  (0.01)  
 
 





Year FE YES  YES   YES  YES  
PE-country FE YES  YES   YES  YES  
N 9,593  9,593   9,593  9,593  
PE-country pairs 589  589   589  589  





3.A.4 Influence of distance on deal activity in foreign countries subject to the presence 
of a local office 
This table reports estimates for the number of cross-border deals in a target county (Number deals CB) in the 
observation period from 2000-2016 using a tobit model. Sample includes 9,593 PE-country-year observations. 
Beside independent variables tested in Table 3.6, analyses include variables on distance between PE firm and 
target company (Common border, common language, log_country tie, log_geographic distance, cultural distance). 
Variables of PE firm and country characteristics are summarized as controls. Moreover, regressions include PE 
firm, target country and year fixed effects. I apply robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Tobit - Number deals CB 






Local office present 1.150 *** 1.152 *** 






Local office present x Common language 0.144  
 
 








Local office present x Common border 0.276  
 
 








 Common language 0.324 * 
 
 








 Common border 0.587 *** 
 
 








Local office present x log_geographic distance   -0.006  
 
 






Local office present x cultural distance 
 
 0.002  
 
 






Local office present x Log_country tie 
 
 0.055  
 
 








 -0.335 *** 
 
 








 -0.019  ** 
 
 






Log_country tie   0.089  *   
   (0.05)  
 
 
   
 
 
    
Controls YES  YES  
Year FE YES  YES  
PE firm FE YES  YES  
Target country FE YES  YES  
N 9,593  5,678  
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Empirical research finds that management buyouts frequently occur in volatile phases, e.g., 
when overall M&A activity (Cao, Coy, & Nguyen, 2016) and industry profitability (Harford, 
Stanfield, & Zhang, 2019) are low. These findings are in contrast to empirical evidence of 
standard investment behavior (Ahsan & Musteen, 2011; Baker, Bloom, & Davis, 2016; Bloom, 
2009; Bloom, Bond, & van Reenen, 2007; Delios & Henisz, 2003). According to general theory, 
one would expect the buyout decision to be postponed to more stable phases, which Bachmann, 
Elstner, and Sims (2013) describe as “wait-and-see” behavior. This deviating investment 
behavior is striking considering that managers are usually less risk-diversified after a buyout 
decision. They often need to invest large part of their personal wealth to finance a substantial 
equity stake of the target company (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). 
Access to private information is a potential explanation for this investment puzzle. If 
managers are confident enough to risk a large portion of their personal wealth for an MBO/MBI 
(Morck et al, 1988), they are signaling superior knowledge about the real or potential value of 
the target (Harford et al., 2019). While it is almost impossible to quantify the exact level of 
information advantages on firm-level,15 we regard Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) as 
valuable in assessing the importance of access to superior information in the buyout context. 
First, empirical evidence from stock markets shows that EPU increases bid-ask spreads for 
listed companies, a proxy for information asymmetries between “insiders” and external 
investors (Nagar, Schoenfeld, & Wellman, 2019). Consequently, the advantage of access to 
private information increases in times of higher uncertainty. We expect this relation to hold for 
the buyout context: In times of higher EPU, access to private company information should be 
more valuable for managers considering a management buyout. Second, empirical evidence 
suggests that the impact of EPU is higher for companies with a higher firm-level uncertainty 
                                                 
15 Mainly due to the private nature of this “insider information”. 
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(Kang, Lee, & Ratti, 2014), firms with more irreversible investments (Gulen & Ion, 2016), and 
during periods of distress (Kang et al., 2014). Building on these findings, we assume that 
managers have better information compared to outsiders in assessing their company’s current 
firm-specific risk, investment pipeline, and solvency/liquidity situation. Consequently, we 
expect EPU to increase the advantage of access to private information in the leveraged buyout 
context. 
This leads us to our question, what factors increase the likelihood of PE backed management 
buyouts (MBOs and/or MBIs) compared to the alternative that PE sponsors acquire the firm as 
the majority shareholders, called institutional buyout (IBO). Existing studies investigate 
variations in portfolio firm characteristics to explain a higher likelihood of MBOs. For example, 
MBO targets tend to be smaller in size, are on average more undervalued and have lower sales 
(growth), stock trading volume, and cash flows than other buyouts (Aslan & Kumar, 2011; 
Bharath & Dittmar, 2010; Cao et al., 2016; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1987; Fidrmuc, Palandri, 
Roosenboom, & van Dijk, 2013). Fidrmuc et al. (2013) argue that MBOs have a higher 
likelihood when the management team has lower financial constraints. Looking at our sample, 
we find that the share of MBOs in relation to all PE backed buyouts (LBOs) substantially varies 
between countries. This suggests, that factors beyond portfolio firm characteristics explain 
differences in propensity of management-led buyouts.  
While several buyout studies already investigate country-specific factors (Cao, Cumming, 
Qian, & Wang, 2015; Hammer, Hinrichs, & Schwetzler, 2018; Holloway, Lee, & Shen, 2016; 
Meuleman & Wright, 2011), they focus on long-term factors, such as culture or institutions, 
that do not or only gradually change over time (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 2008; Hofstede, 1980; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011; La Porta, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1998). In addition to long-term cross-country factors, short-term time variation is key 
to explain variance in propensity of MBOs and/or MBIs. We think it is worth investigating 
  
98 
EPU, a monthly updated measure, since access to information can be a relevant driver of MBOs 
and/or MBIs, as discussed earlier.  
To address our question, we draw on a sample of 18,225 PE backed LBOs across 52 
countries (covering 90% of the world’s current GDP). 2,332 (13%) of those LBOs are classified 
as management buyouts and/or management buyins, i.e., management controls a majority stake. 
We use probit regression analysis to examine how policy uncertainty is influencing the decision 
to perform an MBO/MBI relative to an IBO. We refer to EPU, a variable developed by Baker 
et al. (2016), as the indicator for national, time varying policy uncertainty.  
In our base analysis, we investigate how EPU affects the propensity of MBOs/MBIs relative 
to IBOs. We find that the national EPU score is positively associated with the probability of an 
MBO/MBI. The results indicate that managers are more likely to benefit from private 
information in times of higher policy uncertainty. We perform three additional analyses 
providing support for our intuition, that higher MBO/MBI likelihood relative to IBOs in times 
of uncertainty can be at least partially explained by differences in access to information. First, 
we investigate differences in the effect of EPU on “insider” driven management buyouts 
(MBOs) compared to “outsider” driven management buyins (MBIs). We find that MBOs are 
more likely than MBIs in times of higher uncertainty. Second, we investigate how EPU affects 
partnerships of MBOs/MBIs with domestic and foreign PE firms. We find that domestic PE 
backed MBOs/MBIs are more likely than foreign PE backed MBOs/MBIs in times of higher 
uncertainty. Third, we investigate how EPU affects MBOs/MBIs in an adverse information 
environment. We find that the likelihood of MBOs and/or MBIs to be executed in an adverse 
environment increases in times of higher policy uncertainty. Our findings continue to hold after 
replacing EPU for alternative volatility measures, namely stock price volatility and (negative) 
GDP growth. Furthermore, we address endogeneity concerns through replacing EPU with an 
exogenous variable covering close national elections as an event of local uncertainty in the 
respective entry year. The results support the view that access to private information is more 
  
99 
valuable in countries with lower governance standards. In sum, these empirical findings are 
consistent with the assumption that access to information is a key driver for management 
buyouts.  
Respective results contribute to the literature on both management buyouts (e.g., Aslan & 
Kumar, 2011; Bharath & Dittmar, 2010; Cao et al., 2016; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1987; 
Fidrmuc et al., 2013) and Economic Policy Uncertainty (e.g., Baker et al., 2016, Beckmann & 
Czudaj, 2017, Bloom et al., 2007, Gulen & Ion, 2016; Kang et al., 2014). To the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first large-scale investigation of international LBOs that links the 
likelihood of management buyouts to cross-country and time differences in Economic Policy 
Uncertainty. Using this analysis, we address the broader question to what extent differences in 
access to information affect entrepreneurial activities in economically uncertain times. Results 
uncover that beside portfolio firm and general country characteristics also market uncertainty 
is a relevant factor for management’s likelihood to perform buyouts as majority shareholder. 
Through stronger differentiating LBOs, we follow Tykvová’s (2018) agenda for future buyout 
research. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the nature of 
MBO/MBIs, provides theory on determinants of management buyouts and Economic Policy 
Uncertainty, and develops hypotheses. Section 4.3 introduces material and methods. Section 
4.4 reports our results including robustness tests. Section 4.5 concludes.  
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
4.2.1 Nature of management buyouts 
In general terms, management buyouts (MBOs) are a specific type of buyouts, which 
Meuleman, Amess, Wright, and Scholes (2009) define as: 
“Buyouts are the principal focus of private equity investments in which investors and a 
management team pool their own money (usually together with debt finance) to buy shares 
in that company from its current owners, to create a new independent entity.” 
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When these (leveraged) buyouts emerge first in the US in the 1980s (Kaufman & Englender, 
1993; Wright, Robbie, Chiplin, & Albrighton, 2000b), early private equity research often uses 
the terms leveraged buyout (LBO) and management buyout (MBO) interchangeably,16 for three 
main reasons. First, during going-private transactions SEC rules require management to become 
the sole owner of the company by purchasing all outside stocks, even if they immediately sell 
large shares to a third-party private equity investor (DeAngelo, 1986; DeAngelo & DeAngelo; 
1987). Second, the most prevailing buyout type in the 1980s are going-private transactions 
(Meuleman et al., 2009), making most LBOs equal to MBOs at that time. Third, compared to 
public companies, executives usually receive a higher equity stake as incentive (Jensen, 1986), 
highlighting the importance of management during LBOs. 
MBO research in this broader buyout context of the 1980s and early 1990s is mainly 
interested in the agency dimension of this new phenomenon “private equity” overall (Wright, 
Hoskisson, & Busenitz, 2000a). First, buyouts are perceived as a new way of organizational 
restructuring through changing governance structures, aligning incentives of managers and 
owners, and raising debt levels, resulting in superior performance (e.g., Jensen, 1989; Kaplan, 
1989; Phan & Hill, 1995). Central management role in these “efficiency buyouts” is 
maximizing cash flows through effective revenue management and cost efficiencies, a 
successful strategy in mature industries with stable cash flows (Wright, Hoskisson, & Busenitz, 
2001a). Second, going-private buyouts are perceived as an effective way to reduce competitive 
disadvantages, since managers of private companies have less incentive to invest myopically 
(Holmstrom, 1989). Central management role in these “revitalization buyouts” is regaining 
competitiveness through “catch-up innovation”, a successful strategy for bureaucratic 
companies lacking relevant competitive capabilities (Wright et al., 2001a).  
                                                 
16 See e.g., DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1987) and Smith (1990b) who use both terms as synonyms. Fox and Marcus 
(1992) combine both terms by defining LBO as “leveraged management buyout”. 
  
101 
Besides agency improvements resulting in efficiency and competitiveness, Wright et al. 
(2000a) identify “entrepreneurship” as another important value creating dimension of buyouts. 
Based on results from privatizations of both publicly-listed and state-owned companies, they 
show the potential of “strategic innovations”. Central management role in these 
“entrepreneurial buyouts” is to transform the organization through a new strategic direction or 
pursuing strong R&D investments (Wright et al., 2000a). Long and Ravenscraft (1993), for 
instance, find that R&D intensive buyout companies outperform both non-LBO and low R&D 
LBO industry peers. Key success factor for this entrepreneurial buyout type is high managerial 
discretion, e.g., through a significant share of management ownership as in the case of 
MBOs/MBIs (Wright et al., 2001a). 
In the light of these differences in underlying buyout motives and success factors, studies 
provide a systematic categorization of LBO types (Cumming, Siegel, & Wright, 2007; Wood 
& Wright, 2009; Wright et al., 2000b). A common distinction in the context of management 
buyouts is made between a management buyout (MBO), driven by the existing management, a 
management buyin (MBI), driven by an outside management team, their combination (MBO/I), 
and an institutional buyout, driven mainly by a private equity firm or PE syndicate (Meuleman 
et al. 2009; Renneboog, Simons, & Wright, 2007; Wood & Wright, 2009).  
Theory identifies four underlying motives for management to opt for a buyout and/or buyin. 
First, managers execute going-private buyouts (MBOs) if they perceive that public markets 
undervalue their company and there is a potential threat of a hostile takeover (DeAngelo & 
DeAngelo, 1987; Fox & Marcus, 1992; Kaplan, 1989; Weir, Laing, & Wright, 2005). The 
underlying reasons for managers are to preserve their job, reduce costs of a public listing and 
increased upside potential through a high equity share (Fox & Marcus, 1992). Second, managers 
execute private-to-private buyouts (both MBOs & MBIs) if the privately held/family firm faces 
a succession problem (Meuleman et al., 2009; Scholes, Wright, Westhead, & Bruining, 2010; 
Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Dial, 2001b;). When the founding family members/owners lack 
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the decision-making and entrepreneurial skills to lead the company to the next development 
phase, MBOs and MBIs can be an effective way to organize succession (Wright et al., 2001b). 
Third, managers execute divisional buyouts (both MBOs & MBIs) if they see an opportunity to 
lead a business division independently from the rules and bureaucracy of a corporate umbrella 
(Meuleman et al., 2009; Wright et al., 2001b). Fourth, managers execute privatizations of 
previously state-owned companies if they can seize significant efficiency opportunities through 
leading a company out of state bureaucracy (Wright et al., 2000a). While the first motive is an 
example for agency improvement efforts, the latter three reflect the entrepreneurial dimension 
of buyouts (Wright et al., 2000a, 2001a).  
Although these underlying motives are very different in nature and research does not provide 
standard thresholds on required management stakes,17 the general distinction between MBOs, 
MBIs, MBO/Is, and IBOs helps navigating through the two main fields of management buyout 
research: Pre-deal characteristics (see Appendix 4.A.1, panel A) and post-deal characteristics 
(see Appendix 4.A.1, panel B).  
We identify two major strands of empirical research on pre-deal characteristics of 
management buyouts. The first strand investigates direct agency conflicts between 
management’s self-interest to negotiate a low entry price and their fiduciary duty towards the 
previous owners prior and during the buyout. Respective research indicates that buyout 
managers perform significant earnings management prior to the transaction (Mao & 
Renneboog, 2015; Perry & Williams, 1994; Wright, Shaw, & Guan, 2006) and negotiate lower 
transaction prices (Chen, Kim, & Marcus, 2011). The second strand intends to explain the 
determinants of management buyouts. What are the specific factors that increase the likelihood 
of an MBO, MBI or MBO/I compared to an institutional buyout? 
                                                 
17 For a deal to be classified as management buyout, e.g., Fidrmuc et al. (2013) require management to become the 
sole owners, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) a majority stake, Wright, Wilson, and Robbie (1996) a majority or 




Looking at the post-deal characteristics of MBOs, most studies shed a positive light on 
MBOs and MBIs (e.g., Bruining & Wright, 2002; Fidrmuc et al., 2013; Kamoto, 2017; Wright, 
Wilson, & Robbie, 1996), since specific business and industry knowledge is key for successful 
companies (Markides, 1998). In the following section we describe the main strand of interest 
for our paper – determinants of management buyouts – in more detail. Furthermore, we outline 
the potential role of Economic Policy Uncertainty in this context. 
4.2.2 Determinants of management buyouts and Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Empirical research suggests that MBOs frequently occur in volatile phases, e.g., when 
overall M&A activity (Cao et al., 2016) and industry profitability (Harford et al., 2019) are low. 
These findings are in contrast to standard investment behavior in volatile phases. Previous 
research shows that uncertainty has an overall negative impact on investment decisions, asset 
growth, and employment at firm level (Ahsan & Musteen, 2011; Baker et al., 2016; Bloom, 
2009; Bloom et al., 2007; Delios & Henisz, 2003). Bachmann et al. (2013) describe this reaction 
as a “wait-and-see” behavior, because it generally leads to postponed investment decisions. A 
potential explanation for this investment puzzle is access to private information. If managers 
are confident enough to risk a large portion of their personal wealth for an MBO/MBI (Morck 
et al, 1988), they are signaling superior knowledge about the real or potential value of the target 
(Harford et al., 2019).  
In order to assess the importance of access to private information, it is worth reviewing the 
existing research strand of determinants of MBOs and/or MBIs: This strand investigates factors 
that increase the likelihood of an MBO, MBI or MBO/I compared to an institutional buyout. 
Existing studies mainly investigate variations in portfolio firm characteristics to explain the 
probability of MBOs and/or MBIs (see Appendix 4.A.1, panel A for an overview). In a 
descriptive comparison of going-privates DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1987) find that MBO 
targets are smaller in size (revenues, assets, and market capitalization), and are more likely to 
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be listed at smaller stock indices. Aslan and Kumar (2011), Bharath and Dittmar (2010), Cao 
et al. (2016), and Fidrmuc et al. (2013) report that going-private MBOs are more undervalued 
and have lower sales (growth), stock trading volume, and cash flows than other buyouts. In 
addition, Fidrmuc et al. (2013) argue that MBOs are more likely when management has lower 
financial constraints to finance the deal, i.e., it already owns a relevant equity stake, portfolio 
firm’s cash holdings are high, and the firm is cheaper to purchase. Even though these studies 
partly present consequences of differences in informational access, e.g., undervaluation, they 
do not investigate the underlying reason for the deviating investment behavior of managers, as 
described earlier.  
While it is almost impossible to quantify the exact level of information advantages on firm-
level due to the private nature of “inside information”, Economic Policy Uncertainty is a 
potential factor to assess the importance of access to private information. 
Baker et al. (2016) first introduced the EPU index as a measure of policy uncertainty in the 
US. Indices for multiple countries were developed later. These country-specific indices are 
calculated based on frequency counts of key words/word combinations in major newspapers. 
The relatively new EPU measure displays favorable properties compared to other volatility 
measures18 (see section 4.3.2.2), which explains why it is gaining popularity across economic 
literature in recent years. For instance, research shows that EPU significantly influences 
commodity markets (Antonakakis, Chatziantoniou, & Filis, 2014), exchange rates (Beckmann 
& Czudaj, 2017), asset-pricing (Broogard & Detzel, 2015; Pástor & Veronesi, 2013), and firm-
level investments (Gulen & Ion, 2016; Kang et al., 2014). In our management buyout context, 
EPU indicates current levels of policy uncertainty in the respective buyout target country.  
We regard the application of Economic Policy Uncertainty valuable for assessing the 
importance of access to private information in the buyout context for two reasons. First, 
                                                 
18 Such as stock price volatility or (negative) GDP growth. 
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empirical evidence from stock markets shows that EPU increases bid-ask spreads for listed 
companies, a proxy for information asymmetries between “insiders” and external investors 
(Nagar et al., 2019). Consequently, the advantage of access to private information increases in 
times of higher uncertainty. We expect this relation to hold for the buyout context: In times of 
higher EPU, access to private company information should be more valuable for managers 
considering a management buyout. Second, empirical evidence suggests that the impact of 
uncertainty is higher for companies with a higher firm-level uncertainty (Kang et al., 2014), 
firms with more irreversible investments (Gulen & Ion, 2016), and during periods of distress 
(Kang et al., 2014). Building on these findings, we assume that managers have better 
information compared to outsiders in assessing their company’s current firm-specific risk, 
investment pipeline, and solvency/liquidity situation. 
In sum, we expect that EPU increases the advantage of access to private information on firm-
specific policy exposure in the management buyout context. 
4.2.3 Hypotheses 
Based on the previous arguments about Economic Policy Uncertainty and access to private 
information, we expect a significant positive impact of EPU on the likelihood of MBOs/MBIs 
relative to IBOs. Evidence suggests that MBOs frequently occur in volatile phases (Cao et al., 
2016). A positive signaling could explain this effect during uncertain times: If managers are 
confident enough to invest a large portion of their personal wealth for an MBO/MBI (Morck et 
al, 1988), they are signaling superior knowledge about the real or potential value of the target 
(Harford et al., 2019). Based on empirical evidence from public markets, we expect information 
advantages to increase with EPU (Nagar et al., 2019, see section 4.2.2). If this logic holds that 
EPU is increasing the importance of access to private information, we expect a stronger relation 
of EPU and the probability of MBOs and/or MBIs, compared to EPU and the probability of 
IBOs. This leads us to our first hypothesis: 
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H1  MBOs and/or MBIs are more likely in times of higher Economic Policy 
Uncertainty. 
In addition to the overall impact of EPU on MBOs and/or MBIs, we are interested in relevant 
differences in access to information. Renneboog et al. (2007), for instance, identify differences 
in undervaluation between MBOs and MBIs. Incumbent managers have superior information 
compared to “outsiders”. Furthermore, we expect incumbent managers considering an MBO to 
better assess firm-specific policy exposure than external managers considering an MBI, since 
MBO managers usually have many years of experience from multiple positions within the target 
company (Robbie, Wright, & Thompson, 1992). Consequently, we expect EPU to increase the 
advantage of access to private information on firm-specific policy exposure (see section 4.2.2). 
Applying this logic, we expect a stronger relation of EPU and the probability of “insider” driven 
management buyouts (MBOs), compared to EPU and the probability of “outsider” driven 
management buyins (MBIs). This leads us to our second hypothesis: 
H2  MBOs are more likely than MBIs in times of higher Economic Policy 
Uncertainty. 
Another key difference in access to information lies between domestic and foreign 
investments. We expect higher EPU to bear a stronger risk for foreign PE sponsors to back an 
MBO/MBI due to the increased uncertainty of economic and political consequences of their 
investment decision (Mäkelä & Maula, 2008). Zaheer (1995) established the notion “liability 
of foreignness” for this disadvantage. Domestic investors might have superior information on 
the policy exposure of their local investment (Kang & Kim, 2010; Tykvová & Schertler, 2014). 
Furthermore, we expect that EPU increases the advantage of access to private information on 
firm-specific policy exposure (see section 4.2.2). Consequently, domestic PE sponsors 
supporting an MBO/MBI should benefit more from access to superior information than foreign 
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PE sponsors in times of higher policy uncertainty. Applying this logic, we expect a stronger 
relation of EPU and the probability of domestic PE backed MBOs/MBIs, compared to EPU and 
the probability of foreign PE backed MBOs/MBIs. This leads us to our third hypothesis: 
H3  Domestic PE backed MBOs and/or MBIs are more likely than foreign PE backed 
MBOs and/or MBIs in times of higher Economic Policy Uncertainty. 
Finally, we have a look at the impact of the general information environment on the 
importance of access to private information. Humphery-Jenner, Sautner, and Suchard (2017), 
for instance, suggest that information asymmetries are significantly higher in countries with 
low governance levels and uncertainty about the government’s reaction towards an M&A 
announcement. Consequently, we expect that managers are more able to exploit superior private 
information to execute an MBO/MBI in an adverse information environment (e.g., high 
bureaucracy). Based on empirical evidence from public markets, we expect this information 
advantage to increase with EPU (Nagar et al., 2019, see section 4.2.2). Applying this logic, we 
expect a higher probability of MBOs/MBIs to be executed in an adverse information 
environment in times of high compared to times of low Economic Policy Uncertainty. This 
leads us to our fourth and last hypothesis: 
H4  MBOs and/or MBIs executed in an adverse environment are more likely in times 
of higher Economic Policy Uncertainty. 
4.3 MATERIAL AND METHODS 
4.3.1 Sample construction 
We use a sample of 18,225 worldwide private equity backed buyouts across 52 countries 
with deal entry between 1997 and 2016 to test our hypotheses. The LBOs are retrieved from 
Bureau van Dijks’s “Zephyr” (BvD) database. In our sample we include LBOs whose financing 
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type is labelled as “private equity” or “leveraged buyout” and checked for the availability of 
explanatory and control variables. 
The sample comprises 2,332 MBOs and MBIs (13% of total sample), of which 2,014 are 
defined as “Management Buyout (MBO)”, 235 as “Management Buyin (MBI)” and 83 as 
“Management Buyin/Buyout (MBO/I)” by Zephyr. According to Zephyr, management must 
hold at least 50 percent of the company’s shares to classify the respective deal as an MBO 
(existing management acquires the stake), MBI (new management acquires the stake) or MBO/I 
(combination of existing and new management acquires the stake). The remaining 15,893 LBOs 
are labeled as “Institutional Buyout (IBO)”, i.e., one or more private equity investors are the 
majority owners of the portfolio firm. We follow Zephyr’s definition, as we believe that the 50 
percent equity threshold is most appropriate to indicate whether management has effectively 
gained majority control over the portfolio firm (e.g., Holderness & Sheehan, 1988).19 We 
concentrate on PE-backed deals to increase comparability between MBOs/MBIs and IBOs. 
Firstly, research indicates that portfolio firms of purely management led buyouts show relevant 
differences, e.g., in terms of size, to other types buyouts (Bharath & Dittmar, 2010; Fidrmuc et 
al., 2013). Thus, it is also more difficult to retrieve a comprehensive set of information on 
respective deals. Secondly, we decide to keep the element of PE-backing constant across the 
sample and to focus on the differentiating element of management’s equity stake in the course 
of our analyses. 
Table 4.1 presents the distribution of our sample by country of the portfolio firm. The table 
shows that the sample comprises MBOs and MBIs from 32 global countries.20 We see the 
highest total number of MBOs/MBIs and the highest relative share of MBOs/MBIs in the 
                                                 
19 Our definition differs from buyout classifications used to investigate other MBO characteristics. For example, 
Fidrmuc et al. (2013) classify all deals, where a PE sponsor is involved independently of the management stake 
as an IBO. This implies that all MBOs are performed without any PE sponsor participation. Renneboog et al. 
(2007) use a broader definition. They classify any PE backed buyout at which management acquired equity in 
the bidding process or received equity as part of the remuneration as an MBO. 
20 Information on IBOs is available for 52 countries, see information provided earlier in this chapter. 
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United Kingdom (1,194 MBOs/MBIs) and France (439 MBOs/MBIs). The share of 
MBOs/MBOs shows significant variations between the countries. While management has a 
majority equity stake in only 3.7 percent of US LBOs, MBOs/MBIs make 8.5 percent in 
Germany and 38.2 percent in the UK.  
Table 4.1: Sample distribution 
This table presents the distributions of the sample of management buyouts ("MBO deals"), management buyins 
("MBI deals"), their combination ("MBO/I deals"), as well as LBOs with a management investment lower than 
50% or zero ("IBO deals"). The sample consists of 18,225 LBOs that were entered in the period between 1997–
2016. The table shows the sample distribution by home country of the portfolio firm. It is sorted by number of all 
MBOs and MBIs and only displays countries with MBO or/and MBI deals. Percentage values describe the share 
of the respective deal type relative to all deals within a specific country. 
Distribution of deals by target country  
    MBO, MBI and MBO/MBI deals  IBO deals 
  All 
deals 
 Total MBO & 
MBI 
 MBO  MBI  MBO/I  IBO 
    n   n in %   n in %   n in %   n in %   n in % 
UK  3,122   1,194 38.2%  1,036  33.2%  108  3.5%  50  1.6%  1,928  61.8% 
France  1,565   439  28.1%  346  22.1%  70  4.5%  23  1.5%  1,126  71.9% 
US  6,995   262  3.7%  247  3.5%  10  0.1%  5  0.1%  6,733  96.3% 
Germany  1,252   107  8.5%  94  7.5%  12  1.0%  1  0.1%  1,145  91.5% 
Netherlands  682   90  13.2%  82  12.0%  8  1.2%  -    0.0%  592  86.8% 
Belgium  209   30  14.4%  28  13.4%  2  1.0%  -    0.0%  179  85.6% 
Australia  281   29  10.3%  25  8.9%  3  1.1%  1  0.4%  252  89.7% 
Italy  496   26  5.2%  21  4.2%  3  0.6%  2  0.4%  470  94.8% 
Spain  442   23  5.2%  20  4.5%  3  0.7%  -    0.0%  419  94.8% 
Canada  162   10  6.2%  9  5.6%  1  0.6%  -    0.0%  152  93.8% 
Finland  282   15  5.3%  14  5.0%  1  0.4%  -    0.0%  267  94.7% 
Japan  202   14  6.9%  14  6.9%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  188  93.1% 
Switzerland  188   13  6.9%  11 5.9%  2  1.1%  -    0.0%  175  93.1% 
Ireland  65   11  16.9%  10  15.4%  1  1.5%  -    0.0%  54  83.1% 
Sweden  471   10  2.1%  10  2.1%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  461  97.9% 
Denmark  277   9  3.2%  8  2.9%  1  0.4%  -    0.0%  268  96.8% 
Austria  115   9  7.8%  5  4.3%  4  3.5%  -    0.0%  106  92.2% 
South Africa  79   7  8.9%  7  8.9%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  72  91.1% 
Singapore  41   6  14.6%  6  14.6%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  35  85.4% 
Poland  156   5  3.2%  3  1.9%  2  1.3%  -    0.0%  151  96.8% 
New Zealand  30   4  13.3%  4  13.3%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  26  86.7% 
Latvia  13   3  23.1%  3  23.1%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  10  76.9% 
India  98   3  3.1%  1  1.0%  2  2.0%  -    0.0%  95  96.9% 
Portugal  69   3  4.3%  3  4.3%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  66  95.7% 
Czech Rep.  98   1  1.0%  -    0.0%  1  1.0%  -    0.0%  97  99.0% 
Russia 49   2  4.1%  2  4.1%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  47  95.9% 
Malaysia  24   2  8.3%  1  4.2%  -    0.0%  1  4.2%  22  91.7% 
Norway  196   1  0.5%  1  0.5%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  195  99.5% 
Argentina  6   1  16.7%  1  16.7%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  5  83.3% 
Turkey  47   1  2.1%  1  2.1%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  46  97.9% 
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Thailand  6   1  16.7%  1  16.7%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  5  83.3% 
Bulgaria  18   1  5.6%  -    0.0%  1  5.6%  -    0.0%  17  94.4% 
Other countries  489  -  0.0%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  -    0.0%  489  100.0% 
Total  18,225   2,332  12.8%  2,014  11.1%  235  1.3%   83  0.5%   15,893  87.2%  
 
4.3.2 Methodology and variables 
4.3.2.1 Methodology and dependent variables 
We use probit analysis on deal-level to determine what factors are associated with a higher 
likelihood for the entrepreneurial decision to perform an MBO/MBI relative to an IBO. Our 
dependent variable for the LBO i is a binary variable yi. It equals 1 if management is the new 
majority shareholder, and 0 otherwise. We aggregate MBOs, MBIs and MBO/Is and jointly 
investigate those LBOs, as we are interested in the general question, what effect Economic 
Policy Uncertainty has on management’s decision to take a majority position, independent of 
management’s prior role. In section 4.4.2.2, we differentiate between MBOs and MBIs for a 
separate analysis whether differences in access to information affect the influence of policy 
uncertainty. Base results which are presented in section 4.4.1 are robust for both sub-samples 
of insider driven MBOs as well as outsider driven MBIs. 
A given LBO i has a certain propensity, yi*, that management takes the majority ownership. 
The propensity is linearly related to a vector of independent variables xi, and other factors we 
cannot observe, εi. Unobservable variable yi* can take infinite positive and negative values, 
based on the underlying latent model:  
𝑦𝑖
∗ =  βx𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (1) 
A probit model captures that we can only observe the binary outcome, whether management 
has a majority stake, yi = 1, or not, yi = 0. The probability Pr that yi = 1 is given by formula 2, 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution.  
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1 | 𝑥𝑖) = Φ (𝑥𝑖𝛽) (2) 
  
111 
β is a vector of estimated coefficients. It is estimated based on maximum likelihood estimation. 
Positive coefficients indicate that the respective variable is positively related to the propensity 
of an MBO/MBI. The dummy variable 𝑦𝑖 is given the value of 1, if the latent variable 𝑦𝑖
∗ is 
positive in model 1. xi. comprises a set of independent variables, we describe in the following 
two sub-sections.  
4.3.2.2 Main explanatory variables 
We employ EPU indices developed by Baker et al. (2016) as an indicator for Economic 
Policy Uncertainty. These indices lately gained popularity in economic research (see section 
4.2.2), since they provide a quantifiable measure of uncertainty, beside measures such as stock 
volatility and consumer surveys (e.g., Meinen & Roehe, 2017). EPU is calculated based on 
frequency counts of words/word combinations (e.g., “economy” plus “uncertainty” plus 
“congress”) and exhibits two favorable properties. First, EPU is useful for cross-country 
comparisons of uncertainty, since its values are nation-specific. For the US, for instance, the 
index spikes near tight elections, wars (e.g., Gulf War I &II), the attacks of 9/11, and the failure 
of Lehman Brothers. The Russian index spikes after the Lehman crisis, the Russian Financial 
Crisis in 1998, and the Ukrainian military conflict (Baker et al., 2016).21 Second, the index is 
useful to analyze variations across time (e.g., within a country). EPU scores are monthly 
updated. This results in a quite accurate measure of the current state of policy uncertainty within 
a country (Baker et al., 2016). For our analyses, we calculate annual country EPU scores as the 
average of monthly scores of the respective years. For few countries where the EPU score is 
not available, we use the average score of the global index.  
                                                 
21 These two examples illustrate the advantage for our management buyout context, compared to other standard 
volatility/uncertainty measures, such as the VIX. While stock market volatility (VIX) highly correlates between 
different countries, the political environment is more nation-specific (Baker et al., 2016). 
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In addition, we analyze the investment behavior of foreign investors. Therefore, we apply 
the binary variable Foreign PE. It takes on a value of 1, in case all PE sponsors have their 
headquarters in a different country than the portfolio firm, and 0 otherwise.  
The variable Bad information environment indicates a negative governance level in the target 
country. For variable construction, we orientate on Humphery-Jenner et al. (2017) and apply an 
index derived from the scores of World Governance Index (WGI) developed by Kaufmann et 
al. (2011). WGI assesses institutional governance based on six dimensions on country-level: 
government effectiveness, quality of institutional policies, rule of law, political stability, voice 
and accountability, and control of corruption. We calculate deal-year specific national 
governance levels (institutional quality index) as the average of the six governance dimensions. 
As Bad information environment is the opposing indicator, the score changes sign.  
Moreover, we introduce two time-varying variables as indicators for market growth and 
market sentiment, GDP growth and Stock price volatility, to cross-validate results on EPU. 
GDP growth represents real GDP growth in portfolio firm’s country in the observation year 
based on World Bank data. For Stock price volatility, we orientate on EPU literature (e.g., Baker 
et al., 2016), which also applies stock volatility metrics as measures to investigate robustness 
of EPU results. Stock price volatility measures yearly implied volatility in national stock 
indices. We retrieve data from World Bank.  
In order to address endogeneity concerns related to EPU, we follow Bhattacharya, Hsu, Tian, 
and Xu (2017), Julio and Yook (2016), and Sitorus (2018) and use close national elections as 
an alternative to EPU. Close national elections are a purely exogenous approximation of policy 
uncertainty, since investors and managers can hardly influence the timing of national elections 
(Sitorus, 2018). Therefore, we assume that uncertainty over which party is winning the 
parliamentary election and/or which candidate is winning the presidential race in the respective 
target company’s country is driving policy uncertainty. First, we collect election data from the 
IDB Database of Political Institutions from all 52 countries in our sample. Second, we hand 
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collect further data based on publicly available election sources if the data is missing or 
inaccurate. Thus, we apply the binary variable Election. It takes the value of 1 in a year, in 
which a national election (national parliament and/or presidential election) took place in the 
respective target country, and 0 otherwise.22 We expect close national elections of major 
importance approximating policy uncertainty and apply the binary variable Close Election I. It 
takes the value of 1 if the margin of victory between either the largest and second largest party 
(parliamentary election) or the winning and defeated candidate (final presidential race) is 
smaller than 5 percentage points, and zero otherwise. In addition, we restrict close national 
elections further and apply the binary variable Close Election II. It takes the value of 1 if the 
margin of victory between either the largest and second largest party (parliamentary election) 
or the winning and defeated candidate (final presidential race) is smaller than the first quartile 
voting share of the margin of victory distribution over the sample of countries under 
consideration (i.e., 3.2 percentage points), and zero otherwise.23 In order to cross-check our 
results based on elections we conduct a placebo test with two binary variables Close election I 
placebo and Close election II placebo. They take the value of 1 randomly distributed over all 
years (1997 to 2016) based on the total count of close elections (as defined above) in the 
respective target country, and 0 otherwise. 
4.3.2.3 Control variables 
Extant literature provides evidence that cross-county differences in culture and institutions 
shape financial markets overall (e.g., Chui, Lloyd, & Kwok, 2002; Fidrmuc & Jacob, 2010; 
Hearn, 2015; La Porta et al., 1998, La Porta, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002) and venture capital as 
                                                 
22 For China, we count the National Congress of the Communist Party as Election, since it is the most important 
political event determining the national leadership and shaping the future economically and socially important 
Chinese five-year plan (Piotroski and Zhang, 2014). Considering our sample (1997 to 2016), it takes the value 
of 1 in a congress year (1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012), and zero otherwise. We apply the same logic for Hong 
Kong, accounting for the nomination years (2002, 2005, 2007, and 2012) of the Chief Executive, the head of the 
government in Hong Kong. 
23 For China and Hong Kong, we count all congress and Chief Executive nomination years as Close election I & 
II, since each event took only place four times in our sample period. 
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well as buyout markets in particular (e.g., Cao et al., 2015; Groh, Liechtenstein, & Lieser, 2010; 
Hammer et al, 2018; Holloway et al., 2016; Lerner & Schoar, 2005). Based on these research 
findings, we expect country factors, such as culture and the investment environment, to further 
affect likelihood of management buyouts. We control for relevant cross-country variations.  
A commonly used measure of cross-country cultural differences in venture capital and 
buyout literature (Cao et al. 2015; Dai & Nahata, 2016; Nahata, Hazarika, & Tandon, 2014) are 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede 1980; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). Current 
discussions in literature indicate that cultural orientation towards power distance tends to affect 
likelihood of MBOs/MBIs. First, power distance refers to the degree of which people assess 
unequal distribution of power and wealth to be functional for society (Hofstede, 1980). After 
an MBO and/or MBI, power and wealth are concentrated in the hands of few managers 
(Holderness & Sheehan, 1988). Second, individuals of societies with high power distance 
appreciate status, power, and prestige (Daniels & Greguras, 2014; Schwartz, 1999). Third, 
Mitchell, Smith, Seawright, and Morse (2000) find that power distance has a significantly 
positive correlation with entrepreneurial arrangements, e.g., having patents. We retrieve latest 
available national scores on power distance (Hofstede PDI) from Geert Hofstede’s website.24  
We employ three variables as indicators for the investment environment of the portfolio 
firm: Institutional quality index, Creditor rights index, and Shareholders’ minority rights. 
Firstly, empirical evidence suggests that the overall institutional quality (e.g., low levels of 
bureaucracy) is highly relevant for venture capital and buyout markets (Cumming, Fleming, & 
Schwienbacher, 2006; Cumming, Schmidt, & Walz, 2010; Groh et al., 2010). We construct the 
variable Institutional quality index based on scores from World Governance Index (WGI), as 
described in the previous section. Secondly, empirical evidence shows that creditor rights 
significantly influence both debt and buyout markets (Cao et al, 2015; Citron, Robbie, & 




Wright, 1997). Creditor rights help to mitigate this adverse selection problem through better 
debt claim protection (La Porta, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). Moreover, better creditor protection 
is associated with a higher credit supply, i.e., banks are more likely to provide capital (Djankov, 
McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2007; Houston, Lin, & Ma, 2010). We obtain data for Creditor rights 
index (Djankov et al., 2007) from Andrei Shleifer’s website.25 Thirdly, research shows that 
shareholder’s minority rights have a significant impact on risk taking/entrepreneurship 
(Bonfiglioli, 2012; John, Litov, & Yeung, 2008), family firm succession (Burkart, Panunzi, & 
Shleifer, 2003) as well as venture capital and buyout markets (Cao et a., 2015; Nahata et al., 
2014). If shareholders’ minority rights are insufficient, management could exploit their majority 
position after an MBO/MBI to expropriate the minority investor (La Porta et al., 1998, 2002; 
La Porta & Shleifer, 2006). We also obtain data for Shareholders’ minority rights (Djankov et 
al., 2008) from Andrei Shleifer’s website. It measures the legal protection of minority 
shareholders based on questionnaire results from 72 countries. 
As further control variables, we include the credit/GDP ratio (Credit to GDP) and the natural 
logarithm (log) of GDP per capita of the target country ((ln) GDP per capita). Thereby, we take 
into account effects of credit supply and economic power in the portfolio firm’s country. In 
addition, we control for two portfolio firm specific factors, portfolio firm’s M&A activity 
(Portfolio firm M&A) and natural log of deal value ((ln) Deal value). Portfolio firm M&A 
activity represents an indicator for growth orientation and professionalism of the portfolio firm. 
The variable is a dummy of 1 if the portfolio firm has acquired more than one firm before the 
respective MBO/MBI, 0 otherwise. We include the natural log of deal value to control for 
differences in portfolio firm’s size. We retrieve deal values for 6,835 LBOs from BvD’s ORBIS 
database. Deal values for the 11,390 LBOs with missing deal values are estimated using a 




Heckman two stage imputation model.26 Results of this underlying model are outlined in 
Appendix 4.A.2. Deal values are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentiles.  
Table 4.2 provides an overview with a description and sources of all variables used in this 
article. 
Table 4.2: Variable definitions 
This table describes construction details and sources of the dependent and independent variables as well as fixed 
effects used in this paper. 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Variable Description Source 
IBO LBO at which one or more private equity firms have acquired 
an equity stake of at least 50% in the portfolio company. 
Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
MBO/MBI 
 
LBO at which the existing management (MBO) and/or external 
managers (MBI) buy at least a 50% equity share of the portfolio 
company. In addition, the portfolio firm is backed by the capital 
of private equity sponsors as minority shareholders. 
Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
MBO LBO at which the existing management (MBO) buys at least a 
50% equity share of the portfolio company. In addition, the 
portfolio firm is backed by the capital of private equity sponsors 
as minority shareholders. 
Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
   
Panel B: Independent variables/fixed effects (FE) 




Index indicating a negative governance level in target country. 






Close election I Year, in which a close national election (national parliament or 
presidential election) took place in the respective target 
company's country. Close national election defined as margin of 
victory between largest and smallest party (parliamentary 
election) or between winner and loser in the final election round 
(presidential election) is smaller than 5%. Dummy of 1 if a close 
election took place, and 0 otherwise. 






Close election I 
placebo 
 
Placebo variable of close election I (see definition above). 
Dummy of 1 randomly distributed over all years (1997 to 2016) 
based on the total count of close elections in the respective target 





Year, in which a very close national election (national 
parliament or presidential election) took place in the respective 
target country. Very close national election defined as margin of 
victory between largest and smallest party (parliamentary 
election) or between winner and loser in the final election round 
(presidential election) is smaller than the first quartile voting 
share of the margin of victory distribution over the sample of 
countries under consideration (i.e., 3.2%). Dummy of 1 if a very 
close election took place, and 0 otherwise. 






                                                 
26 The model is named after the procedure outlined by Heckman (1979). We based the estimation on our original 
dataset of 18,992 LBOs (7,135 deals with and 11,857 deals without EV information) (see Appendix 4.A.2 for 






Placebo variable of close election II (see definition above). 
Dummy of 1 randomly distributed over all years (1997 to 2016) 
based on the total count of very close elections in the respective 
target company's country (see definition above), and 0 
otherwise. 
Random distribution 
Credit to GDP Total bank credit divided by national GDP (average of 





Index indicating creditor rights in target county. The index 
ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). 
It tests whether four creditor rights related criteria are satisfied 
in respective country and assigns a score for 1 for each 
requirement which is met. Creditor’s consent in the process, 
creditor’s ability to opt for possession, priority of secured credit, 
and debtors not automatically keeping administration rights. 






Entry type Classification of LBOs into the groups: Public-to-private, 
private-to-private, divisional, financial, privatization, 
receivership. 
Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
Election Year, in which a national election (national parliament or 
presidential election) took place in the respective target 
company's country. Dummy of 1 if an election took place, and 0 
otherwise. 






EPU Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) score of the target country 
(average score of the respective year). If the score for a specific 
country is not available, the broader global index is used. 
Baker et al. (2016) 
http://www.policyuncert
ainty.com 
Foreign PE Indicator for foreign PE involvement. Dummy of 1 if the 
respective LBO was solely backed by PE sponsors outside the 
target’s home country, and 0 otherwise. 
Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
GDP growth Annual GDP growth in local currencies in the target country in 
the year of the buyout. 
World Development 
Indicators 
Hofstede IDV Hofstede score of national level of "Individualism" (IDV). 
Individualism is defined as the extent to which countries focus 




Hofstede MAS Hofstede score of national level of "Masculinity" (MAS). 
Masculinity is defined as the extent to which countries prefer 





Hofstede PDI Hofstede score of national level of "Power distance" (PDI). 
Power distance is defined as the extent to which the less 
powerful members of institutions and organizations within a 




Hofstede UAI Hofstede score of national level of "Uncertainty avoidance" 
(UAI). Uncertainty avoidance is defined as the extent members 




Industry Industry classification based on Fama French 30 system. Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
Institutional 
quality index 
Index indicating the governance level in the target country. 
Average score of 6 governance dimensions (range from -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong)) of the portfolio firm country defined by 
Worldwide Governance Indicator of the World Bank 
(Accountability, Pol stability, Gov effectiveness, Reg quality, 





(ln) Deal value Natural logarithm of deal value in million USD. Deal value for 
11,390 transactions is imputed using Heckman two stage 
imputation model based on 7,123 transactions with deal value 
information. 
Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
(ln) GDP per 
capita 
Natural logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 







Indicator for growth orientation and professionalism of portfolio 
firm. Dummy of 1 if the portfolio firm acquired more than one 
firm before the respective MBO/MBI, and 0 otherwise. 




Index indicating level of legal protection of minority 
shareholders against expropriation in target country. The index 
was developed by Djankov et al. (2008) based on questionnaire 
results from 72 countries. It focuses on private enforcement 
mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that 
govern a specific self-dealing transaction. 






Sponsor Private equity company that is involved in backing the 
respective LBO. 
Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
Stock price 
volatility 
Average of the 360-day volatility of the national stock market 
index in target country in the year of the buyout. 




Target country Country in which the respective portfolio (target= company has 
its headquarters. 
Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
Year Year, in which the respective LBO took place. Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
We assume that beside the described variables, the vector xi needs to account for systematic 
differences in terms of industry of the portfolio firm, time, entry channel and PE sponsor. 
Therefore, we include fixed effect of the industry, deal year, entry type and lead sponsor into 
our model. To analyze the time varying dimension of EPU, we additionally apply country fixed 
effects.  
4.3.3 Summary statistics 
Table 4.3 provides summary statistics for independent variables. Panel A reports respective 
statistics for the total sample of 18,225 LBOs. We note an average deal size of USD $181 
million. In panel B and C, we split the sample into MBOs/MBIs (Panel B) and IBOs (Panel C). 
Consistent with Strömberg (2008), the table shows that MBOs/MBIs are on average smaller 
than IBOs in terms of deal value. While MBOs/MBIs have an average deal value of USD $51.8 
million, average deal value of IBOs is USD $200.0 million. EPU is on average higher (+17.8 
points) for the group of management-led buyouts. Looking at the control variables of 
investment environment, we note that shareholders’ minority rights are significantly higher in 
mean and median for MBOs/MBIs (mean values of 2.6 for MBOs/MBIs vs. 1.8 for IBOs and 
median values of 4.0 vs. 1.0). Creditor rights index is slightly higher for MBOs/MBIs than the 
one of IBOs in mean (0.7 vs. 0.6) and median (1.0 vs. 0.7). As the variables show relevant 
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correlations with each other (see the correlation matrix in Appendix 4.A.3), we refer to the 
results of the probit regression for statements on the impact of the respective variables on the 
MBO/MBI likelihood.  
Table 4.3: Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics. Variables represent independent variables used in base regression in section 
4.4.1. See 4.3.2.2 for specific variable definitions. Panel A shows the values of all LBOs. Panels B and C present 
summary statistics of the LBOs with equity stake of management above (Panel B) and below (Panel C) 50%. 
Panel A: Total sample 
    n Mean Median SD Min Max 
EPU  18,225 130.4 111.6 71.0 37.6 542.8 
Hofstede PDI  18,225 42.9 40.0 13.0 11.0 104.0 
Institutional quality index  18,225 1.4 1.4 0.4 -1.2 2.0 
Creditor rights index  18,225 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.2 1.0 
Shareholders’ minority rights index  18,225 1.9 1.0 1.3 0.0 4.0 
Credit to GDP  18,225 142.7 152.0 46.7 7.1 233.2 
(ln) GDP per capita  18,225 10.6 10.7 0.4 6.7 11.4 
Portfolio firm M&A  18,225 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Deal value in mUSD  18,225 181 87 268 8 1,240 
Panel B: LBOs with equity stake of management >50% (MBOs, MBIs, MBO/Is) 
    n Mean Median SD Min Max 
        
EPU  2,332 145.9 114.9 101.6 37.6 542.8 
Hofstede PDI  2,332 43.1 35.0 13.7 11.0 104.0 
Institutional quality index  2,332 1.4 1.5 0.2 -0.7 2.0 
Creditor rights index  2,332 0.7 1.0 0.3 0.2 1.0 
Shareholders’ minority rights index  2,332 2.6 4.0 1.6 0.0 4.0 
Credit to GDP  2,332 130.4 130.7 37.0 14.0 206.3 
(ln) GDP per capita  2,332 10.6 10.6 0.2 7.5 11.4 
Portfolio firm M&A  2,332 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Deal value in mUSD  2,332 52 25 114 8 1,240 
Panel C: LBOs with equity stake of PE sponsors >50% (IBOs) 
    n Mean Median SD Min Max 
EPU            15,893  128.1 111.6 65.0 37.6 542.8 
Hofstede PDI            15,893  42.8 40.0 12.8 11.0 104.0 
Institutional quality index            15,893  1.4 1.4 0.4 -1.2 2.0 
Creditor rights index            15,893  0.6 0.7 0.2 0.2 1.0 
Shareholders’ minority rights index            15,893  1.8 1.0 1.2 0.0 4.0 
Credit to GDP            15,893  144.5 161.7 47.7 7.1 233.2 
(ln) GDP per capita            15,893  10.6 10.8 0.5 6.7 11.4 
Portfolio firm M&A            15,893  0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Deal value in mUSD            15,893  200 100 279 8 1,240 
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4.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.4.1 Economic Policy Uncertainty and MBO/MBI propensity 
Table 4.4 reports estimation results for our baseline probit regressions. They investigate how 
EPU and other institutional variables affect the likelihood of MBOs/MBIs relative to IBOs. In 
regression 1, we first separately introduce our main independent variable of interest, EPU, 
beside relevant control variables. This allows to understand EPU’s individual impact without 
being affected by other institutional country characteristics. In later regressions 2 to 4, we 
include variables on cultural orientation and the investment environment. We simultaneously 
include all five variables in regression model 4, as we assume that variations of MBO/MBI 
likelihood between countries are driven by an interplay of institutional determinants. Variance 
inflation test shows that scores for all variables are below 5, indicating no serious problem of 
multicollinearity. Results show that the national EPU score is significantly positively (p<0.01) 
associated with the probability of an MBO/MBI relative to an IBO in all four regressions. 
Results are consistent with hypothesis 1 that management buyouts are more likely in times of 
higher Economic Policy Uncertainty. Practically, we note that a one standard deviation higher 
EPU score than mean (of 71 points) corresponds to a 2.6 percentage points higher MBO 
likelihood.27 MBO/MBI likelihood would increase by 21 percent from 12.4 to 15.0 percent. In 
regressions 5, we introduce target country fixed effects, i.e., control for systematic differences 
between countries to stronger focus on time-series differences in the national EPU score. 
Coefficient of EPU is significantly positive in regression 5, which further supports our notion.  
Table 4.4: Determinants of MBO/MBIs – Base regression 
The table presents results of probit regressions on the determinants of MBOs/MBIs relative to IBOs (deals at which 
PE sponsors have the majority equity share). The sample comprises 18,225 worldwide LBOs from 1997 to 2016. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if the LBOs is an MBO, MBI or MBO/I, i.e., 
management holds more than a 50% equity stake in the PE backed deal. The independent variables include scores 
of Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) as well as country-specific variables (Hofstede’s PDI index, institutional 
quality index, creditor rights index, shareholders’ minority rights index, credit to GDP, logarithm of GDP per 
capita) of the target country. Moreover, regressions include variables for logarithm of deal volume and a dummy 
for portfolio firm's M&A activity. We control for industry, year, entry type and sponsor (columns 1 to 4) and 
                                                 
27 For example, EPU scores in the US increased by 60 points from 2007 to 2008, the year of Lehman’s bankruptcy. 
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additionally target country fixed effects (column 5). We use robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Dummy = 1 if MBO/MBI, 0 if IBO 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
EPU 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.001 ***  
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Credit to GDP 0.000  0.001  -0.003 *** -0.001 * 
 
 














(ln) GDP per capita 0.345 *** 0.437 *** 0.293 ** 0.330 ** 
 
 














Portfolio firm M&A 0.064  0.070  0.052  0.065  0.032  












(ln) Deal value -0.757 *** -0.762 *** -0.746 *** -0.742 *** -0.761 *** 























Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Entry type FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sponsor FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Target Country FE No  No  No  No  Yes  
N 18,225  18,225  18,225  18,225  18,225  
Pseudo R² 0.49  0.49  0.50  0.50  0.52  
Moreover, regressions results indicate that Hofstede PDI, Institutional quality index and 
Shareholders’ minority rights index in the target country are positively related to the propensity 
of MBOs/MBIs relative to IBOs. For example, it implies that increasing the Institutional quality 
index from 0.6 (Italy) to 1.5 (United Kingdom) increases MBO probability by 5 percentage 
points. An increase of Shareholders’ minority rights by 0.6 points, which is equivalent to the 
difference between the UK and Germany, increases MBO probability by 5.2 percentage points. 
Interestingly, Creditor rights index has a negative (column 3) or balanced effect (column 4). 
One possible explanation for those results could be that stronger creditor rights may complicate 
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credit supply for management, i.e., increase the need for larger equity stakes of institutional 
investors.  
Looking at the other control variables, we see that (ln) GDP per capita is positively related 
to the MBO/MBI probability, indicating that managers tend to be more risk-taking in 
economically more developed nations. (Ln) deal value has a negative effect on MBO/MBI 
likelihood, which is consistent with existing literature (e.g., DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1987; 
Strömberg, 2008).28 National credit to GDP ratio (Credit to GDP) and portfolio firm’s M&A 
activity (Portfolio firm M&A) show a lower impact on the probability of an MBO/MBI. In sum, 
models 1-5 report a comparably high explained variability in the dependent variable with a 
pseudo R-squared between 0.49 and 0.52. Among others, the high R-squared results from the 
inclusion of fixed effects, as we control for a variety of effects (industry, year, entry type, PE 
sponsor, and target country).  
4.4.2 Information asymmetries and the effect of EPU on MBO/MBI propensity  
4.4.2.1 Insider vs. outsider driven management buyouts 
To test our hypothesis that the information advantage of managers is a relevant source for 
the higher propensity of MBOs/MBIs in politically uncertain time, we divide the group of 
MBOs/MBOs into two different sub-groups. The underlying idea is that the level of access to 
private information is not homogenous within the group of MBOs/MBIs. External managers, 
which acquire a majority equity stake in a portfolio company, likely have an information 
disadvantage compared to incumbent managers. Furthermore, external managers are likely less 
informed about portfolio firm internals. We re-run our base probit regression on the sub-sample 
of 2,332 MBOs/MBOs and apply MBOs (MBO) as the dependent variable. Accordingly, 
coefficients of independent variables indicate how their influence differs between MBOs and 
                                                 
28 In our sample, we do not see relevant variations of deal values between countries, e.g., mean deal value of top 
10 countries ranges +- 25% around total mean deal value of USD $181 million. Accordingly, we assume that 
our sample is not affected by distortions in sample selection in terms of deal size. 
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MBIs. In column 1, we show regression results for our base regression including the major 
control variables. Regression in column 2 adds target country fixed effects, thereby focuses on 
times series variations. Results are presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Buyout determinants – Differences between MBOs and MBIs 
The table presents results of probit regressions on the determinants of MBOs compared to MBIs. The sample 
comprises 2,332 MBO, MBI or MBO/I, i.e., management holds more than a 50% equity stake in the PE backed 
deal. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if the LBO is an MBO or MBO/I, and zero if 
the LBO is an MBI. Independent variables are consistent with variables applied in our base regression in Table 
4.4. We control for industry, year, entry type and sponsor (column 1) and additionally target country fixed effects 
(column 2). We use robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Dummy = 1 if MBO or MBO/I, 0 if MBI 
(1)  (2)  
EPU 0.002 ** 0.003  **  





Credit to GDP 0.006 *** 
 
 








(ln) GDP per capita 0.222  
 
 








Portfolio firm M&A 0.165  0.257  






(ln) Deal value 0.068  0.101  






        
Industry FE Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  
Entry type FE Yes  Yes  
Sponsor FE Yes  Yes  
Target Country FE No  Yes  
N 2,332  2,332  
Pseudo R² 0.37  0.40  
Table 4.5 shows that EPU has a statistically positive effect on insider driven MBOs 
compared to MBIs in both regressions. This implies that MBOs are more likely in times of 
higher uncertainty than MBIs. Practically, we note that a one standard deviation higher EPU 
score (of 101 points) than mean of all MBO/MBOs corresponds to a 3.0 percentage points 
higher MBO likelihood relative to all MBOs/MBIs.29 The described coefficient provides 
support for hypothesis 2 that access to private information is a relevant reason for the varying 
effect of EPU on deal propensity among the sub-groups. In general, it provides supports for the 
                                                 
29 Share of MBOs to all MBOs/MBIs would rise from 89.3 percent in EPU mean to 92.3 percent, when EPU 
increases by one standard deviation, ceteris paribus. 
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intuition that higher MBO/MBI likelihood relative to IBOs in times of uncertainty can be at 
least partially explained by differences in access to information. 
4.4.2.2 Foreign investors and MBO/MBI propensity 
In the following analyses, we extend the regression model and include the variable Foreign 
PE. Respective dummy variable is added to investigate, to what extent the influence of the 
country environment differs between partnerships with domestic and foreign PE firms. Results 
are presented in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6: Foreign investors and MBO/MBI propensity 
The table presents results of probit regression on the determinants of MBOs and MBIs relative to IBOs. The sample 
comprises 18,225 worldwide LBOs from 1997 to 2016. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals 
one if the LBOs is an MBO, MBI or MBO/I, i.e., management holds more than a 50% equity stake in the PE 
backed deal. Beside variables tested in our base model in Table 4.4, we analyze the effect of the independent 
variable "Foreign PE", which takes on the value of 1, if the deal is solely backed by foreign PE sponsors, and 0 
otherwise. We control for industry, year, entry type and sponsor fixed effects. We use robust clustering of standard 
errors. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Dummy = 1 if MBO/MBI, 0 if IBO 
(1) (2) 
Foreign PE -0.221 *** 0.143  
 (0.06)  (0.12)  
 
    








     










Hofstede PDI 0.018 *** 0.018 ***  





Institutional quality index 0.523 *** 0.529 ***  





Creditor rights index 0.029  0.029   





Shareholders’ minority rights index 0.761 *** 0.780 ***  







Credit to GDP -0.002 ** -0.002 **  





(ln) GDP per capita 0.346 ** 0.344 **  





Portfolio firm M&A 0.071  0.071   





(ln) Deal value -0.741 *** -0.743 *** 






        
Industry FE Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  
Entry type FE Yes  Yes  
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Sponsor FE Yes  Yes  
N 18,225  18,225  
Pseudo R² 0.50  0.50  
Regression results in column 1 show that foreign investors have a significantly lower 
propensity to partner in an MBO/MBI compared to domestic PE firms. This result suggests that 
managers more likely cooperate with local PE partners, which is consistent with the findings of 
Liu and Maula (2016) for venture capital investments. This suggests that domestic PE firms are 
preferred owing to easier interactions within borders, and a better access to private information 
compared to foreign firms. In regression 2, we interact the binary variable Foreign PE with 
EPU. The interaction term EPU x Foreign PE shows a statistically significant negative 
coefficient. It indicates, that the propensity that an MBO/MBI is backed by a foreign PE firm 
is lower in times of higher uncertainty about local policies. Firstly, those results support our 
hypothesis 3, that domestic PE sponsors, backing an MBO/MBI, benefit more from their 
superior access to information than foreign PE sponsors in times of higher uncertainty. And 
secondly, results provide further support that differences in access to information tend to play 
a significant role when explaining the effect of EPU on buyout propensity.  
4.4.2.3 Information environment and MBO/MBI propensity 
To test the hypothesis that a poor information environment amplifies the effect of policy 
uncertainty on MBO/MBI propensity, we introduce the variable Bad information environment 
in our regression model.30 We interact respective variable with the variable EPU. We run probit 
regression first including main control variables, and secondly include relevant institutional 
variables to test robustness. Respective results are presented in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7: Information environment and MBO/MBI propensity 
The table presents results of probit regression on the determinants of MBOs and MBIs relative to IBOs. The sample 
comprises 18,225 worldwide LBOs from 1997 to 2016. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals 
one if the LBOs is an MBO, MBI or MBO/I, i.e., management holds more than a 50% equity stake in the PE 
backed deal. Beside variables tested in our base model in Table 4.4, we analyze the effect of the independent 
                                                 
30 Moreover, we apply the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index as an alternative indicator for the quality 
of information environment. Thereby, we orientate on Humphery-Jenner et al. (2017). Results including this 
indicator, we do not present for brevity, are consistent with the findings presented in Table 4.7. 
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variable "Bad information environment" (see Table 4.2 for variable definition). In regression 2, we replace control 
variable “Institutional quality index” with “Bad information environment”, as variables only differ in sign. We 
control for industry, year, entry type and sponsor fixed effects. We use robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dummy = 1 if MBO/MBI, 0 if IBO 
(1) (2) 
Bad information environment x EPU 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  
     
EPU 0.014 *** 0.013 ***  





Bad information environment -1.178 *** -1.424 ***  
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Creditor rights index 
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Shareholders’ minority rights index 
 
 0.841 *** 
 
 







Credit to GDP 0.000  -0.002  *   






(ln) GDP per capita 0.173  0.363 *** 






Portfolio firm M&A 0.058  0.063  






(ln) Deal value -0.754 *** -0.740 *** 






    
    
Industry FE Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  
Entry type FE Yes  Yes  
Sponsor FE Yes  Yes  
N 18,225  18,225  
Pseudo R² 0.49  0.50  
Results are consistent with our expectation. The interaction term Bad information environ-
ment x EPU shows a statistically positive coefficient in both regressions. Those results indicate 
that the impact of Economic Policy Uncertainty tends to be higher in a country with low 
governance standards. For example, an increase in Bad information environment by 0.8 points, 
which represents the difference between the US and Greece, implies a 10 percentage points 
higher likelihood of MBOs/MBIs, ceteris paribus. Our analysis supports hypothesis 4: The 
likelihood of MBOs and/or MBIs to be executed in an adverse environment is higher in times 
of higher uncertainty. The results represent a further example in support for our notion that 
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differences in access to information are key determinants for the propensity of different types 
of LBOs. 
4.4.3 Robustness 
The following section provides multiple robustness tests regarding base results as well as 
the argument that access to private information is a key driver for higher MBO/MBI likelihood 
in times of uncertainty. First, we re-run base analyses and replace EPU by the two variables, 
Stock price volatility and GDP growth. Thereby, we cross-validate the results using varying 
indicators of market uncertainty. For example, Baker et al. (2016), the pioneers of the EPU 
index, also cross-validated their results using implied stock market volatility. Moreover, 
existing literature shows that market uncertainty is negatively related to economic growth (e.g., 
Bernanke, 1983; Lensink, Bo, & Sterken, 1999). We present respective results in Table 4.8. 
Similar to the results for EPU, column 2 presents that yearly stock price volatility in the target 
country is positively related to the MBO/MBI propensity. Moreover, likelihood of a 
management buyout is lower in times and countries with higher economic growth. Respective 
results support our argumentation that management buyouts are more likely during non-growth 
years, which are likely uncertain times, as managers can better leverage on their superior 
information. 
Table 4.8: The influence of market uncertainty and market growth on MBO/MBI 
propensity 
The table presents results of probit regression on the determinants of MBOs and MBIs relative to IBOs (deals at 
which PE sponsors have the majority equity share). The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one 
if the LBO is an MBO, MBI or MBO/I, i.e., management holds more than a 50% equity stake in the PE backed 
deal. Beside independent variables which are tested in the base model (column 1), we include "Stock price 
volatility" (column 2) and "GDP growth" (column 3) (see Table 4.2 for variable definition). We control for 
industry, year, entry type and sponsor fixed effects. We use robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Dummy = 1 if MBO/MBI, 0 if IBO 
(1) (2) (3) 
EPU 0.003 ***   
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Shareholders’ minority rights index 0.824 *** 1.199 *** 1.221 ***  








Credit to GDP -0.001 * -0.002 *** -0.003 ***  







(ln) GDP per capita 0.330 ** 0.406 *** 0.370 ***  







Portfolio firm M&A 0.065  0.081  0.083   







(ln) Deal value -0.742 *** -0.751 *** -0.751 *** 








           
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  






Entry type FE Yes  Yes  Yes  







Pseudo R² 0.50  0.49  0.50  
Second, we address endogeneity concerns and replace EPU by the election specific variables 
Election, Close election I, and Close election II. We follow Bhattacharya et al. (2017), Julio 
and Yook (2016), and Sitorus (2018) in this approach, since elections provide a natural 
experimental framework for political influences. Close national elections are a purely 
exogenous approximation of policy uncertainty, since investors and managers can hardly 
influence their timing (Sitorus, 2018). We conduct two placebo tests for close elections with 
the binary variables Close election I placebo and Close election II placebo, in order to cross-
validate findings. We present respective results in Table 4.9. Similar to our base results (column 
1), we find that Close election I (column 3) and Close election II (column 5) are positively 
related to the MBO/MBI propensity. The effect is statistically more robust if we apply a stronger 
definition of close elections, namely Close Election II. Practically, we note that a close election 
year in the target company’s country corresponds to 12.6 percentage higher MBO likelihood 
for a close election and 16.2 percentage points higher MBO likelihood for a very close election, 
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compared to non-close or non-election years. The regression of Election as independent 
variable (column 2) presents an insignificant relationship to the MBO/MBI propensity. The 
placebo tests (columns 4 and 6) do also not show a significant relationship to the MBO/MBI 
propensity, as expected. Thus, the effect on MBO/MBI propensity is strongest for very close 
races (column 5), supporting our view that policy uncertainty increases in these respective 
years. These election findings are consistent when we limit the regression to including only 
“democratic” countries in our sample, which we do not present for brevity.31 In sum, respective 
results support our argumentation that management buyouts are more likely during uncertain 
times, as managers can better leverage on their superior information. 
Table 4.9: The influence of (close) elections on MBO/MBI propensity 
The table presents results of probit regression on the determinants of MBOs and MBIs relative to IBOs (deals at 
which PE sponsors have the majority equity share). The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one 
if the LBO is an MBO, MBI or MBO/I, i.e., management holds more than a 50% equity stake in the PE backed 
deal. Beside independent variables tested in the base model (column 1), we include further variables: "Election", 
"Close election I", "Close election I placebo", "Close election II", and "Close election II placebo" (columns 2 to 6, 
respectively) (see Table 4.2 for variable definition). We control for industry, year, entry type and sponsor fixed 
effects. We use robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
Dummy = 1 if MBO/MBI, 0 if IBO  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
EPU 0.003 *** 
      
 (0.00) 
      
 























             
Close election I 0.126 ** 
 
    
(0.05) 
    
        
Close election I placebo 
    
-0.058 
   
     
(0.05) 
   
        
Close election II 
     
0.162 *** 
  
      
(0.06) 
  
        
Close election II placebo 
      
-0.077 
 
       
(0.06) 
 
        













             













        
                                                 
31 This approach follows Brender and Drazen (2013) as well as Sitorus (2018) including only the years in which 
the country has an above zero score in the POLITY IV level of democracy index (retrieved from the Center of 
Systematic Peace webpage: https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). This results in excluding China, 
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Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Entry type FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  













Pseudo R² 0.50  0.49  0.49  0.49  0.49  0.49  
Third, we re-run our base regression on a sub-sample excluding the 25 percent of LBOs with 
the smallest deal size. Results for the reduced sample should investigate whether our main 
findings are not biased by the intuition that LBOs are generally smaller in times of higher 
uncertainty. Results for the sub-sample regression present that coefficient of the variable EPU 
stays significantly positive (p<0.01) using our base regression from Table 4.4. Results are 
reported in Appendix 4.A.4. Consistently, the sub-sample regression indicates that our 
inference on the positive effect of EPU and MBO/MBI likelihood is not largely driven by 
difference in size between MBOs/MBOs and IBOs. 
Finally, we test whether the inclusion of other cultural dimensions of Hofstede affects our 
results. Similar to Cao et al. (2015) who analyze determinants of cross-border LBOs, we include 
power distance (PDI) in our base model for the reasons explained in 4.3.2.3. However, other 
cultural dimensions may affect the findings presented in our base model. Therefore, we 
introduce Hofstede’s indices of Individualism (IDV), Masculinity (MAS) and Uncertainty 
Avoidance (UAI) into an extended model. The results are reported in Appendix 4.A.5. It shows 
that EPU does not change sign and statistical significance is on a 1% level. Comparing the 
cultural dimensions, we note that power distance has the strongest economic impact on the 
  
131 
MBO likelihood, which is in line with the arguments provided in literature. Results are 
consistent when we replace Hofstede’s dimension power distance by the alternative cultural 
definition of “Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism” from Schwartz (1994) that we do not present for 
brevity. 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is the first large-scale investigation of international LBOs that links the likelihood 
of management buyouts to cross-country and time differences in Economic Policy Uncertainty. 
Using this analysis, we address the investment puzzle why management buyouts frequently 
occur in volatile phases, contradicting standard market behavior (Ahsan & Musteen, 2011; 
Baker, Bloom, & Davis, 2016; Bloom, Bond, & van Reenen, 2007; Bloom, 2009; Delios & 
Henisz, 2003). 
Our sample comprises 18,225 private equity backed buyouts between 1997 and 2016 across 
52 countries (covering 90% of the world’s current GDP), thereof 2,332 MBOs, MBIs and 
MBO/Is. We find that the probability for a buyout with majority shareholding of management 
(MBO/MBI) is significantly higher in times of higher uncertainty about national economic 
policies. This positive relationship holds after accounting for sustainable cross-country 
differences, such as in culture, institutional quality, creditor rights, and shareholders’ minority 
rights.  
Additional analyses provide support for our intuition, that higher MBO/MBI propensity in 
relation to IBOs in more uncertain times can be at least partially explained by the better access 
to information of managers. We perform three analyses to investigate the effect of information 
availability on buyout likelihood. Firstly, we show that likelihood of insider driven management 
buyouts (MBOs) is increasing with higher EPU compared to outsider driven management 
buyouts (MBIs). Following our reasoning, we assume that management employed within the 
firm can better leverage private information when uncertainty is high. Secondly, we present that 
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domestic PE backed MBOs/MBIs are more likely compared to foreign PE backed MBOs/MBIs 
when uncertainty is high. Thirdly, we investigate the impact of uncertainty in an adverse 
information environment. Our results show that an environment of lower governance 
requirements significantly strengthens the positive relationship of EPU on MBO/MBI 
propensity. Our findings continue to hold after replacing EPU for alternative volatility 
measures, namely stock price volatility and (negative) GDP growth. Furthermore, we address 
endogeneity concerns through replacing EPU with an exogenous variable covering close 
national elections in the respective entry year.  
Our results contribute to the research strand of determinants of management buyouts and to 
the literature on Economic Policy Uncertainty. Results uncover that beside portfolio firm and 
general country characteristics also market uncertainty is a relevant factor for management’s 
propensity to perform a buyout. Specifically, those findings provide further insights on the 
interplay between information availability and entrepreneurial activity in times of higher 
uncertainty. 
Our study indicates opportunities for future research of the two strands of management 
buyout research, namely pre-deal characteristics and post-deal characteristics (see Appendix 
4.A.1 for an overview of previous research). First, analyzing differences in deal pricing of 
different buyout types with regards to uncertainty could explain whether EPU fosters the 
systematic undervaluation of MBOs, which Renneboog et al. (2007) identified. Second, 
differences in post-deal performance between MBOs and/or MBIs and IBOs (applying the 50 
percent threshold of our study) could clarify whether the greater managerial discretion translates 
to superior performance. Analyzing post-deal performance even further with regards to 






4.A.1 Literature overview management buyouts and management buyins 
Panel A: Pre-deal characteristics of management buyouts/buyins  
Article Sample Dependent variables Key findings 











IBO & Non-IBO 
likelihood 
Non-IBO likelihood increases if 
target assets, cash flows, liquidity 
ratio, sales growth, interest 
coverage, and individual 
ownership are lower, as well as if 
firm age, leverage, earnings 
volatility, capital investments, and 
undervaluation is higher 







1989 - 2004 
MBO/I definition: 
Mgmt. leads or 
participates 
Cox hazard model: Time 
to private for certain 
variables: Analyst cover-
age, Trading volume, 
Sales, Leverage, Market-
to-book ratio, R&D/Sales 
ratio, Dividend payout, 
Free cash flow, Cash/ 
Assets ratio, Net fixed 
assets/Assets ratio, M&A 
experience 
MBOs have a lower analyst 
coverage, trading volume, sales, 
leverage, CapEx/Sales ratio, 
dividend payout, free cash flow, 
M&A experience as well as a 
higher undervaluation, R&D/sales 
ratio, cash/assets ratio, net fixed 
assets/assets ratio 
n.a. 





2000 - 2009 
MBO/I definition: 
Mgmt. leads or 
participates 
MBO likelihood Selling expense/sales ratio, 
market volatility and the financial 
crisis have a significantly positive 
impact, total assets and overall 
M&A activity a significant 
negative impact on the MBO 
likelihood. 
n.a. 
Chen, Kim, and 
Marcus (2011) 
147 MBOs  
US 
Public-to-privates  
1994 - 2006 
MBO definition: 
Mgmt. leads or 
participates 
PREM (% increase of 
final transaction price 




Stock ownership of buyout 
managers is negatively associated 
with buyout premium, whereas 
their option ownership is not, 
implying that managers leverage 
asymmetric information at the 




64 MBOs  
US 
Public-to-privates  
1973 - 1982 
MBO definition: 
Mgmt. leads 
Accrual changes, Earnings 
changes, Cash flow 
changes standardized by 
Total assets 
Managers of MBO targets do not 
significantly manage earnings 
prior to a buyout, implying ma-
nagers trying to avoid potential 
charges from improved share-





64 MBOs  
(31 pure MBOs) 
US 
Public-to-privates  




Total sales, Total Assets, 
Market Value, Book 
Value, LT Debt/Assets, 
Market Value to Net 
Tangible Book Value, 
Management stake 
LBOs are significantly larger than 
pure MBOs in all size measures, 
implying that PE 
reputation/expertise can help 
raising funds. Pure MBOs with 
higher post-deal management 







and van Dijk 
(2013) 
170 LBOs  
(54 pure MBOs) 
UK 
Public-to-privates  






MBO likelihood compared to PE-
backed buyouts increases 
significantly, when under-valu-
ation (market-to-book ratio), cash 
position, and current mgmt. stake 
are higher, as well as when the 
profitability (ROA) and trading 





470 MBOs  
US 
Public-to-privates  
1980 - 2014 
MBO definition: 




Managers of MBO targets achieve 
significant alphas of 1% per 
month and announce deals during 
low industry profitability, 
implying that managers leverage 
asymmetric information at the 








1997 - 2007 
MBO definition: 
≥ 1 incumbent 
manager stays  
Accrual and real earnings Managers of MBO targets 
perform significantly negative 
earnings mgmt., managers of IBO 
targets perform no/modest 
negative earnings mgmt., and 
managers of non-buyout firms 







1981 - 1988 
MBO definition: 
Mgmt. participates  
Abnormal accruals Managers of MBO targets 
perform significantly negative 
earnings mgmt., even if there is no 
hint of potential negative accruals 















Correlation between pre-buyout 
undervaluation and expected 
shareholder gains for all buyouts. 
The effect is stronger for MBOs & 
IBOs, than for MBIs, implying 
that incumbent managers exploit 





63 MBOs (US) 
92 MBOs (UK) 
US & UK 
US: 1981 - 1988 
UK: 1997 - 2002 
Mixed deal type 
MBO definition: 
Significant stake 
Discretionary Accruals Managers of MBO targets 
perform negative earnings mgmt. 
prior to a buyout. US executives 
manage earnings more, even 
though institutions (accounting 
rules) are very similar, implying 
that culture potentially is another 
important explanatory factor. 
Yes 
Panel B: Post-deal behavior of management buyouts/buyins  





1,014 MBOs,  
336 MBIs 
UK 
Mixed deal type 





MBO (MBI) targets with 
significantly higher (lower) 
employment growth compared to 
non-buyout peers. Both MBO/ 
MBIs with negative effect on 






2 case studies 
The Netherlands 
VC-backed MBOs 









MBO targets act more entrepre-
neurial post-buyout. VC funds 
contribute through a spillover of 
market knowledge and through 






Mixed deal type 
1988 - 1994 
MBO/I definition: 
LBO synonym 
Return on equity, Return 
on assets, Leverage, 
Current & Quick ratio, 
EBIT/Profit & Cash flow 
margin 
MBO targets experience a fall in 
return on equity & assets and 
margin ratios post-buyout. At the 
same time, leverage increases and 





and van Dijk 
(2013) 
170 LBOs  
(54 pure MBOs) 
UK 
Public-to-privates  




Return on Assets, Sales 
Margin, Profit growth, 
Sales growth, Leverage 
 
MBO targets with better ROA and 
lower leverage development after 
buyout than PE-backed Going-
privates, whereas sales growth, 
sales margin, and profit growth do 
not differ significantly between 











1981 - 1986 
MBO/I definition: 
Significant stake 
Exit channel (public, 
private, M&A) 
Buyouts with a “high managerial 
equity” (i.e., MBOs) tend to 
remain private after Public-to-






PE holds majority 
n.a. (theoretical model) MBO have a higher innovation 
intensity post-buyout owing to the 
higher risk affinity of the new 
shareholders (PE funds) 
+ 
Kaplan (1989) 76 MBOs 
US 
Public-to-privates 
1980 - 1986 
MBO/I definition: 
LBO synonym 
EBITDA, Capex, Net cash 
flow 
MBO targets increase in EBITDA 
and net cash flow and decreases in 







Mixed deal type 
1977 - 1986 
MBO/I definition: 
Significant stake 
Sales & Operating profit 
development 
MBI targets with lower than 
expected performance and larger 
propensity ending in receivership, 
implying higher information 












1994 - 2003 
MBO/I definition: 
Significant stake 
Post-buyout strategy MBO/MBI targets experience a 
strategy shift towards efficiency 
improvement and future growth/ 
expansion post-buyout. Stronger 
focus on growth if founder is 
involved. 
n.a. 
Singh (1990) 65 MBOs 
US 
Public-to-privates 
1980 - 1987 
MBO/I definition: 
LBO synonym 
Sales, Days inventory, 
Accounts receivable, 
Current ratio, EBIT 
margin 
MBO targets grow faster in 
revenues and show better 
performance in working capital 
management and EBIT margin 





Smith (1990a) 58 MBOs 
US 
Public-to-privates 
1977 - 1986 
MBO/I definition: 
LBO synonym 
Return on assets, Return 
per employee, Working 
capital, Capex/Sales, 
R&D expenses/Sales 
MBO targets improve operating 
returns (on assets and employees) 
post-buyout. Improvements are 







158 MBOs,  
UK 
Mixed deal type 
1983 - 1986 
MBO/I definition: 
Significant stake 
Short-term and long-term 
survival (no receiver-ship, 
liquidation, sell-off) 
MBO targets with significant 
short-term performance improve-
ments. Heterogeneous long-term 
effect, with main influencing 
factors: size and institutions 








Mixed deal type 
1982 - 1984 
MBO/I definition: 
Significant stake 
Return on assets, Return 
on equity, Profit per 
employee, Current & 
Quick ratio 
MBO targets improve perfor-
mance not only right after the 
buyout, but also in the long term 






4.A.2 Heckman imputation model 
This table presents estimates from a Heckman (1979) maximum likelihood estimation that is used to impute 
deal enterprise values for observations without disclosed deal value. The sample comprises 18,992 worldwide 
LBOs from 1997 to 2016 (including 767 deals that were later excluded due to missing country variables of 
interest). The dependent variable for the first stage probit regression is an indicator variable equal to one if 
we observe a deal value for the respective buyout and zero otherwise. The dependent variable for the second 
stage OLS regression is the natural logarithm of the disclosed deal enterprise value. The second stage controls 
for the inverse Mills ratio, obtained from the first stage, to account for non-random deal value observability 
and is used to predict deal values for observations with missing information. Procedure and variables are 
analogous to Strömberg (2008) and Arcot, Fluck, Gaspar, and Hege (2015). Variable specifically constructed 
for the regressions in this table: Sponsor with >20 deals, an indicator variable equal to one if the PE sponsor 
has made more than 20 deals before the buyout; indicator variables equal to one if the buyout occurs in Asia, 
Australia, Continental Europe, Canada, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Scandinavia, UK and US with the 
omitted category being Africa & Middle East; as well as indicator variables equal to one for buyouts in the 
years 1997-2000 (dot-com), 2001-2004 (post dot-com), 2005-2008 (buyout growth), and 2009-2012 (post-
financial crisis) with buyouts in 2013-2016 being the omitted category. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Statistical significance is represented at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level. 
        
 
LN (Deal EV)  Deal value yes/no 
  Coeff. S.E. Sign.   Coeff. S.E. Sign. 
        
Private-to-private -0.830 (0.06) ***  -0.581 (0.03) *** 
Divisional -0.089 (0.05) *  0.127 (0.03) *** 
Financial 0.440 (0.05) ***  -0.042 (0.03)  
Privatization 0.844 (0.27) ***  0.802 (0.23) *** 
Receivership -0.861 (0.13) ***  0.051 (0.09)  
MBO/MBI -1.030 (0.05) ***  -0.357 (0.03) *** 
Syndicated transaction 0.430 (0.05) ***  0.243 (0.03) *** 
Sponsor with >20 deals 0.949 (0.04) ***  0.374 (0.02) *** 
Asia 0.202 (0.13)   0.488 (0.09) *** 
Australia/Oceania 0.514 (0.15) ***  0.302 (0.10) *** 
Central Europe 0.228 (0.12) *  -0.634 (0.08) *** 
Canada 0.186 (0.17)   -0.450 (0.10) *** 
Eastern Europe -0.609 (0.16) ***  -0.295 (0.10) *** 
Latin America 0.762 (0.18) ***  -0.087 (0.11)  
Scandinavia -0.068 (0.14)   -0.679 (0.08) *** 
UK 0.062 (0.12)   0.169 (0.08) ** 
USA 0.690 (0.12) ***  -0.746 (0.08) *** 
LBO 1997 - 2000 (dotcom) -0.231 (0.07) ***  0.615 (0.05) *** 
LBO 2001 - 2004 (post-dotcom) -0.106 (0.06) *  0.707 (0.04) *** 
LBO 2005 - 2008 (buyout peak) 0.166 (0.05) ***  0.499 (0.03) *** 
LBO 2009 - 2012 (post-fin. crisis) -0.103 (0.05) **  0.046 (0.03) * 
λ 0.200 (0.07)      
        
               
Industry FE Yes    Yes   
Constant Yes    Yes   





4.A.3 Correlation matrix – Base regression 
Correlation statistics for country-related independent variables used in our base regression (see Table 4.4). Further 
correlation matrices are available on request. N = 18,225 LBOs in sample 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 




0.064 1.000        




0.160 -0.426 0.132 1.000      
(5) EPU 0.150 -0.287 0.137 0.406 1.000     
(6) Credit to GDP -0.073 -0.425 0.357 -0.144 0.493 1.000    
(7) (ln) GDP per capita -0.013 -0.543 0.799 -0.117 0.035 0.466 1.000   
(8) Portfolio firm M&A -0.044 -0.028 0.039 -0.018 0.019 0.043 0.034 1.000  
(9) (ln) Deal value -0.103 -0.058 0.062 -0.172 -0.010 0.222 0.150 0.247 1.000 
 
 
4.A.4 Sub-sample regression – Base results excl. 25% deals with lowest deal size  
The table presents results of probit regressions on the determinants of MBOs/MBIs relative to IBOs with a sub-
sample of the analysis in Table 4.4 in order to check for robustness. The sample comprises 13,669 worldwide 
LBOs from 1997 to 2016 excluding the 25% smallest transactions of the full sample (18,225 deals) with respect 
to deal size (Enterprise Values). The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if the LBOs is an 
MBO, MBI or MBO/I, i.e., management holds more than a 50% equity stake in the PE backed deal. Independent 
variables are consistent with variables used in regression 1 of Table 4.4. We control for industry, year, entry type 
and sponsor fixed effects. We use robust clustering of standard errors. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dummy = 1 if 
MBO/MBI, 0 if IBO 
(1)  




Credit to GDP 0.002  ** 




(ln) GDP per capita -0.046  




Portfolio firm M&A 0.050  




(ln) Deal value -0.647 *** 




     
Industry FE Yes  
Year FE Yes  
Entry type FE Yes  
Sponsor FE Yes  
N 13,669  
Pseudo R² 0.46  
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4.A.5 Effect of different Hofstede dimensions on MBO/MBIs determinants 
The table presents results of probit regressions on the determinants of MBOs/MBIs relative to IBOs (deals at which 
PE sponsors have the majority equity share). The sample comprises 18,225 worldwide LBOs from 1997 to 2016. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if the LBOs is an MBO, MBI or MBO/I, i.e., 
management holds more than a 50% equity stake in the PE backed deal. Beside independent variables which are 
tested in the base model (see Table 4.4), we include 3 further Hofstede dimensions (masculinity, individualism 
and uncertainty avoidance) combined in column 2 (see Table 4.2 for variable definition). Column 1 shows results 
from our base model. We control for industry, year, entry type and sponsor fixed effects. We use robust clustering 
of standard errors. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) Base model 
(2) Extended model incl. 
Hofstede dimensions 
EPU 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  
 
 
    
Hofstede PDI 0.018 *** 0.022 ***  











     








     
Hofstede UAI  
 





     
Institutional quality index 0.551 *** 0.677 ***  





Creditor rights index 0.030  0.085 *** 






Shareholders’ minority rights index 0.824 *** 0.590 *** 






Credit to GDP -0.001 ** -0.001  






(ln) GDP per capita 0.330 ** 0.127  






Portfolio firm M&A 0.065  0.053  






(ln) Deal value -0.742 *** -0.751 *** 






        
Industry FE Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  
Entry type FE Yes  Yes  
Sponsor FE Yes  Yes  
N 18,225  18,225  
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